In a recent article addressing academia’s ongoing reluctance to accept online publishing, David Gunkel contends that suspicion stems from pervasive skepticism regarding the Internet’s legitimacy as a social technology. “This occurs,” he explains, “because of a prevailing assumption among academics in particular that the information available online is dubious, untrustworthy, and suspicious” (2007a: 1). Gunkel’s argument brings to light one dimension of the material consequences of pervasive, and institutionally entrenched, hostilities towards online communication networks. Despite the extent to which online platforms’ importance as a source for news and other information is increasingly incontestable, concerns remain deeply entrenched, and are evident in a myriad of cultural discourses. This essay argues that the “othered” status of the Internet as a network technology, a stain acquired from association with fringe and unwholesome content, is of particular significance in terms of its relationship to contemporary discourses of terrorism and counter-terrorism surrounding the 10th anniversary of the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center towers. I examine diverse, yet connected, artifacts that speak to this phenomenon through an engagement of Žižek with Deleuze. These objects include popular television program “Homeland” (on the “Showtime” premium network) and New York Times news coverage surrounding it, two
online counter terrorism position papers, and the website of a women’s group called Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE).

Using Žižek’s notion of the neighbor and Lacan’s concepts of the traumatic real and the object petit a, along side theories of affect, movement, and assemblage drawn from Gilles Deleuze, I argue that the constructs of the neighbor and the abject kernel of otherness are variously fantasized as amorphous, yet reified, processes of flows, movement, and affect, rather than fixed qualities located in particular material bodies. Second, I contend that one consequence of this fantasy is a further denigration of the virtual, the aggressive rejection of which emphasizes its heightened importance in contemporary cultural and political discourse. These fantasies appear in both popular and policy discourse, and result in the proposal of actual counter-terrorism strategies. The traversal of fantasy across the realms of popular and policy discourse, and actualization of the fantasy in policy directives shows, I argue, the exigent need to continue to take popular culture seriously as a structuring ideological force.

Fear surrounding re-conception of the neighbor as a possessing force stems from increasingly evident discursive intertwining of terrorist impulses with globalized communication networks, and the fear that these processes, movements, and flows imbue others with a heightened ability to “pass” undetected. For Žižek, the neighbor is an uncanny and horrific figure, one whom we cannot “identify and empathize” with. The neighbor “confronts us directly with the abyss of the Other-Thing” as a “de-subjectivized subject…a monstrous dark blot” (2010: 2-3). The neighbor is a figure of radical alterity. For the populist, the neighbor is reified into a scapegoat, usually an ethnic group, fantasized to be a “positive ontological entity whose annihilation would restore balance and justice” (Žižek 2002: 278). In order to avoid confronting the horror of the abyss, the neighbor is designated as a concrete manifestation of it, the quilting point of an ideological space, and its extermination is aggressively sought. The neighbor embodies an antagonism that supposedly introduces strife into what would otherwise be a whole and harmonious social field. Increased involvement with another threatening neighbor-Internet communication technologies-brings an additional element of angst, the fear that the neighbors, with their skill in passing and ambiguity of ethnic affiliation, require more sophisticated methods of surveillance to detect their inner abjection. As Jack Bratich (2008) argues, the Internet, since its inception, has occupied a discursive position as a constitutive outside to legitimate journalism, its threatening neighbor, and thus an assumed bastion for suspicious content. Its use as a platform for radical populist views
such as those of the birthers has fueled the backlash (Bratich 2011). In the sections that follow, I argue that fears the neighbor and its power are, more than ever, intertwined with mistrust of the network itself, to a degree that network’s othered status is re-entrenched through its implication in “harboring” the neighbor, and thus soaking up its terrible energy. The “new” neighbors of 2011 increasingly need the Internet network as an ally to unleash their terrible powers, and thus require similarly diffused and rhizomatic methods for their eradication.

Fears of the other/neighbor, I demonstrate, are increasingly expressed in terms of the terrible possibility of becoming neighbor, particularly the ability of legitimate or inchoate subjects to acquire neighbor-ing potential through their union with network machines. These fears express an anxious answers to the “true problem” posed by Žižek in Organs without Bodies, his most notable engagement with Deleuze. He asks: “how does the identity of the human mind rely on external machinic supplements…how does it incorporate machines?” (2004: 16) As a partial answer to his own question, Žižek offers that the future will bring an intertwinement of the human and the machine, not, as some fear, a supplanting of human by machine. In the context of this economy of fear and anxiety, I argue here, cultural fears of subjects harboring the explosive potential to become-abject, become-terrorist, through their involvement and interconnectedness with networking machine technologies emerge. Popular culture is one of the key sites where struggles over the neighbor and its potential play out. Containment and eradication strategies posed by popular culture include creative arming of material bodies with the necessary ammunition to fight this threatening “virtual shadow” (Žižek 2004: 19) and the pushing through, via popular discourse and policy initiatives, technological counter-terrorism measures specifically designed to combat this othered and othering network. The “Homeland” program is one example of a virtual space where these tensions explode.

The ideologies mobilized by the artifacts presented here, surrounding terror/ism in 2011, take the global and amorphous dimensions of the neighbor into account, and produce strategies of detection, apprehension, and eradication that increasingly rely both on an all-encompassing gaze (often augmented by technology) and “soft” strategies including sex and love, parenting, and community engagement. Through this, a global cultural fantasy is (re)produced that not only further shores up the workings of Empire (Hardt and Negri: 2001) and governmental security labor offloaded onto the citizenry (Foucault 1994, Rose 1999, Andrejevic 2007), it indicates a sense in which non-State or
para-state flows of bodies and energies promise to prevent the neighbor’s radical otherness from actualizing its potential in a variety of bodies. The neighbor is no longer simply a “positive ontological entity” (Žižek 2002: 278) as much as it is a fantasy of pure potential, energy, and affect that is able to travel among and infect bodies at will. This movement is similar to how Deleuze and Guattari understand territorialization, a process whereby virtual as well as material bodies and energies seek new places to inhabit. They write:

But are there not only territories and deterritorializations that are not only physical and mental but spiritual—not only relative but absolute in a sense yet to be determined? (1994: 68).

These movements of potential energy are “dynamic features” productive of “conceptual personae.” Territorialization is also productive of “relational features,” personae defined by their becoming vis-à-vis other subjects. (1994: 71). Deleuze and Guattari give the example of the friend, who becomes defined as such based on an emerging territorialization of affectionate energy. Territorialization is useful in furthering understanding of the processes of becoming-neighbor through affective travel and movement through bodies, and the relationships that these territorialized bodies enter into with other subjects. Affects are “beings” in their own right, and when they territorialize in bodies, they occasion a process of non-human becoming (1994: 164).

Monsters in Systems

In Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, Žižek distinguishes between several types of violence. Subjective violence occurs when violence is localized in particular acts traceable to the discrete actions of a subject. Subjective violence is a fetishized, highly visible entity. It is indicative of desire to apprehend the gaze as an abject object of desire, what Jacques Lacan the object petit a. For Lacan, the object petit a is a fetishized manifestation of the scopic drive itself, “the most concealed object” that exists (1998a: 17). Fetish objects, such as agents of subjective violence, are examples of object-“trap(s) for the gaze,” in that desiring searches following this trajectory will always result in missed encounters with the Real, for it is in “seeking the gaze in each of its points…you will see it disappear” (1998a: 89). The fetish object (here, a violent agent) conceals a type of violence, an invisible backdrop, that sustains the normal state of things, which is more amorphous, elusive, and harder to identify. This is objective violence, which takes systemic and anonymous forms. Objective violence, in which the
fantasized agent is elusive and de-centered, is constructed from an assembled system of facts, data, and information. Although the scopic fetishist fantasizes that the truth of the object/gaze is in the system somewhere, borne by an ultimate agent, it is in actuality diffused among the level plane of an assembled field, which, by virtue of being invisible, eludes the gaze.

An assemblage, according to Manuel De Landa, is the emergence of wholes from heterogeneous parts in which “language plays an important” but never “constitutive part” (2009: 3). According to Gilles Deleuze, an assemblage is comprised of “slowness and viscosity…acceleration and rupture…lines and measurable speeds” (1996: 4). It includes not only the paths and points along and through which energies flow, but the affects themselves. Although invisible and elusive to the gaze, the assembled backdrop is responsible for devastating laws, economic policies, and other material realities that occasion violence upon bodies. The scopic fetishist misses this, however, and continues to search for abject agents of subjective violence. An example is the post-9/11 obsession with Osama bin Laden and the airplane hijackers, the focus upon whom obscured nuanced historical understanding of sustained violence against the Middle East, the very history that inspired the agents’ frustrations in the first place.

In an assemblage, miniscule elements connect to form a whole constituted by heterogeneous parts. It is akin to understanding a body as a machine, a whole comprised of separate, autonomous, yet connected, parts. Understanding an assemblage involves turning away from subjects and agency as key concepts, and towards the ways in which systems are built through proximity, connections, and traversal of affect. Crucially, however, this material plane includes a space of depth; assemblages have an unconscious teeming with monstrous energies. Deleuze understands encounters with monsters as transcendental experiences of sense occurring on the immanent plane. Sense is “that which is formed and deployed at the surface,” although the immanent, structuring architecture carries highly disruptive and destructive moments, encounters with traumatic sense. “When the surface is rent with explosions and snags,” Deleuze explains, “everything falls back again into the anonymous pulsation wherein words are no longer anything but affections of the body-everything falls back into the primary order which grumbles beneath the secondary organization of sense” (1990: 125).

The passage above shows how territorializing affect functions as a constitutive piece of an assembled, immanent system. Even as an ardent materialist, Deleuze, in
Logic, acknowledges that a moment of the Real, what he calls a singularity or explosion, not only breaks the signification system, but plunges a body into a depth. Although the monsters exist on the surface, the affects that they occasion actively “make us fall back into the abyss which we believe we had dispelled” (1990: 93). In an attempt to disavow disavowal, we have strengthened its power over us. This illustrates Žižek’s explanation of the “proper Deleuzian paradox” perfectly, in that “something new can only emerge through repetition” (2004: 9).

Monsters have the ability to drag us to a pre-linguistic realm of affect and jouissance, the register of the terrifying, ecstatic, and unsignifiable (Lacan 1998b) that we have attempted to disavow. But who and what are the monsters? Assemblage theory gives insight into how these creatures take shape, and trace and map the processes by which language gives them form, and offers them up as opportunities to mis-identify the gaze in yet another agent-trap of fantasized subjective violence. Although this act of designation is itself a mis-step, the end results are materially present, powerful entities that function in popular discourse to bring us to the affective realm of terror. The 2008 film Paranormal Activity demonstrated this phenomenon perfectly, in which a literal “ghost in the machine” of masculine, technological rationality captured, possessed, and dragged a superstitious woman to a realm of terrible affect, turning her into a bloodthirsty fiend. Fully theorizing the role of affect, such as the affect felt by the populist upon gazing at the terrible object of desire, entails interrogating the practices and processes by which some things become other-how elements collide and join in affective assemblages are processes that must be examined if the libidinal object-kernel of desire (Žižek: 1989) can be fully understood.

Abject kernels become abject-and emerge as highly visible and affectively charged entities on the plane of potential-as a result of certain groupings, assemblages of nodes, and convergences. Media scholars have analyzed how texts are increasingly diffused among multiple platforms, creating new opportunities for brand expansion, story extension, and audience building (Jenkins 2006, Caldwell 2008). Shifting focus towards looking at convergence of mediated texts and objects through the lens of assemblage is helpful in ascertaining the affective charge residing in the objects in these systems, and the ways in which their currents are re-territorialized and “trapped” in othered agents of subjective violence that, time and again, constitute the stuff of fantasies. The following analysis of “Homeland” seeks to map the ways in which notions of monstrosity and otherness are produced and fantasized as currents flowing across and through
networked bodies, introducing the potential for terrible change and becoming-other. These flows of constitutive affect, in turn, produce strategies and tactics of contemporary counter-terrorism.

“Homeland,” Extremism, and Becoming-Other as Affective Process

The recent shootings in Norway revealed the racial elements of terrorism discourse in this political moment. Once it was ascertained that the shooter was a Norwegian national, not a Middle Easterner, he became an “extremist” and ceased to be a terrorist. (Mala and Goodman: 2011) This event hearkens back to Žižek’s point about the Western fantasy of an abject subject: when the violence is perpetrated by a Muslim, it is an Act of Terror, localizable and discrete, event centered. (2008). When the violence is committed by a white national, it becomes “extremism,” a category suggesting excess and improperly disciplined subjectivity. The label of “extremism” indicates an expression of enjoyment that has veered off of the course of legitimate citizenship. The extremist enjoys too much, takes things too far, but retains the potential of returning back into the boundaries of national belonging. The Muslim terrorist is radically outside of this system, pure alterity. It is within this space that “Homeland” intervenes as a narrative that simultaneously queers the boundary separating self and other, as well as the multicultural liberal demand for tolerance and acceptance of the other (Žižek 2008). In a recent interview with the New York Times, Howard Gordon, executive producer for “Homeland,” discusses the show’s contemporary relevance. Contrasting the narrative to “24,” another popular program about counter-terrorism, Gordon explains that ambiguity and uncertainty are driving premises of the show, which both distinguish it from “24” and situate it as germane to the current state of affairs of terrorism and security. “24,” Gordon explains, “relied on conventional understandings of who was the patriot and who was the traitor. “Homeland” absolutely embraces the ambiguity of that question. The world has changed 10 years later.” The New York Times enthusiastically agreed with Gordon’s assessment, heralding “Homeland’s” contemporary relevance and proclaiming that “the two shows are as different as the Bush and Obama administrations,” as the world in 2001 and 2011 (Brown 2011, Stanley 2011).

“Homeland” focuses on the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency to ascertain whether Special Agent Nicholas Brody, who has returned to the United States
after an extended detainment by Al Qaeda, has been “turned” into an Al Qaeda operative. The show centers on the lengths that a mentally ill female agent named Carrie Mathison goes to in her attempts to prove that Brody was “turned” during his capture, and is now working within the U.S. to perpetrate a domestic terrorist attack. Mathison’s suspicions toward Brody are proven correct towards the end of the season, positioning the audience to side with Mathison against her naysayers in the CIA. A “turned” U.S. soldier who speaks Arabic, prays to Allah on a mat in his garage, and mourns for an Iraqi boy killed in a CIA raid, agent Brody is a highly affectively charged nodal point, the physical embodiment of terrorist networks through which affects of violence flow. His unmarked, uniformed white body can pass as a sort of hyper-legitimate subjectivity as he appears in front of the local news cameras as the American hero returned home. Carrie, however, deploys her own mode of excess-psychotic obsession and scopophillic enjoyment-in an attempt to ferret out the abject kernel of otherness that she is certain lurks beneath Brody’s veneer of legitimacy. She falls into precisely the sort of traps mentioned by Lacan, in that she disavows the scopic drive, displacing the desire into a fetishized object of subjective violence (Brody). Carrie is patently excessive in this sense.

As a female subject, she inverts Laura Mulvey’s gazing system (1997). For example, she actively looks at erotic spectacles. In the episode “Grace,” Carrie “goes rogue” in this manner, spearheading the extensive surveillance procedure designed to catch Brody engaging in terrorist behavior and/or communicating with his terrorist boss Abu Nasir. Ignoring the legal and ethical problems raised by her colleagues, Mathison orders Brody’s house bugged with an assortment of audio and video surveillance equipment, including a tiny camera affixed to the ceiling fan above Brody and his wife’s bed. She then outfits her own home with two large flat screen televisions to monitor the activities at Brody’s residence, arranging them in a V shape on her coffee table, so that the televisions totally encompass her when she reclines on the couch. During one of these episodes, Mathison watches, with rapt attention, as Brody and his wife undress and have sex.

No longer a passive object playing to the male’s gaze, Mathison is a desiring subject, a woman who looks, even viewing pornography under the guise of searching for terrorism. These modes of looking are intertwined, as the desire to bear the gaze-to partake in scopophilia-becomes part and parcel to, as Mulvey (following Lacan) argued, a desire to possess the look itself, through the body of the looked upon, as the object a.
The gaze, however, is fundamentally a void, a moment of terrifying and ecstatic self-abnegation, unsignifiable and not localizable in a fetish object (Lacan 1998a, Žižek 2002, McGowan 2008). By presenting the affect of pleasurable looking in a female body, “Homeland” produces a “uniquely 2011” mode of acceptable national citizenship. The gaze is sought by a woman who, while not a populist, is a patriot. Her body exemplifies affective becoming, as a formerly othered, abject mode of subjectivity (feminine, psychotic) becomes, through proper focus of her intense energy at the “right” target, a legitimate national subject. The affect has territorialized in a new body. Žižek has argued that a common misreading of Lacan’s feminine position (see 1998b) involves understanding the feminine as “the exception, the excess, the surplus that eludes the grasp of the phallic function” (1995: not paginated). This alleged misreading is present in contemporary popular cultural analyses of the Lacanian feminine (Monk Rosing, 2011). Instead, Žižek argues, the construction of woman as excess or exception is, conversely, itself a defining characteristic of masculine fantasy. This construct is evident in “Homeland’s” virtual space, where the excessive woman is not excessive simply as a feminine subject, but as a figure of sovereignty, the embodiment of the state of exception. As Giorgio Agamben explains, the sovereign is the one who determines the state of exception, and the state of exception entails governance enacted through the suspension of law (1995). The fantasy of “Homeland” aligns with this reading of Lacan’s notion of the feminine as well as concepts of sovereignty and state of exception, insofar as Mathison’s excessive femininity is re-routed into statist (counterterrorist) agendas and practices, reconfiguring her into a figure of the sovereign suspension of the law as opposed to a feminine transgression of the phallic law. This is achieved chiefly through the re-territorialization of excessive affect.

For Brian Massumi, the significance of affect lies in its relationship to movement, and its characteristic as a visceral, primary force—it does not signify like emotion does. It is autonomous, not tethered to particular bodies, with emotion being an expression of its capture. Existing in a “field of potential” where it is “external to the elements in play” (2002: 76) affect constitutes bodies and subjects by imbuing them with the power of becoming. Affect is a force that moves and generates, it is becoming and inspires becoming, what Deleuze calls a “quasi-cause” (1990: 6). The State applies its regulatory practice by “sniffing out and running after feral belongings it must attempt to recoup, to re-channel into State-friendly patterns” (2002: 83). Within this new “field of potential,” the crazy woman, a “feral belonging” of the state, an excessive extremist, is captured, and
her body re-coded, as a good patriot focused on purging the true anti-State other, the “real” abject scapegoat, the terrorist. Although the self/other dialectic initially seems disrupted, what emerges from the dust-up is a more deeply entrenched, yet, paradoxically, more difficult to define and apprehend, concept of absolute otherness. A new type of abjection has been produced by the virtual, dialectical struggle between self and other.

The process of assembling is evident in “Homeland’s” narrative and news coverage of it, in that we can witness the becoming of a new type of terrorist subject—the white other—as well as a new type of security citizen, the psychotic woman. Within this system, existing possibilities are queered and modified, as affects and bodies swirl together, becoming self, becoming other. This process is determined not only by individual agents, responsible for subjective violence, but the systems within which they function. In the case of “Homeland” Brody’s use of networked communications to converse with other terrorists, and Mathison’s utilization of sophisticated surveillance equipment, supply the (violent) systemic backdrop that sets the stage for acts of subjective violence to erupt. In another scene, for example, Mathison watches Brody during a television appearance, and notices his hand twitching. Convinced that he is sending a signal to Nasir, Mathison orders more resources directed towards tracking him.

Mathison’s unorthodox practices, psychotic behaviors, and libidinal desire to make connections and solve puzzles out of every piece of information presented to her implicate another abject subject—the conspiracy theorist. Dean (2002, 2008) shows that the conspiracy theorist is caught in the circuit of drive, always missing its object of desire, yet taking pleasure in trying to find it. The conspiracy theorist is “extreme and obsessive,” suspicious and distrustful to an exaggerated extent, and barred from the space of proper subjectivity delineated by rational, enlightened democratic citizens (2002: 61). Swirling together with a DIY ethos of democratized consumer technologies, conspiracy theorists become the neighbors of democratic publics, the latter of whom rely on reason, deliberation, and expert knowledge. These proper citizens “want to block the extreme and obsessive from the democratic public” (2002: 61), indicating their desire to purge the public sphere of its neighbors. Jack Bratich (2008) has argued that the barring of conspiracy discourse is intertwined with a larger cultural suspicion of the Internet, with the network itself being othered by liberal democratic discourse as a bastion of excesses, illegitimacy, and obscenity. This point emerges in the television program The
Lone Gunmen, a spinoff of the X Files. Mocking the conspiracy theorists for their aspirations as serious journalists, a female informant points out that they spend “too much” time in a basement using computers, speculating that they must also have an unhealthy interest in pornography. Conspiracy has traditionally been an other, a perversion, the neighbor. In addition to this, its abnormality is supported by the Internet. The conspiracy/theorist, then, like the network that supports it, is the repressed underside of legitimate liberal rationality. The two neighbors co-constitute each other, and, as a conjoined entity, inform the discursive environment that “Homeland” inhabits.

“Homeland’s” relationship to conspiracy bears mention in the context of the gaze and desire. Although Mathison’s conspiratorial thinking is questioned and ultimately invalidated by her colleagues, who repeatedly warn her of going “too far,” viewers are positioned to bear an omniscient gaze that proves her suspicions correct. Spectators are even invited to peer into Brody’s garage—where he prays and builds a vest bomb—a “blank spot” of a space that even Mathison cannot access. In the universe of “Homeland,” viewers become the Big Other who validate conspiratorial thinking as a viable 2011 counter-terrorism strategy even when the “little brothers” (Dean 2002: 80) discredit it. This viewer positioning folds conspiracy thinking into legitimated practices of counter-terrorism—a significant feature of what is “uniquely 2011” about the show.

“Homeland” pushes the process of techno-securitization and the acceptance of conspiratorial security-subjectivity one step further. In this post-post 9/11 world, Mathison’s paranoid psychosis, especially her feminized psychosis, are assets. Conspiracy theorizing has been removed from the purview of the dubious Internet and incorporated into the fold of sanctioned techno-security procedures. This neighbor has tentatively been invited in. This is not to say that the emergence of feminine security subject is unprecedented. Grewal (2006) has previously analyzed the post-9/11 function of the feminized security citizen, in the form of the “security mom” tasked with protecting children, home, and homeland from terrorists. Carrie is a different subject, however. She is a previously barred subject who is not operating on a strictly private register, but rather has been accepted (through the text’s injunction to viewers) as an official figure tasked with security practice in an institutional capacity precisely because of her othered status. We are enjoined to accept the other as a perfect subject to enact the state of exception.

“Homeland” positions an excessive subject as necessarily engaging in “below board,” extra-legal, creative tactics to manage and apprehend terrorists. The importance of affect in structuring systems is another central component indicative of the current
cultural discourse of global counterterrorism, of which “Homeland” is a part.

In “The Future Birth of the Affective Fact,” Brian Massumi outlines some of the consequences of the era of affect, and their impact on political deliberation and everyday life. In a world defined by everyday fear-of the random subjective violence of the terrorist attack, of unpredictable financial collapse, of job loss and bankruptcy, we exist as terrorized subjects. An affective fact is a sense of certainty accessed quickly, that privileges feeling and intuition over deliberation and process. It is immediate, and “always already known.” It happens when “threat triggers fear. The fear is of disruption. The fear is disruption” (2005: 8). The affective fact always already is, it exists in a system, possibly latent and dormant, but there, ready to erupt and strike at any moment. The affective fact is a moment of the Real, it is a shock that precedes signification, symbolization, and capture by the process of language. It is terror. As a political rationale, fidelity to the affective fact entails a system driven by feeling and certainty. An affective fact is a paradoxical entity, empirically difficult to locate but seemingly offering certainty. It happens when the “explosion” wrecking the system (Deleuze 1990: 125) becomes the norm, definitive of the system itself. It happens when the state of exception becomes-commonplace.

Carrie Mathison’s character embodies a security-subject driven by affective certainty. As a rogue element-a feral creature annexed by the state-Mathison is an ideal subject to spearhead security initiatives based in affect. She lives in a world defined by desire and feeling; psychotic and sexual. Mathison’s madness and undisciplined feminine excess become handy tools in the era of the affective fact, as her formerly abject characteristics become re-territorialized and annexed in the service of the state. She is becoming-citizen, a neighbor no more. Brody exemplifies the opposite side of this coin. He is becoming abject, an emerging neighbor, because in this age of networked communication and diffuse terror cells, of too much liberal multiculturalism, anything goes. He is also the manifestation of the abject network. Brody thus stands as the repressed core of liberal multiculturalism’s demand for tolerance. This core, however, is no longer a hard kernel-it is a shock. A powerful feeling of dread and fear, the affective fact is an abject charge, the battle cry of a suicide bomber before he detonates himself.

As a fluid entity that travels through bodies, possessing them and altering them, affect in an assemblage, as Puar (2007) pointed out, really queers things. Brody’s white, uniformed body, infected by affect, can be made to kneel and cry out Allah’s name. Through this depiction of affect and becoming other, “Homeland” reveals something truly
ideologically troubling. To return to Žižek’s reflections on violence, “Homeland” embraces not only the reign of the affective fact and everyday fear, but further reifies disavowal of objective violence in favor of the transgressions of subjects. Regardless of how fluid the subjects and others are, regardless of how much traversal of affect disrupts and unsettles preexisting depictions of abject bodies, the end result nonetheless defaults into decidedly commonplace practices of fetishism and disavowal. Brody acquires his status as a terrorist through highly visible activities, demonstrating this system. The anxieties presented in “Homeland” are not relegated to the domain of popular culture fantasy. Rather, they are symptomatic of contemporary life defined by networks-of terrorist cells, global communication technologies, and the ways in which fear of the other is displaced onto the network itself. Shifting attitudes on surveillance, security, and subjectivity that appear in “Homeland” can be traced outside of the show, and manifest in policy decisions and the efforts of counter-terrorist Non-Governmental Organizations. In particular, notions of terrorism as an energetic and infectious force, exploration of “soft” counter-terrorism methods, and hostility toward the Internet all make major appearances in institutional discourses of terror in 2011.


In September of 2011, the Bipartisan Policy Center, an American think-tank, issued a “report card” and position paper detailing the state of national security ten years after the 9/11 attacks. In addition to a literal report card where various security measures were designated as “unfulfilled” or “improvement needed” with a color-coded dot, the report also included an analysis of persistent terrorist threats facing the homeland. Referencing the Fort Hood murders and shootings in Norway, the paper warns that “other brands of extremism…threaten all of us (2011: 9).” This sentence supplies some insight into the discursive landscape of terrorism and terror management that intersects with other cultural narratives and popular culture products such as “Homeland.” First of all, we must ask, who are these “others” and what is their “brand” of extremism? Posing a challenge to Žižek’s distinction of extremism and terrorism, the report card seemingly combines the two categories in a new way, as individuals coded in other places as “extremists” (white nationals like the Norway shooter) are re-branded as terrorists. So, what does it mean to suggest that there is a new brand of extremism that warrants new counter-terrorist
measures? In a telling move that implicates network technology, the report card warns of “blogs and other online content” that can influence “self radicalization” of Americans and other “perpetrators of different national and ethnic backgrounds that cannot easily be ‘profiled’ as threats.” As a “network, not a hierarchy,” (2011: 7) al Qaeda is well positioned to adapt to communication technologies and utilize networked media, despite the fact that its leader, Osama bin Laden, was executed by U.S. troops on May 2nd, 2011. The position paper, through this language, expresses concern that potential terrorists, like the fictional agent Brody, could be “turned” by too much involvement with online communication networks.

The language of this position paper reflects deep anxieties surrounding the nature of networked media technologies, citizenship, belief and belonging in a post-post 9/11 world. The report card fears the very nature of the network itself; its ability to transmit affects to a broad swath of bodies, regardless of ideological predispositions, religious affiliations, and/or ethnic backgrounds. Within this system, the sense of the neighbor as “by definition, too close” (Žižek 2008: 45) is heightened, because the neighbor is now pure potential, traversing a swirl of virtual and material bodies, their boundaries porous and susceptible to the terrorist affect constantly circulating around and through them. The affect itself, which Deleuze and Guattari remind us is itself a “being” (1994: 164), is now the “too close” neighbor, possessing the ability to turn material bodies; to make itself bodily, material flesh. The neighbor is not only affect and potentially affected bodies: it is the lurking Internet itself. In this affective loop the signifier is elusive, for “what seems, is” (Massumi 2005: 8). The neurotic question “how can I be sure that I see another subject, not a flat biological machine lacking depth?” (Žižek 2004: 46) becomes much tougher to answer in the era of terrorist affect, as the potential for becoming-other through affective territorialization is heightened. The affective fact is not an empirical entity, but a “partial object of a semiotic event” (Massumi 2005: 10) that is in the system more than itself.

Affective facts are horrific, libidinal partial objects, and come to stand, surpassing corporeal bodies as quilting points that suture ideological spaces and generate systems of objective violence increasingly defined by technology and techno-culture. Others (Gates 2008, Andrejevic 2011) have pointed out how the systemic violence of turning bodies into data to be managed is implicated in the diminishing of civil liberties, in that bodies are being subjected to more and more intrusive “security” protocols involving biometric recognition and other types of surveillance. This strategy of "diversification" not
only others the network and unites it with the others of terrorist affect, it imbues this affect with its own sort of autonomy and agency. Able to possess bodies regardless of preexisting affiliations, this affect enjoys an autonomous, powerful existence in its own right. It is a truly excessive jouisseur, an obscene father situated outside the law, partaking in as many bodies as it pleases (Freud 1950). As Brian Massumi writes:

The autonomy of affect is its participation in the virtual. Its autonomy is its openness. Affect is autonomous to the degree to which it escapes confinement in the particular body whose vitiality, or potential for interaction, it is (2002: 35).

Affect freely penetrates material and virtual bodies. This concept of autonomous affect is important to a Zizekian analysis of contemporary counterterrorism discourse for two reasons. First, affect, of terror and extremism, stands in as the libidinal kernel (Žižek 1989). The impossible object of desire, owing to networked technology and virtual worlds, is no longer understood as accessible and visible in particular bodies that can be easily marked for expulsion and removal, as in the context of the populist fantasy of totality and wholeness. What distinguishes this ideological space from that of Red Scare era (portrayed in Invasion of the Body Snatchers) is the reign of technoculture, fear of network technologies, and how this cultural moment implicates ideological entrenchment of the injunction for enhanced security and more surveillance, allegedly necessary to capture the invisible, flowing affect igniting the others who are potentially becoming-terrorist. The kernel is now an amorphous entity—a feeling or belief, a shock, a terror.

Anxiety over the non-corporeal and virtual nature of abjection today is palpable in the report card. The solution to this new kind of terrorism, including a “nightmare scenario” involving terrorist computer hackers destroying the economy by compromising online banking systems, is more sophisticated technological means for combating their efforts. Initiatives laid out include assigning radio bandwidth spectrum for an alert system, as well as, of course, biometric entry and exit screening procedures. The turn to biometric procedures as a strategy to “adapt quickly to new and different kinds of enemies” is telling. Rather than accepting the un-detectability of the core of otherness, the Bipartisan Center, like Mathison the vanguard CIA agent, concludes that harnessing smarter, more precise surveillance measures will uncover the truth of terror. The Bipartisan Center desires total body surveillance, involving enhancement of the controversial TSA body scanners and other securitization technologies. It is as if the kernel of terrorism is now, quite literally, an explosive, excremental remainder, a
gaseous force hiding deep inside the body, that is, paradoxically, ultimately visible by a technologically enhanced gaze.\(^4\)

Another document illustrating the strangeness of the anxieties generated by the elusive object of terrorism is a position paper released by the Strategic Studies Institute in 2011. Also a follow-up to the 9/11 Commission Report, this document outlines three objectives that need to be accomplished if the eradication of al Qaeda is to succeed. Two of these, “decapitation” and “hardening of homeland security” have supposedly been achieved. A third, “deradicalization” has been “relatively less” successful (2011: vii). Although author Kamolnick seems more optimistic than the 9/11 report card regarding the status of homeland security, the issue of deradicalization brings up similar fears and concerns. Achieving this “elusive strategic objective” (2011, 1) involves “soft” tactics ranging from “offering exit ramps” to members (2011: 3) manipulation achieved through infiltration, involving encouraging in-fighting, factioning, and other forms of implosion, and labeling and isolating “extremists” from their support network. Kamolnick advocates for an approach termed “jihad-realistic jurisprudence,” which entails laying out a legally based, rational argument to Muslims conceding that, although jihad is legitimate in some contexts, the majority of scenarios under which it is waged are in direct violation of Shari’a law.

Kamolnick’s approach exemplifies what McGowan (2011) discusses regarding the role of belief and the anchoring of the signifier. Belief, McGowan argues, is ultimately necessary to sustain the symbolic order, for eventually a system of meaning needs to be anchored in the S2 term, the “God” or Master Signifier term that props up and legitimizes the “because I said so” injunction. Kamolnick, in the body of his position paper, attempts to designate Shari’a law as this S2, a strategy which he believes will be effective in deradicalizing Islam by effecting a split between law and belief, effectively isolating the outliers—“those traditional categories of terrorist littering the political landscape (separatist, ethno-nationalist, communist, anarchist or doomsday cults”) (2011: 5) from al Qaeda, which “legitimates its self-proclaimed right to wage jihad based on what it claims is a faithful adherence to Islamic law” (2011: 5).

Within this system, bin Laden emerges as an obscene figure—an “invited guest” (2011: 17) turned unruly neighbor in Afghanistan, who enjoys “intolerance, fanaticism, and terror” and “perverts” the law with his excessive enjoyment and violent jouissance (2011: 19). A classic obscene figure who stands outside the law (Freud 1950), bin Laden, who has been “decapitated,”\(^5\) is not totally purged from Islam. Although the father
has been murdered, and a legitimized symbolic structure (Shari’a law) erected in his place (Freud 1950), bin Laden has simply floated down to the unconscious of the law, where he festers as its undead, obscene underside, still able to pervert with his excessive fantaticism. This is important, for it reveals that it is the terrorist affect itself, not simply bin Laden the man, that functions as the pre-Oedipal father. As Deleuze mentioned, monsters produced at the surface can absolutely drag us into pre-symbolic depths. This process is precisely what Kamolncik seems to be grappling with, suggesting that fetish-agents of subjective violence are never truly evacuated of their affective charge, even when purged from the assemblage that produced them. The position paper worries that the neighbor always lives on, as undead, drive-ing affect, in the dark lands of the virtual.

Bin Laden’s persistent power-in the form of the force he exerts as an undead entity that nonetheless emits energy-exemplifies Lacan’s point that “God is unconscious” (1998a: 59). Moreover, it suggests that God and affect are interchangeable terms, omnipotent, moving forces that cause effects upon bodies (the “possessed” white soldier kneeling and crying out Allah’s name), persisting the death of one corporeal body and flowing to others. This process is similar to how Freud understood the function of drive (1961). Perhaps contemporary counterterrorist strategists are Deleuzians. Rather than accepting the inevitability of terrorist affect, they propose strategies for how it can be changed and altered, and they remind us that God/affect is a process of becoming, and through the deployment of strategic and targeted strategies, the undead possession that grabbed Brody can be transmogrified into something else, through proper strategies of seduction, manipulation, and influence.

Although bin Laden’s physical body is dead, it lives on in the (virtual) circuits of drive, the impossible object of total, ecstatic destruction. He is in him more than himself: The Force that Mathison was trying to see in Brody. What Kamolnick proposes is a strategy to “deradicalize,” to neutralize the excessive enjoyment, the drive that survives bin Laden the man. This powerful force can, again, be the kernel of the real understood as movement itself, a process of becoming, that, aided by interactive systems and networked technologies, threatens to infect any body. In the case of “Homeland” this anxiety is palpably brought to the surface in the case of agent Brody, who continues to elude the CIA’s gaze and hide his radicalization beneath an undetectable veneer, escaping to his secret (to the other characters) space to engage in his behaviors. David Gordon and the other writers of “Homeland” respond to this strategy by posing additional
questions and problems. Carrie Mathison is, in Kamolnick’s metric, a perfect subject to uncover the “truth” of Brody’s allegiances, and is well suited to “deradicalize” him. Mathison supplies the ideal “off ramp” for Brody, providing good company and satisfying sex, a fresh, exhilarating alternative to his failing marriage. During the course of the rendezvous, Mathison and Brody laugh and drink; she entertains him and makes him smile while attempting to gently extract information about Abu Nazir, his experiences in Afghanistan, and his overall political profile. The viewer/Big Other is enjoined to accept the legitimacy of de-radicalizing “soft” counter terrorism in the form of a neighbor brought “home” via the affective power of the “Homeland’s” feminine body.

Elsewhere, the notion of affective labor has been analyzed as a new demand placed on women, in both paid and non-paid contexts, as the service sector becomes an increasingly integral component of the global workforce (Hardt and Negri 2001, Ouellette and Wilson 2011, Myer 2000). As a supplement to her office tasks as a CIA agent (looking up information, responding to operatives), Mathison brings exactly this sort of “service sector” element to her work. She engages in “off the clock” activities aimed at taming Brody’s wild impulses and coaxing him into letting his guard down. Her deployment of affective labor, a form of women’s work that is not separate from, but rather enhances, her professional directive, comes into play as a modern “deradicalization” strategy illustrative of a new type of anti-terrorism regime deployed against the uncertainty and amorphousness of these new neighbors. In the age of global terrorism, global capital, and techno-saturation, bodies, affects, money and information are flowing quickly, with potentially disastrous results (a “nightmare scenario” perpetrated by terrorist hackers). Given this new reality of globalization, the Big Other needs to legitimate formerly barred subjects if they can be of use in stopping the “real” other-affect’s-reign of terror. The feminine is an integral, indispensible component of deradicalization in the age of global, networked terror. Women’s affective labor, itself a phenomenon indicative of shifting global work rhythms, slots neatly into this system.

Returning again to Kamolnick’s paper, this counter-terrorism proposal introduces a directive that essentially calls out Western scapegoating of Islam. The West, and its “contorted occidentalist imagination,” Kamolnick (2011: 33) chides, is guilty of indulging in a perverse fantasy of Islam AS the excess, when in fact the excess is that which exceeds and transgresses shari’a law, the previously discussed obscene affect, God becoming Devil. Kamolnick is correct in pointing this out. He is, however, ultimately himself guilty of indulging this perverse “occidental” fantasy himself, which is apparent in
the organization of the paper. The body of the text does, indeed, read as a pragmatic
document, devoid of flowery prose and highly focused on legal analysis, close reading of
Shari’a law, and logical arguments. Buried in the footnotes, however, are the obscene
fantasies that Kamolnick himself unsuccessfully attempts to disavow. At the 10-year
anniversary of 9/11, Kamolnick writes, we can bear witness to a “gaunt, ghostly, hidden,
underground shell of a savaged conspiratorial vanguard group” whose “singular
accomplishment” on 9/11/11 was to post a video to a jihadist website while “bin Laden
himself falls slave to deep sea ocean currents and inevitable corporeal decomposition”
(2011: 27). Kamolnick’s legalese and level-headed practicality merely disguise its
obscene supplement, as fantasies of bin Laden’s decaying, waterlogged corpse
commanding extremist ghouls from beyond the grave contort his imagination.

The bin Laden zombie exists both on the surface and deep below it, a non-
linguistic, affective force always threatening to possess subjects and drag them out of
everyday fear and into terrorism-to radicalize them. Although he attempts to trivialize the
significance of the online video, Kamolnick’s overwrought minimization of its impact
conceals a deep anxiety regarding bin Laden’s ability to affect terrorist networks
(especially their online organizing). Like the liberal multiculturalist, the Islam
“legitimating” counter-terrorist nonetheless reveals the prurient underside of its ideology,
disavowed, decapitated, and flung into the depths of the ocean, but nonetheless
transmitting powerful affects, enabled by networked communication technologies, to
those porous, perverse bodies open to excessive enjoyments and the possibility
becoming-extremist. Looking awry (Žižek 1992) at this jurisprudential counter-terrorism
position paper reveals its ideological dimensions, specifically its anxiety over networked
becoming-otherness and abjection, that link it with “Homeland.” In addition, Kamolnick’s
paper sets the stage for the real-world implementation of “soft power” counterterrorism
also introduced in “Homeland.”

Conclusion  Sublating the Neighbor: The Power of
Material Becoming

I conclude this analysis with a brief discussion of the efforts of an anti-terrorism
campaign called Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE), an initiative launched by the
global Non-Governmental Organization Women without Borders. WWB’s mission
statement calls for ongoing efforts to pursue “non-violent conflict resolution in countries
in transition or undergoing reconstruction.” The SAVE project was launched in 2008, and is heralded by WWB as “the first women’s counterterrorism platform.” WWB’s homepage includes a quote from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton lauding SAVE for showing that “women are refusing to sit on the sidelines while extremism undermines their communities.” The SAVE project brings to bear the resonance of a number of issues discussed earlier in this analysis, including “feminized” deradicalization strategies, terrorism as elusive affect, and the importance of becoming and potential as forces constitutive of, and constituted by, the terrorist/citizen dynamic. Moreover, it supplies insight that further reveals the anxieties of becoming-neighbor inherent in understanding counter-terrorism in the era of network and affective fact. Gunkel’s analysis of the Hegelian concept of sublation is helpful in situating the function of SAVE with regards to these notions, as well as its emergence as a nodal point from the assembled system that also includes “Homeland” and the counter-terrorism papers discussed here. Sublation, according to Gunkel is a paradoxical concept embodying a dialectical struggle. It means

[T]o preserve, to maintain…and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. The sublation of the dialectic of being and nothing, for instance, is becoming. Becoming constitutes a third term that both puts an end to the mere opposition of being and nothing, and at the same time preserves their difference in itself (Gunkel 2007b: 24).

Out of all of the artifacts discussed here, the SAVE project most directly engages in the process of sublation, while reflecting greater anxieties over the role of becoming, as it both constitutes, and is constituted by, the terrorist/citizen dialectic. In her essay “Women as Counter-Terrorism Activists,” Fahmia al-Fotih, a Yemeni SAVE coordinator, praises the productive potential that the “uneducated ordinary women” have to deradicalize potential terrorists. Unlike men, who are occupied in the discretely bounded public sphere, Yemeni women can “freely move from one neighbor’s house to another,” circling the community and looking for “early warning signs” of extremist potential. SAVE’s research project Mothers for Change elaborates on this goal, calling, in its executive summary, for mothers to learn to “recognize the signs of early radicalization in youth.” As this passage states:

Women are strategically positioned at the center of the family, where they are the first to recognize resignation and anger in their children. They build an ideal early-warning system when their sons, daughters, or husbands travel down the wrong path. Just as terrorist organizations are able to exploit latent activist energies in youth, the project seeks to identify and unlock mothers’ directive
Sublation, as it manifests in this passage, can de-radicalize the potential terrorist while upholding the fundamental self/other dichotomy of terrorist and citizen that sustains the entire system. The role of affect travel and becoming-potential is inherent in the injunction of the “uneducated” mother to “read” the faces of her family for signs of extremist affect-resignation and anger present on bodies.

Like the Mathison character, the ideal counterterrorist of 2011 is a highly feminized subject, operating on the realm of the personal and the felt to provide off-ramps, promote peace, and “transmit state-wide preventative measures to the individual level.” Both of these subjects tarry with the neighbor, and are tasked with routing him out of terrorist networks through highly embodied, material and affective measures.

Mathison surveils Brody’s private residence for signs of the elusive, abject object, and initiates a sexual and romantic relationship to further her agenda of ascertaining information. The mothers of SAVE, however, have even more potential. They, uninhibited by any rules, directives, and/or protocols, are empowered and enabled to travel and flow freely within their embodied community networks, encountering multiple neighbors as they traverse the material field. These “ordinary” bodies are wholly material, outside of the pernicious, neighboring pull of virtual networks, and thus safe bets to SAVE others from them. As quasi-dehumanized entities, supposedly “uneducated,” and “illiterate,” these women are, distinct from Mathison, freed from the limitations of intellectualism, intrigue, and language. Their bodies, like affect itself, are fantasized as pre-symbolic and non-linguistic. Although the tone of SAVE’s website seems to herald the role of dialogue and discourse to spread the gospel of peace and cosmopolitan citizenship to achieve the “elusive” aim of deradicalization, what lies beneath this outward appearance falls squarely within the register of affect. This is also apparent in analysis of the SAVE conference, which focused not on academic presentations and intellectual analysis of the extremism problem, but on the women’s tears, their frustration and anger, and ultimately the power of these emotions, generated by the affect of terror/ism, to ensure group cohesion.

The Mothers for Change project exemplifies the affective dimension of counter-terrorism even more clearly, as the women charged with eradicating the neighbor-power are, quite literally machine-objects, “transmitters” functioning as a “state wide alert system,” the material, bodily equivalent of the radio bandwidth warning system called for by the Report Card. They are, interestingly, also likened to “old” media, which perhaps
further neutralizes the fear of virtual otherness. Which brings us back to the virtual. Analysis of counter-terrorism proposals exemplifies fear of the virtual in the form of an “othered” network of circulating terrorist affect. The SAVE project is a material node (with a virtual, online supplement that, presumably, the “illiterate” mothers are not encountering) poised to deradicalize the virtual network’s abjectifying power, a goal identified by the Bipartisan Center’s report. “Homeland” is its virtual twin, and is, as a highly popular U.S. television program praised by both the New York Times (Stanley, 2011) and President Barack Obama (Huffington Post Staff, 2012), what ought to be considered as the privileged term in the dialectic of the real/virtual (Gunkel 2007b: 31). Although a fictional, popular, culture industry product oft-compared to the action program “24,” “Homeland” carries out the initiatives of U.S. Homeland security in a more high-profile manner than the material activities of Women Without Borders. The need to take popular culture seriously as a component of exploding the naturalization of the “real” as the privileged term points to the power of the virtual supplement.

This intertwinement of popular culture programming with policy proposals and NGO endeavors reminds us of why Žižekian analysis of popular culture is absolutely necessary, because “today, liberal democracy frequently achieves its most powerful ideological effects through the appearance of being non-ideological” (Taylor 2010: 150). Looking awry at these sublime objects of ideology allows us to “take seriously the powerful structuring role of fantasy” (Taylor 2010: 157). Moreover, adopting a parallax view towards these objects as pieces of a larger, systemic, networked assemblage supplies even more ammunition for this aim, in that it allows us to further examine the structuring role that these pieces have in the systems they inhabit, for, when we begin to see them as nodal points interacting and intersecting with other nodes, we can more effectively trace, chart and map the trajectories across and through which their affects flow, and the manners in which they territorialize. The knot consisting of “Homeland,” the New York Times online coverage of it, and the websites, videos, and position papers of the counter-terrorism groups examined here exemplify one such networked relationship. Through this analysis, I have attempted to further emphasize the importance of utilizing Žižek’s method, as well as demonstrate, through careful investigation of an affect-driven assemblage, the ongoing need to pay attention to the virtual supplements that maintain ongoing relationships with material bodies in the interconnected, assembled network of reality.
1 In the action novel *Gideon's War*, written by “Homeland” producer Howard Gordon, the white other terrorist-villain, also a “turned” U.S. soldier, has renamed himself Abu Nasir. Note that this is the same name given to the Middle Eastern terrorist leader in “Homeland,” further exemplifying the autonomous, fluid nature and free-flowing quality of terrorist potential within a network of virtual and material bodies.

2 The report card contains to symbol to signify adequate progress, suggesting that this part of this document’s mission is to remind its readers that the threat of terrorism is ever present and tenacious, a cultural and political mainstay that can never be fully solved, only managed, contained, and “improved.”

3 Rather than a “fight fire with fire” mentality, the manual returns to an “old” media communication format as solution to the terrorist network. Perhaps mistrust of the network is so great that counter-terrorism specialists fear that even they are not immune to its powers. This seems to speak to Gunkel’s (2007b) point that emerging technologies are frequently analogized to highly addictive, dangerous narcotics. As such, perhaps bastions of responsible, proper subjectivity imagine that they are best avoided if possible.

4 This narrative, in part seems to again stem from fear of terrorist potential to use virtual methods and unconventional (often miniature-ized) devices to destroy and detonate infrastructure. It is not just that they are building bombs, what is terrifying about terrorists is that they are increasingly becoming bomb, as crashing networks, enjoyment, exploding bodies, and physical detonation swirl together in a knot of abject excesses. (see Asad 2007). As Jeremy Packer (2006: 378) has pointed out, this new anxiety has helped to usher in a securitization system in which we are all “becoming bomb” under the gaze of the Big Other.

5 Discourse surrounding bin Laden’s death typically plays a role in this Freudian theatre, in accounts where his death is graphically described at the hands of a U.S. military Band of Brothers who, in some accounts, are depicted as assassinating bin Laden while he is in the midst of an orgy with multiple women. The psychoanalytic origin tale of the obscene father hoarding all of the tribe’s women thus supplies the obscene underside of the liberal, multicultural outrage demanding the “liberation” of oppressed, subjugated Afghani women. News accounts are also enhanced by a plethora of photographs showing bin Laden’s bloody, mutilated head, driving the point home. See [http://alhayatwadounia.wordpress.com/2011/05/02/al-qaeda-leader-osama-bin-laden-killed-in-pakistan-by-us-forces/](http://alhayatwadounia.wordpress.com/2011/05/02/al-qaeda-leader-osama-bin-laden-killed-in-pakistan-by-us-forces/), [http://europeancourier.org/test/2011/05/02/photos-osama-bin-laden-dead/](http://europeancourier.org/test/2011/05/02/photos-osama-bin-laden-dead/) for examples.

6 The use of this dialectic as a metaphor is intentional. The anxieties expressed in the artifacts used here point to a fundamental fear of becoming as a perverted/perverting process. No longer are we engaged in a cosmic struggle between Go(o)d and Evil as discrete, fixed terms. Now, thanks to heightened concerns of “turned” Americans as well as hope for “deradicalization” enabled on various levels by global technologies and initiatives, the to force to be tamed is not Evil itself, but the process by which evil comes to be and take shape in bodies, the becoming-evil itself.

7 The supposed stupidity of SAVE’s counter-terrorist is extremely important, in that visual recognition and awareness are integral parts of her duties. Literature focusing on the process of witnessing as a mode of looking conjoined to an ethical imperative (Durham Peters 2005, Oliver 2001) elaborates on the necessity of simple-mindedness as an element of “good” witnesses, in that they are supposed to function as an uncritical, uncreative vessel, a piece of recording technology whose purpose it is to record and transmit “dumb” facts. The becoming-machine element of this category of subjectivity bears more discussion that I do not have the space for here.

References:


