The Baroque Idea: Lacan contra Deleuze, and Žižek’s Unwritten Book!

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As someone recently noticed, I am situated (je me range) – who situates me? is it him or is it me? that’s a subtlety of llangauge – I am situated essentially on the side of the baroque.

Jacques Lacan, Seminar XX

Prologue

Who forgot to notice that Lacan is situated on the side of the baroque? Who ignored this proclamation by Lacan? Many. Including Slavoj Žižek. What does it mean that Lacan is situated on the side of the baroque? Should we all follow the Master and situate ourselves on the side of the baroque? Does it matter to be on that side? In this essay I want to interrogate this matter and its forgetfulness.
Filing a Complaint

In late twentieth century two entirely distinct complex ideas about the notion of the
baroque emerged. In their significance they are equal to the first occasion in the early
twentieth century when Walter Benjamin wrote his treatise on the baroque.\(^1\) Of the later
two, one is by the philosopher, Gilles Deleuze – who makes a brief reference to Benjamin
and pays tribute to him for the “allegorical” understanding of the historical Baroque. And
the other is by Jacques Lacan – who would not mention Benjamin, as the style of his
“Écrits” would not require such “scholarly” references, which was typical of his detractor,
Deleuze. The philosopher’s interpretation of the baroque is an instance of his anti-
Lacanian position. While in contemporary theory Deleuze’s idea on the baroque has been
widely publicized and advertised, that of Lacan’s, in contrast, has remained unanalyzed
and almost entirely ignored. Deleuze put his ideas on the subject in his treatise, The Fold:
Leibniz and the Baroque, the original French version of which came out in 1988,\(^2\) whereas
Lacan’s discussion of the topic was confined to a single Session in his late Seminar,
Seminar XX, published in 1975.\(^3\) This absence of Lacan in contemporary debate on the
idea of baroque is disconcerting. In Slavoj Žižek’s Organs Without Bodies, On Deleuze
and Consequences, a book devoted to the critique of Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy, one
cannot find any reference to The Fold. This is a book deemed to be important enough by
Alain Badiou, who otherwise defines his own philosophical work in confrontation with
Deleuze’s, to prompt him to write a sympathetic commentary on it and calling it “admirable”
(Badiou 1994), and later, to devote a chapter to its analysis in his Deleuze: The Clamor of
Being, in which he said: “I was impressed and fascinated by the book.” (Badiou 2000: 4). It
is peculiar that Žižek who based his critique of Deleuze on Badiou’s Clamor of Being,
should have ignored altogether to discuss this later book of Deleuze and the question of
the Baroque, all the while when The Fold has had the good fortune to be referenced as the
ur-text whenever the concept of baroque comes up in contemporary philosophical, artistic,
literary and architectural circles. This text is considered to be in continuity with the early
great philosophic works by Deleuze that Žižek has told us to be sympathetic to as opposed
to those middle books that the philosopher coauthored with Félix Guattari. Strangely
enough, nobody took the trouble to examine the exposition of the baroque by Lacan, which
had appeared long before Deleuze wrote his book. But more importantly, its conspicuous
absence in Žižek’s work is noticeable and a cause for a major concern – for several
reasons.
First of all, the treatment of this text would have served Žižek for another purpose at hand in taking Deleuze to task for yet another problematic topic, the “baroque” (along with that of “Body Without Organ”), that could have been an occasion to confront the philosopher for his anti-Lacanian stand in interpretation of the baroque, which is radically and diametrically opposed to the philosopher’s exposition of it. This omission matters because the absence of a direct discussion of the idea of baroque and its singular interpretation by Lacan constitutes, if I may exaggerate it a bit, a lacuna in Žižek’s work. Why? Partly because that at least four major concepts in Lacan, mainly, “jouissance,” “anamorphic,” “sublimation,” and the “Gaze” may be considered to emanate from the idea of baroque and are embedded in its concept, let alone Lacan’s discussion on Science and the Unconscious. Moreover, it must be emphatically said here that at least for these four concepts, we owe it to Žižek before anybody else for having given us the very first original ground-breaking interpretations and for their extensions from the clinical experience to its outside for cultural, art and political analysis. We should note here that Žižek’s recent adoption of the notion of “parallax” in The Parallax View, which he took from the great work of Kojin Karatani, is also a concept that ultimately is related to the baroque idea of “anamorphic perspective,” which is in fact an extension of the idea that Lacan expounded and Žižek repeatedly used in his previous books. Now, I take that this omission of the word “baroque” and its absence in Žižek is part of a larger absence in almost all of the large volumes of interpretative works so far we have on Lacanian theory. It seems that a disquieting silence surrounds Lacan’s idea of the baroque. If I paranoiacly dramatize it, it amounts to an intellectual conspiracy to remain silent as if everybody has secretly taken the Fifth Amendment! (“You have the right to remain silent!”), without appearing in the court of law! But let us first see what could possibly be the reasons for this silence.

Lacan devoted the Session May 8, 1973, in his Seminar XX, Encore, to “On the Baroque” (Lacan: 1998) It seems that critics and commentators who have been analyzing Lacanian terms, specially those mentioned above, keep discussing them while having a fear that if they directly touched the “baroque question” in Lacan they might inadvertently fall into a black hole. Is this fear the primordial dimension of horror vacui, the fear of empty space that they sense in baroque space? Or, is it of a political matter because they are afraid that any direct discussion of the “baroque” would put them automatically (with Lacan) in the camp of “conservatives”? What possibly are they thinking? Are they thinking that it would be utterly “perverse” if they defend the idea of the baroque in archaeology of the secular modernity because it is linked to Counter-Reformation and political Absolutism
attached to the baroque cultural themes, as opposed to the “Protestant Ethic,” which Max Weber identified with the origin of modern secular society and the ideology of liberal-democratic-industrial capitalism. Of course, Lacan did not have such “fear,” and for that matter, neither Deleuze who deployed Leibniz for his “The Baroque House,” knowing well that Leibniz in standard interpretation is considered as a philosopher who cynically justified absolutism and centralized power. Neither has Žižek, for that matter. But Lacan precisely identified himself with this “perverse” side of the culture of modernity when in his Seminar XX he categorically stated, “I am telling you all that precisely because I just got back from the museums, and because the Counter-Reformation was ultimately a return to the sources and the baroque the parading thereof.” (Lacan 1998: 116) Are not the so-called “Lacanian Left” entitled to the Master’s alleged “conservatism”? Where is the demarcation line to be drawn here? In this respect, why would Žižek have any fear, for that matter, against all those commentators of Lacan who profess to be on the Left, to deploy the very ideas that these other writers associate with conservative camp? In fact, he does not – and rightly so. For this very reason, he is accused of being contaminated by conservative, if not reactionary, ideas by some of his critics. And this is my justified reason to file my complaint against nobody else but Žižek who has not taken up – or not yet – to write about the idea of baroque in Lacan to confront Deleuze’s interpretation. And, I would beg him not to take the Fifth Amendment! Although I would imagine that he would still says he is entitled to it! Just as I imagine that he would plead “not guilty,” or use the optional plea of nolo contendere (= “I am not saying that I’m guilty or innocent; I’m just not contesting the charge!”), if this case comes up in front of a judge! So let me prepare my case against this formidable contender in order to present a believable argument beyond a reasonable doubt!

Raising Questions

We must be fair and reasonable to Žižek. There are omissions all over, of a direct or any discussion of the baroque idea in the vast literatures on Lacan where it should have been appeared. Let me list the major ones here. In the index of the book devoted to Reading of the Seminar XX, no entry under “baroque” appears. None of the fine essays in this anthology makes any specific reference to the Session “On the Baroque” in Seminar XX (Session of May 8, 1973) that may be considered a major contribution to the history of the idea of baroque in twentieth century. In commentaries on the earlier Seminar VII, Ethics of
Psychoanalysis, nowhere we find any specific or significant reference to the role of “anamorphic perspective,” originated in the historical Baroque period, as the context for Lacan’s analysis of Jouissance. In a recent fine book devoted to a comprehensive reading of this Seminar by Marc de Kesel\(^9\), there is not a separate discussion of the section, titled “Marginal Comments,” in Lacan’s Seminar which was the topic of Session February 3, 1960, where Lacan sheds lights on the idea of “emptiness,” “sublimation” and “perspective” in connection to his early discussion of “anamorphosis” as an “exemplary structure,” and as the “geometrical field of vision,” in Hans Holbein’s famous painting, The Ambassadors, which he will take up again in Seminar XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. The context of the above concepts, as I said above, should be really traced originally to the notion of the baroque. While a whole book has been devoted to Lacan’s “Medievalism,”\(^10\) there is not yet a single article devoted to Lacan’s “baroquism” (Lacan’s own neologism). When Bruce Fink (the translator of Seminar XX) in his excellent book, Lacan to the Letter, discussed the Session on “Love and the Signifier” in Seminar XX, in which Lacan contrasts Kepler to Copernicus and discussing that the former evidently problematized the notion of “center” by the introduction of ellipse – that is the baroque idea par excellence – Fink did not care to discuss Lacan’s session “On the Baroque.” In the book devoted to the Reading of the Seminar XI, Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,\(^11\) again, there is no entry under “baroque” in the index and no reference to the name of Jurgis Baltrusaitis, the author of the famous Anamorphoses, first edition of which published in 1955 to which Lacan refers as the authority on the subject. Lacan is indebted to this text for its comprehensive description of Holbein’s The Ambassadors, from which comes his theory of the “Gaze” as grounded in the idea of Renaissance “projective perspective” and its transformation in the seventeenth century into anamorphic perspective, constitutive aspects of the historical Baroque in art and architecture and the fundamental transformation in the mode of vision. Still, in none of the essays devoted to the Reading Seminar XI and dealing with the chapter “Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a,” is there any discussion of the baroque. I am making the assumption, if I am correct, that the notion of the baroque had already been present in Lacan’s thoughts when he first launched on the analysis of the “Gaze” and anamorphic perspective that ultimately was foregrounded in Seminar XX. I should mention here in passing that in the later French edition of his Anamorphoses published in 1996, Baltrusaitis added a section titled “Les Texts Modernes,” in which he acknowledged the psychoanalytical contribution to his topic and directly cited Lacan’s Seminar XI quoting extensively from it.\(^12\)
I must emphasize here that my interrogation of these absences and omissions is not based on any “scholarly” ground complaining about the “carelesness” of otherwise very capable and intellectually sharp Lacan’s commentators, but, rather, it is on the political ground. The question is: Which vision is related to the political ideology of modernity and its so-called conflicting “scopic regimes”? And more pointedly: Is the baroque culture, and its “culture industry,” not intimately linked to the discourse of Capitalism, or more precisely to the “Discourse of Capitalist” that Lacan expounded in his Seminar XVII and later added to his four fundamental discourses, those of the Master, Hysteric, University, and Analyst? Is there not an intimate relationship between the rise of the Baroque and the rise of secular capitalism? Should not the critique of secular capitalism pass through the critique of the Baroque and its “Theology”? Well, as we will see below, it is not for nothing that Lacan said that the baroque is the “little history” of Christ. Who else but Žižek (apart from Alain Badiou) has opened the fascinating and provocative discourse of Christianity in the critique of secular capitalism?

Žižek is the first and perhaps the only one to take up the notion of anamorphosis for radical political analysis, not to mention for artistic and filmic analysis, in “looking awry” at contemporary culture (in the book with the same title.) So, when he fails to articulate this concept in the context of the Lacan’s doctrine on the baroque, it becomes a matter of concern. As I said above, Lacan’s thought on baroque is the second most important idea in the twentieth century after Walter Benjamin’s historical analysis, outside the traditional art and literary history (Benjamin 1977). It is in this sense that Benjamin stands as a “silent partner” to Lacan. I am referring here to the excellent collection of essays, Lacan, The Silent Partners, that Žižek edited sometime ago. It is uncomfortably noticeable that when Deleuze published his essay Le Pli: Leibniz et le baroque in 1988, he made no reference to Lacan’s Seminar XX or to the Session “On the Baroque,” which had already been published in 1975 in its original French version. Instead, he chose to mentioned Lacan in a rather disparaging manner and indirectly in a footnote, in order to dismiss him and only in connection to the context of his citation of Christine Buci-Glucksmann’s La folie du voir, De l’esthetique baroque. About this text, Deleuze only cared to say this: “The author [Buci-Glucksman] develops a conception of the Baroque that appeals to Lacan and Merleau-Ponty.” (Deleuze 1993: 147, n.16) Notice the conflation of Lacan with that of his friend, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, thus reducing Lacan’s radical originality. Surely, Deleuze must have been aware of the ongoing Lacan’s Seminar during 1972-1973 in Paris. And given the sheer force of the scholarship and wide range of references to major writers on the
baroque in his remarkable book, we would be justified to claim that the conspicuous omission and in failing to acknowledge Lacan’s radical contribution to the idea could be more than an oversight on the part of the philosopher. Remember, in this context, all the misinterpretations of Deleuze and his coauthor, Gauftari, on the question of “Oedipus Complex” in Lacan in their Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. As I said above, Deleuze’s The Fold, which won the praise of Alain Badiou, has been widely circulated in contemporary cultural theory circles. More particularly, it has been appropriated in certain architectural theory circles, which deserves a separate discussion that I will take up later in this essay. Deleuze’s book has yet to be challenged from the Lacanian position, and for that matter who else other than Žižek should do it?

In the light of the objection against absences and omissions I have listed above, I must now pose some questions: Should not a theory of aesthetics of modernity and its “scopic regime” in Lacan be worked out in the context of his analysis of the baroque in conjunction with his Seminar XI, Seminar VII, and Seminar XVII? Is it not that the very notion of jouissance in Lacan is rooted in his idea of the baroque, itself related to the Discourse of Capitalism in the seventeenth century, that will go beyond Benjamin’s writing on the baroque? To be more specific, is it not true that Lacan’s final reflections on feminine jouissance in Encore the result of his observations on the historical Baroque art to which he emphatically alluded in Seminar XX? (The cover of the original French version of Encore with an illustration of Saint Teresa sculpture by Bernini attests to this fact.) How should one decipher the most challenging, opaque and provocative definition of the baroque put forwarded by Lacan in Encore where he says, “The baroque is the regulating of the soul by corporeal radioscopy”? How should this definition be contrasted to Deleuze’s “fold,” and thereof, to the fashion of the renewed interest in Leibniz as its result? Remember that Žižek has already taken to task the fashion of on Leibniz by its advocates in contemporary digital capitalist cyberspace in his On Belief. Shouldn’t the ideas of baroque in Lacan and Deleuze be considered as the two main confrontational definitions of the baroque in the late twentieth century?

At this point I have to continue this essay by declaring a disclaimer: I do not have any claim to authority in providing answers to all questions I raised above. This is all the good reason why I am filing my complaint against Žižek! I am only positioning myself in the role of a provocateur by posing questions and making a plea: It is only Žižek who can address these complex questions in continuation and in conjunctions with his sympathetic confrontation with Deleuze and his anti-Lacanian stand that Žižek has already begun, but
not in connection with the “baroque question” that is missing in his critique. I am suggesting that Žižek must continue the challenge he began to pose to Deleuze by countering his very influential *The Fold*, which since its publication has become the sole philosophical reference for the interpretation of the baroque idea in contemporary art, literary and architecture analysis. He cannot avoid it, if I can put it flatly and bluntly. The question to be asked is this: What would be the perspective on the baroque in contemporary theory from the Lacanian side? I want to relegate the task of undertaking this question to Žižek and only allow myself to offer a working title for Žižek’s “Yet Unwritten Book!” I have a tentative title for him without his solicitation that I will disclose below. To that end, in the following section I would like to supplement my complaints I listed above with some preliminary and fragmentary remarks that are only working notes reflecting on a genealogy of the baroque idea in theory and criticism that has been entered contemporary theory. Particularly, I would like to discuss the consequences of the importation of the baroque idea into the contemporary architectural discourse, for two reasons: First, because of the facile and simplistic adoption of the Deleuze’s *The Fold*, which has resulted in its de-philosophizing and in misguided application of it to design practice. This is mainly because of the fact that Deleuze’s celebrated text was quickly appropriated in architectural theory circles soon after its reception in philosophical and literary discourses, if not sooner. Second, it is appropriate to put this discussion in the context of Žižek’s recent critique of contemporary architecture that he began with his initial “Talk” on “The Architectural Parallax,” which I took up for a commentary before in the pages of this journal, which now I want to revisit on the occasion of its extended version that Žižek has included in his recent book, *Living in the End Times*. I want to revisit this text in relation to the critique of the phenomenon of the “neo-baroque” in contemporary architecture, which largely is the result of fashionable reading of *The Fold* in architecture discourse that Žižek has missed to address in his otherwise serious and severe critique of contemporary architecture.

**Baroque: The Fold, or, *Objet Petit a*?**

The so-called the “return of the baroque” in contemporary culture has prompted some writings revisiting the genealogy of its idea in secular modernity and the rise of postmodernity by examining art and literary historical narratives behind the history of its concept and the conflicting interpretations. Commentators trace it back to Pascal and
Baudelaire and to a whole host of twentieth century and contemporary writers including Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes. But this is not the place to rehearse this genealogy. One example which tries to cover it all is the recent book by Gregg Lambert titled *The Return of the Baroque in Modern Culture.* Written from a Deleuzian position, the author has traced the history of the interpretation of the concept of the baroque starting with famous art historian Heinrich Wölfflin and his classic work, *Renaissance and Baroque*. Lambert while sporadically mentions Lacan’s name, nevertheless pays only a lip service to him by just acknowledging the conception of *jouissance feminine* in reference to Bernini’s sculpture of St. Theresa, not even bothering to cite Lacan’s *Seminar XX* in the bibliography. One merit of this book though is that the author devotes a chapter to Severo Sarduy’s important work that I will discuss below.

While we do not need to go deep into the debate over conflicting interpretations or exposition of the history of the concept of the baroque, it is nevertheless useful for our purpose here to reflect briefly on certain aspects of the idea of baroque and its occurrences in contemporary theory that have bearings on the confrontation between its philosophical and psychoanalytical interpretations in so far as its two major definitions in Deleuze and Lacan are concerned. Perhaps ultimately the common salient feature between the two is around the question of “visions,” or the so-called the “scopic regimes” of modernity, contending with each other for hegemony that has certain definite political ramifications. It was Deleuze himself who first touched on the political aspect of the historical Baroque itself. When in *Negotiations* he was asked about his book on Leibniz and how the concept of the “fold” relates to nonphilosophical realities, i.e., in the field of painting, sculpture, architecture, and literature, but also on social and political world, Deleuze’s answers is illuminating: “Certainly, and the baroque was itself linked to a political system, a new conception of politics (Deleuze: 1995, 157). He then further remarks, “Not only is there a social ‘morphology’ in which textures play their part, but the baroque plays a part in town-planning and rural development. Architecture has always been a political activity, and any new architecture depends on revolutionary forces, you can find architecture saying ‘We need a people’, even though the architect isn’t himself a revolutionary. Through its relation to the bolshevik revolution, constructivism links up to baroque. A people is always a new wave, a new fold in the social fabric; any creative work is a new way of folding adapted to new materials.” (Deleuze: 1995, 158) What is significant in these remarks is the political dimension of the baroque. This aspect of baroque culture fell on deaf ears in Deleuze’s architectural followers who hurriedly took the idea of the
“fold” from him in theory and practice. This political aspect is precisely the main factor that was not missed by Žižek in his text on architecture, which underlies his take on contemporary architecture but not yet discussed specifically in relation to the problematic of the “neo-baroque” aestheticism dominating contemporary architecture, as I will discuss in next section.

This political dimension is ultimately linked to the “scopic regimes,” as I mentioned above, and to the question of cultural and visual hegemony in contemporary culture. Martin Jay in his seminal essay “Scopic Regimes of Modernity,”18 has astutely articulated this problem in relation to the baroque visual culture. Starting with the dominant vision in modernity that he characterized as “Cartesian Perspectivalism,” defined as a “geometricalized and rationalized intellectual concept of space,” Jay then discusses the two moments in which this dominant vision was contested. The first instance is the model of the Dutch experience in the seventeenth century painting in which the abstract grid of Cartesian space is cracked by an empirical visual experience depicted in fragmentary details and articulated in surface treatment of the world doing away with hierarchical and proportional organization of the dominant perspective. And the second model of vision contesting the dominant “perspectivalism” is, of course, the anamorphic perspective of the baroque that Wolfflin contrasted with Renaissance perspective. Here Jay refers to Christine Buci-Glucksmann’s two seminal texts, Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity, and La folie du voir. Deleuze in The Fold, as mentioned above, cited the latter work. In her discussion, Buci-Glucksmann considers the baroque explosive visual power against the hegemonic visual style in its disorienting vision filled with ecstatic surplus of images in rejection of geometrization of Cartesian tradition. As Jay writes “…baroque visual experience has a strongly tactile or haptic quality [reminiscent of Benjamin’s discussion of haptic in his Artwork essay] which prevents it from turning into the absolute oculacentrism of its Cartesian perspectival rival.” (Jay 1998, 17) He then summarizes the characteristic of this visual experience succinctly: “In philosophical terms, although no one system can be seen its correlate, Leibniz’s pluralism of monadic viewpoint, Pascal’s meditations on paradox, and the Counter-Reformation mystic’s submission to vertiginous experience of rapture might all be seen as related to baroque vision.” (Jay, ibid) Now add all of these features belonging to baroque to Žižek’s anamorphic analysis in his Looking Awry without troubling yourself looking for the word “Baroque” in this book.19 It is worth mentioning here that Jay points out that Buci-Glucksmann sees in unrepresentable and melancholic aspect of the baroque vision, that which Walter Benjamin saw in baroque
allegory, which also establishes its connection to the dimension of Sublime. “As such, it was closer to what a long tradition of aesthetics called the sublime, in contrast to the beautiful, because of its yearning for a presence that can never be fulfilled. Indeed, desire, in its erotic as well as metaphysical forms, courses through the baroque scopic regime. The body returns to dethrone the disinterested gaze of disincarnated Cartesian spectator.” (ibid, 18).

Buci-Glucksmann in her Baroque Reason comes closer than anybody else (except for Severo Sarduy, see below) to acknowledge the “situatedness” of Lacan in baroque. She establishes the line of baroque in the chain of Pascal-Baudelaire-Benjamin-Barthes-Lacan in the context of twentieth century modernity with her paradoxical idea of baroque reason.” She discusses this idea as the female Otherness and attempts to translate Benjamin’s baroque idea of “allegory” into Lacan Discourse of the Other. She writes: “‘Baroque Reason’: the term may appear provocative, so greatly has the explaining [render raison] of reason obliterated the plurality of classical reason and obscured the baroque as a paradigm of thought and writing which overflows conventional models of identity, essence and substantiality. For those who identify reason with its ‘long chain’, Cartesian or other, it seems impossible that a ratio should be stylistic and rhetorical, that it should be permanently at grips with its theatricization and dramatization, that it should act itself out in ‘bodies’. But in the baroque, the reason of the unconscious and the reason of utopia present themselves to be interpreted. The baroque signifier proliferates beyond everything signified, placing language in excess of corporeality.” (Buci-Glucksmann: 1994, 139) If we go by this analysis, of the seeming impossibility of ratio to be in conjunction with rhetorical, then one can say that the whole structure of thought in Lacan and not only his style is situated on the baroque as he himself has confessed – and not only those notions in his discourse, such as Gaze, Sublime, Anamorphic, jouissance that I mentioned to have their origins in the baroque logic. Buci-Glucskmann cites Lacan from his Seminar XX, where he said, “The Baroque is, at the outset, the ‘storyette’ [historiole, a neologism] or little history of Christ” (Lacan1998, 107). This, she says, is established “through his body.” She then remarks: “By this Lacan has in mind not only the precariousness of the body on the Christian doctrine of salvation, but also the very modalities of the enjoyment [jouissance] of the Other’s body. For if the body of Christ assumes importance only through oral incorporation (the Catholic act of communion/devourment as a sublimated oral drive), it is because somewhere the display of the body evokes infinite jouissance and thus defines the Baroque.” And here she quotes Lacan’s important thesis that “Everything
is bodily exhibition evoking *jouissance*.” (Buci-Glucksmann, ibid., 139) In fact, this last quotation must be put in the extended remarks that Lacan made, which is truncated by Buci-Gluksma. Lacan in *Seminar XX* said this: “In everything that followed from the effects of Christianity, particularly in art – and it’s in this respect that I coincide with the ‘baroquism’ with which I accept to be clothed – everything is exhibition of the body evoking *jouissance* – and lend credence to the testimony of someone who has just come back from an orgy of churches in Italy – but without copulation.” (Lacan 1998: 113) Now I wonder if Žižek who forgot to comment on the baroque side of Lacan has seen this “orgy of churches in Italy”! But, who else than Žižek, with his recent challenging interpretation of Christianity and the relation between Theology and Politics, would be the most capable and qualified commentator to take up this remark by Lacan? Buci-Gluksmann, based on the Lacan’s distinction between the Phallic *jouissance* and the feminine *jouissance*, and the female as “not-all” and the *jouissance* excess in the body of female, ventures unsatisfactorily to interpret that famous definition of baroque by Lacan that I quote again here: “The baroque is the regulating of the soul by corporeal radioscopy.” She is nevertheless is the only one as far as I know to get close to a possible interpretation of this enigmatic statement. But I wonder if without a whole repertoire of knowledge of a discursive interpretation of the Christian theology and Counter-Reformation, on the one hand, and the baroque art on the other, it would be possible at all to make an informed and convincing sense of this definition. I therefore relegate it to Žižek to do so!

It was apparently Severo Sarduy, the Latin American literary critic, to be the first and only one to establish a connection between the baroque idea and Lacan’s *objet petit a*. In the beginning of his essay, “The Baroque and Neobaroque,” Sarduy acknowledges that the baroque from the very beginning “was destined for ambiguity and, for semantic diffusion.” (Sarduy 1980: 115) Sarduy is also the one who published a book on *Barroco* in 1975 as Lambert has discussed in his above-mentioned book. Sarduy goes on to give a concise etymological definition of the baroque. It is originally derived from Portuguese *barrocco*, which he points out destined for ambiguity and semantic diffusion: “It was the great irregular pearl – in Spanish *barrueco* or *berrueco*, in Portuguese *barroco* – the rock, the knotted, the agglomerate density of rock – *barrueco* or *berrueco* – or perhaps the excrescence, the cyst, what proliferates, both free and lithic, tumorous, warty; even perhaps the name of a student of the Carraccis, excessively sensitive and affected with mannerism – Le Baroche or Barrocci (1528-1612); perhaps fantastic philology, an ancient mnemotechnical term of Scholasticism, a syllogism – *baroco*. Finally, for the denotative
catalogue of dictionaries, accumulation of codified banality, the baroque is equivalent to ‘shocking bizarreness’ – Littre – or to eccentricity, extravagance, and bad taste’ – Martinez Amador. 

After a long exposition on literary criticism and rhetoric as a metaphor in discussing Roland Barthes, Sarduy comes to the “conclusion” of his essay divided into various subtitles. In the section on “Eroticism,” he brings the baroque to the psychoanalytical discourse related to the Freudian “partial object” and concludes with some most significant remarks not written by anybody else on the relation of Lacan to the baroque doctrine. He writes: “Baroque space is that of the superabundance and overflow. In contrast to language which is communicative, economic, austere, and reduced to its function – to serving as a vehicle for information – baroque language takes pleasure in the supplement, in the excess, and in the partial loss of the object. Or rather, in the search, by definition frustrated, for the partial object. The ‘object’ of the baroque can be specified: it is that which Freud, but specially Abraham, called partial object: maternal breast, excrement – and its metaphoric equivalent: gold, constitutive material and symbol of all baroque – vision, voice, a thing which is always alien to everything men can comprehend, assimilate from others and themselves, residuum which we could describe as (a)lterity, to mark the contribution to the concept made by Lacan, who precisely calls this object (a).” (Ibid, 130)

He further remarks: “Object (a) as residual quantity, but also as fall, loss, or discrepancy between reality (the visible baroque object) and its phantasmal image (saturation without limits, asphyxiating proliferation, the horror vacui) presides over baroque space.” (Ibid.)

And in the section “Revolution,” Sarduy concludes with authority: “Baroque which, in its action of weighing, in its fall, in its ‘painterly’ language, sometimes strident, motley, and chaotic, is a metaphor of the impugnation of the logocentric entity which until now structured it and us with its distance and its authority; baroque which refuses all restoration, which makes metaphor of the discussed order, of the judged god, of the transgressed law. Baroque of the revolution.” (Ibid., 132). Perhaps these remarks by Sarduy can be taken to be summarizing the whole Lacan’s “baroquism” on which he wanted to be sided, or in which he desired to be situated. One has to begin from here to actually begin a discourse about the baroque side of Lacan, by taking his “conservative” proclamation serious, and probe its consequences for a radical politico-aesthetic and cultural analysis.
Architecture, Žižek, and the “Neo-Baroque”

One area that such undertaking would have its proper place, with a sense of urgency, is the field of architecture. And this for two reasons: First, because Žižek has recently announced his intervention into discourse of contemporary architecture forcefully for a political analysis, and the second, because it is in this field that Deleuze’s baroque became the only frame of reference and the body of work that was quickly appropriated and misappropriated to some negative effects with serious politico-cultural consequences. This (mis)appropriation gave a central character to the dominant architectural production that has been identified by certain critics, specially Hal Foster whom Žižek quotes, as “Neo-Baroque.” This characterization of contemporary architecture is apt and serious. I would like to take this term in its most derogatory sense to indicate not only the misinterpretation of the original tenets of the baroque idea in Deleuze by his architectural followers, but more importantly, to signify the debasement of the same idea as has come down to us from Benjamin to Lacan, and to Roland Barthes in between. The same goes also with the term Sublime, which has been used as the prefix for the “neo-baroque” to describes contemporary building which should also be restored to its original sense as the most important critical category coming down to us from Kant’s transcendental turn to Lacan’s ground-breaking interpretation of it. This postmodern neo-baroque aesthetics is primarily the product of a certain reading of Deleuze’s idea of the “fold” in architecture discourse, as I have already tired the readers by repeating it. Žižek has missed this aspect in his recent architectural discussion. The elite architectural theory circles having the “radical” members in their wing, those who had previously devoured Deleuz and Gauttari’s A Thousand Plateaus, quickly rushed to Deleuz’s The Fold shortly after its publication. Their readings amount to de-philosophizing that text and in applying it misguidedly to practice of building, dulling its sharp critical and philosophical edges and emptying its potential political significance. For its philosophical significance I should refer the readers to Badiou’s important Clamor of Being mentioned above. They have been ignorant of what Deleuze himself had declared about the “political” underpinning of the idea of the baroque, as I cited his statement above. In consequence, these “critical” theorists naively managed to hand over architecture to the “culture industry” of late capitalism and its digital technologies – and disturbingly are euphoric about it. This is a case of how architecture, in theory and practice, and through a complex aesthetic discourse, can be assimilated into capitalist dynamics. It is an irony that the sophisticated philosophical corpus of the Deleuze
can even be appropriated for reactionary political end. A case in point is the important report by Eyal Weizman who in his excellent book, *Hollow Land, Israel’s Architecture of Occupation*, writes about the case in which the Israeli Defense Force, in order to strategize and conceptualize the urban warfare against the Palestinians, resorted to Deleuze and Gauttari in reading their *A Thousand Plateaus*. Weizman writes: “Headings such as *Difference and repetition – The Dialectic of Structuring and Structure; ‘Formless’ Rival Entities, Fractal Manoeuvre; Velocity vs. Rhythms; Wahhabi War Machine, Post-Modern Anarchist; Nomadic Terrorists*, and so on, employed the language of French Philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Gauttari.” (Weizman 2007: 200) Of course, as Žižek has commented on Weizman’s report, it is not “the nonsensical accusation that Deleuze and Gauttari were theorists of militaristic colonization – but the conclusion that the conceptual machine articulated by Deleuze and Gauttari, far from being simply ‘subversive’, also fits the (the military, economic and ideologico-political) operational mode of contemporary capitalism.” (Žižek 2007: 27) And this is disturbingly true. The use and abuse of Deleuze’s idea of baroque in *The Fold* in the architecture discipline, notwithstanding its aesthetic appeals, is not of course as comic or tragically dramatic as the use of Deleuze and Gauttari’s *A Thousand Plateaus* by IDF, who, by the way, also found Bernard Tschumi’s *Architecture and Disjunction* very instructive for their theory and practice of the urban warfare machine.22

My claim here is that Lacan’s discourse on the doctrine of the baroque is a critical counteract against this so-called “neo-baroque sublime” in contemporary trend and can be corrective of it. In this regard, I want here to re-examine briefly certain points that Žižek has raised in his critique of contemporary architecture that are important and merit further discussion in the light of his extended version of “The Architectural Parallax” that he has included in his *Living in the End Times*. I have previously reviewed the original version of that text in pages of this Journal, but now I want to revisit it in the light of above argument I have advance and take him to task. I want to point out what Žižek has actually missed discussing about this dominant neo-baroque aspect of the contemporary architecture that he could have conceptualized more effectively and forcefully had he touched on Deleuzian’s appropriation of the “fold,” and its counter analysis by Lacan about the whole idea of the baroque. Žižek in the middle section of “The Architectural Parallax,” very persuasively brings forward the idea of “Envelope” and the fundamental “Incommensurability” between the inside and outside in contemporary buildings. He astutely observes that this “incommensurability between outside and inside is a
transcendental a priori – in our most elementary phenomenological experience the reality we see through a window is always minimally spectral, not fully real as the closed space we are in.” (Žižek, 2010: 258) I should insert here in passing, regarding this division between inside and outside, that I am at a loss as to why Žižek does not take up Lacan’s discourse on “Extimacy” to problematize precisely this phenomenological experience.23 Yet, his observation is apt if we regard the general feature of the contemporary neo-baroque, which amounts to a general aestheticization of the skin of the building, as Žižek properly has observed. Žižek cites a passage by Hal Foster where he mentions that the Frederic Jameson’s critique of postmodern architecture has strangely been taken as a paragon by other architects with the creating of extravagant spaces, which Foster characterizes as “neo-Baroque sublime.” In Foster’s critique, of course, there is no mention of Deleuze’s “fold” as the very origin of this “neo-baroque sublime” turn, but his general characterization is to the point. In the same text, Žižek should have looked further down to see what Foster says in his expansion of the “neo-baroque” character analogical to the Statue of Liberty, which is sharp. This would have been instructive regarding the same problematic relation between the inside and the outside in relation to Frank Gehry’s work that Žižek himself has discussed in length. Žižek should have paid attention to what Foster wrote under the category of “tectonic.” He wrote: “Tectonics: For all the futurism of the computer-assisted designs of architects like Gehry, his structures are often akin to the Statue of Liberty, with a separate skin hung over a hidden armature, and with exterior surfaces that rarely match up with the interior spaces.” (Foster 2002: 197) Foster then further remarks that, “With The putative passing of the industrial age, the structural transparency of modern architecture was declared outmoded, and now the Pop aesthetic of postmodern architecture looks dated as well. The search for the architecture of computer age is on; ironically, however, it has led Gehry and followers to nineteenth-century sculpture as a model, at least in part. The disconnection between skin and structure represented by this academic model has two problematic effects. First, it can lead to striated spaces that are mistaken for a new kind of architectural sublime. Second, it can abet a further disconnection between building and site.” Foster: ibid.) To be fair, Žižek should not be blamed for being the only one to ignore Foster’s comments, since many inside the architectural discipline are guilty of this neglect. But it is unfortunate that Foster, like Žižek, neglects to trace the philosophical-theoretical underpinning of this problematic phenomenon of the inside and outside to its origin, i.e., to misappropriation of the Deleuze’s “fold” by the same theoretical elites who are the ones who have shown the
way to Frank Gehry in the first place, in spite of the architect himself and his independent of his “artistry.” But nevertheless, Žižek goes on to cite Zaero Polo, a Deleuzian in architecture discipline, who writes in his “The Politics of the Envelope: A Political Critique of Materialism,” about the “Market forces and bureaucracy” in typically Deleuzian take on contemporary capitalism that Žižek does not miss to take to task. But, again, short of reflecting on a more inclusive nefarious impact of Deleuzianaim on discourse of contemporary architecture and its practice that Foster has identified as “neo-baroque” in which Zaero Polo is one of the most significant figures. Žižek sharply writes: “Zaero Polo’s starting point is what one is tempted to call ‘neo-capitalist Deleuzianaim’ (no jibe intended) Deleuze and Gauuttari proposed a certain conceptual network – the opposition between the molecular and the molar, production and representation, difference and identity, the nomadic multitude and the hierarchical order, etc. – within which one pole is the generative force and the other its shadowy representation: the multitude is productive, and is as such reflected in a distorted way in the theatre of representation.” (Ibid: 272) There are more points that have to be discussed in otherwise powerful critique by Žižek of contemporary architecture in respect to the “ideology critiques” and the political “class struggle” staged in architecture. But I should stop here in order to get to the conclusion that I want to draw for my purpose regarding the baroque discourse. Along this line of argument, my claim has been that the neo-baroque state of the contemporary architecture paradoxically needs a “baroque” critique, the original letters of which is in Lacan’s doctrine in relation to Sublime and jouissance that Žižek unfortunately has not taken up for a further critique of Deleuze and his impact on contemporary architecture. This is due, I would say, to his neglecting to discuss The Fold text. Now I should return to the promise I made at the outset of this essay.

**A Title for Žižek’s Unwritten Book!**

Now that I filed my lengthy complaint, presented my case and voiced my concern (and I hope beyond a reasonable doubt!), I must keep my promise and offer a title for Žižek’s yet-to-be-written book. I make my offer without being asked but also not charging any fee!

Since Lacan situated himself on the side of the baroque, or somebody situated him on that side, and since Žižek has undoubtedly situated himself on the side of Lacan, I gather that, by a logical consequence, Žižek must also be situating himself on the side of the baroque. Every ground-breaking thing Žižek has written on, from “anamorphosis,”
“parallax,” “sublime,” the “gaze,” “jouissance,” and “objet petit a,” to “Christianity” (because this is what is at stake when Lacan talks about the baroque, provocatively as he puts “Christianity” as neighboring “Obscenity”), are all the indications that he belongs to the side of the baroque. He cannot refute it! The baroque, according to Lacan has to be linked to the “essence of Christianity.” For Lacan it is through the essence of Christianity that we can understand what the baroque is. “The Baroque is, at the outset, the ‘storyette’ or little tale of Christ,” Lacan told his audience. And, he warned his audience that “you are going to have to bust your asses to follow me here.” (Lacan: 1998, 109) Well, I have to report that I busted my ass following him in this matter but to no avail, and therefore would like to call on the authority of a Žižek to help me! I am assuming that by taking Lacan’s word for it, that he has situated himself on the side of the baroque (or was it a SHE who situated him on that side?) it means something larger than what he put in his Session “On the baroque.” As I have been trying to secure a position on the same side, and since I am not convinced, by any measure, of the one or two facile interpretations of the most ambiguous and provocative definition of the baroque that Lacan put forward in his Session, I am therefore appealing to Žižek’s authority. Let me repeat that definition one more time here: “The baroque is the regulating of the soul by corporeal radioscopy.” Is this “soul” an Aristotelian one, the “thought” of which bears on the “body”? But what Body? Lacan is talking of this body as an “enclosed body (un corps ferme) and say: “Isn’t it plain to see that the soul is nothing other than the supposed identicalness (identité) of this body to everything people think in order to explain it? In short, the soul is what one thinks regarding the body – on the winning side.” (Lacan: ibid., 110) He then clarifies that “If there is something that grounds being, it is assuredly the body, on that score, Aristotle was not mistaken,” and while castigating his audience that they never read De Anima (On the Soul) in spite of his supplication, he adds, “that man thinks with – instrument – his soul, that is, as I just told you, the presumed mechanisms on which the body is based.” (Ibid.) Still, what does it have to do with the baroque art? It is interesting that Lacan in this Session never brought back the discussion of anamorphosis in all the museums and churches that he visited in his tour in Italy. The baroque has to do something with Christ who brought Christianity. The baroque then has to be thought with Theology. And yet, Lacan perplexedly also says, “What is amusing is obviously – I already told you this, but you didn’t catch it – that atheism is tenable only to clerics.” (Ibid., 108) We cannot go further into this complex statement.
Beyond all of the exegesis above, however incomplete, I might have a clue that could be helpful regarding the baroque, and that leads me closer to suggesting a title for Žižek’s book he has not yet written. It certainly has to do with Sublimation and the Object. My inkling in this comes from the remarkable essays by Gérard Wajcman titled “Desublimation: The Art of What Falls.” (Wajcman: 2007) Wajcman writes: “What one must understand is that this movement from the sublime to the object does not exactly describe a conceptual advance, but rather a fall. Lacan took up a topology of sublimation at divers times. I would not stop there. I would suggest, rather, conceiving of it as a physics of sublimation, a Newtonian physics, in the sense that, in the 20th century, from Freud to Lacan – according to the trajectory of the concept described by Lacan – sublimation appears changed by the law of gravitation, the law of the implacable fall of bodies.” (Wajcman 2007: 88) Reflecting on the Freud’s conservative understanding of the Modern art and his problematic thought on Sublimation contrasted to the one by Lacan whose thoughts are based on his acute observations of twentieth century art and Surrealism and even the anticipation of what would come later in the century, Wajcman insightfully writes that “Lacan is going to change things, to disrupt them by linking sublimation to the object, to which he will give the weight of a fall. For Lacan, the object chooses; it is not elevated. Thus there is a difficulty in perspective: when sublimation is linked to the object, an intimate contradiction emerges at the heart of sublimation between what rises and what falls. The Object changes the emphasis to what falls.” (Ibid., 93) Hence the term in the title of Wajcman’s essay, “Desublimation.” Twentieth century art has everything to do with this desublimation. From Marcel Duchamp to Robert Rauschenberg. It has to do with “theory-of-the-object,” discovered by Lacan beyond Kant. My claim is that this is precisely what lies at the basis of what we call the baroque. Now here is the title I suggest for Žižek’s future book: “THE OBJECT FALLS: LACAN AND THE BAROQUE.” Once this book is written, then we will have a powerful counter argument contra Deleuze’s The Fold. From that point on, writers and critics in the fields as different as literary criticism, art, philosophy, and specially architecture, will have to come to terms with another Baroque Idea which will not be amenable to the “ideology of late capitalism,” particularly in the “neo-baroque” forms in architecture that we have observed. In the light of Žižek’s discussion of architecture that will be further expounded by him in this yet imaginary book, I will start to assign it as required readings back to back with Deleuze’s The Fold, and will attach a warning to it: that this is not going to be taken as a recipe for practice to those misguided architectural theorists and practitioners who
misappropriated Deleuze’s philosophy (for which I have a great respect) in order to turn it into a prescription for practice in the service of culture industry of late capitalism and aestheticization of the empirical reality. As this “fold” is responsible for the turn to the so-called the discourse of “formless” in building (which was started with Georges Bataille) only to be co-opted by the Institutions of high culture in the service of cultural logic of late capitalism. This is a means for them to get their jouissance by turning building into a “slime formlessness,” which, by the way, ominously recalls Marx’s prophecy in *The Communist Manifesto* where he said, “All that is solid melts into the air.”
I would like to thank Donald Kunze for taking the trouble and time to read the first draft of this essay. I am grateful to him for his helpful comments and editorial suggestions.


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For this accusation leveled at Zizek see the recent work by Mathew Sharp and Geoff Boucher, 2010, Zizek and Politics, Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press.

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I owe this idea of the plea bargain, “nolo contendere,” to Donald Kunze who suggested it to me upon his reading the first draft of this essay.

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Translated as The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, forward and trans. by Tom Conley (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1993).

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It is interesting to read Weizman related to his interview with Shimon Naveh who is the co-director of the Operation Theory Research Institute in IDF who said that he read also the work of the architect Bernard Tschumi. “When I asked him, ‘why Tschumi?!’ (in the annals of architectural theory a special place of honor is reserved to Tschumi as a ‘radical’ architect of the left) he replied: ‘The idea of disjunction embodied in Tschumi’s book Architecture and disjunction became relevant for us […] Tschumi has another approach to epistemology; he wanted to break with single-perspective knowledge and centralized thinking. He saw the world through a variety of different social practices, from a constantly shifting point of view…’ I then asked him, if so, why does he not read Derrida and deconstruction instead? He answered, ‘Derrida may be a little too opaque for our crowd. We share more with architects; we combine theory and practice. We can read, but we know as well how to build and destroy, and sometimes to kill.’” See Eyal Weisman, Hollow Land, Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (London and New York: Verso, 2007), 200.

References


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