The Question of Lacanian Ontology: Badiou and Žižek as Responses to Seminar XI

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Introduction

It is no question that metaphysics and ontology are making something of a comeback in mainstream philosophy. Along with the emerging “speculative realism” movement, a decidedly different form of ontology has been quietly brewing in the work of Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, both heavily indebted to and informed by Lacan. The relation of psychotherapy and metaphysics dates back to the origins of dynamic psychiatry and its own foundings in Romanticism and German Idealism. In the 19th Century there was no question that psychotherapy was grounded in the metaphysical unconscious, be it that of Schelling, Schopenhauer, Fechner or Carus. After Freud the problem seems reversed; no longer do we attempt to ground our therapeutic practice in metaphysical speculation but quite the opposite, drawing metaphysical conclusions from the work of the therapist. This is seen clearly in the after effects of the Lacan-event: from Deleuze, to Badiou, to Žižek we
can see philosophers grappling with the structural form of psychoanalysis, not on the grounds of therapeutics, but taking Lacan as having produced works of metaphysics, or at least, of metaphysical import. In this essay I will suggest that it is in light of the question of Lacanian ontology, that question posed bluntly enough by Jacques-Alain Miller to Lacan, “What is your ontology?” that we should read both Badiou and Žižek. While it could be argued how satisfactorily Lacan answered the question of ontology, it seems clear that both Badiou and Žižek, if they are not attempting both to answer the question for Lacan, are at least answering the question in some way. It will be shown that not only do they present two different possible answers to the question of Lacanian ontology, but that in doing so they present us with two different ways of viewing and reading Lacan.

While many if not all of Lacan’s works could perhaps be labelled as “transitional,” there is something almost mercurial about the eleventh of Lacan’s seminars (held in 1964). Perhaps it is the fact that it was the first to be held at the École Normale Supérieure (with a larger audience), or his excommunication from the IPA, but beyond this Seminar XI marks the beginnings of Lacan’s famously difficult later work with its focus on diagrammatics, knots, and locks. What this later work signifies is a move beyond language towards topology and structure-as-such, but it begins in this seminar, with its focus on the Real in opposition to the Symbolic. The question of ontology forces Lacan to re-evaluate the structure of the Imaginary-Symbolic-Real system and focus in a new way on the Real as that which shrugs off the Symbolic. Seminar XI (1978) should be read as a kehr in Lacan’s work, being the beginning of the end of the reign of linguistics as the dominant model for Lacanianism and the first effort to move towards a formal theory, with structures used not for the sake of modeling or approximating the truth but because the truth of Lacanianism becomes structure-as-such.

The Question of Ontology

In the section of the eleventh seminar titled “Of the Subject of Certainty,” Lacan begins by discussing Miller’s “excellent outline” of his own thought as grounded in “the structuring function of a lack” (Lacan 1978: 28). Lacan then says that Miller “questioned [him] as to [his] ontology” (Ibid). His response is to maintain that while speaking of this gap he is dealing with an “ontological function,” the unconscious cannot be questioned in ontological terms because it is “pre-ontological.” This suggests first that the gap qua “ontological function” is not the gap in subjectivity (the unconscious). Interestingly enough, a section of
the seminar is devoted to his own refutation of idealism, maintaining a ground for
psychoanalysis outside of the “merely” subjective, and also complicating the relation
between the gap in subjectivity and the gap qua ontology. Nevertheless, he seems to be
responding to the question in two ways throughout the seminar, giving us perhaps the “two
sides” of Lacan, what I will term the formal and the phenomenological.

Two themes dominate Seminar XI, the first is the relation of psychoanalysis to
science, whether psychoanalysis is a science or can be a science. The second is the
relation between the Subject, the Symbolic and the Real, as seen in Lacan’s development
of objet a from its origin as part of schema L, to the matheme of fantasy ($◊a$), to the object
of desire, here becoming identified with the “remainder” of symbolic castration, that which
is severed from the Subject through their introduction into the Symbolic Order and which
they continually seek out of a sense of incompleteness. Objet a here becomes a structural
necessity of subjectivization, the source of the structuring lack itself. These two themes
could be said to be the two dominant themes of the whole of Lacan’s corpus, the attempt
to phenomenologize the subject of the unconscious by understanding the nature and
ground of subjectivity and its relation to language, and the attempt to construct and
elaborate a purely formal theory through the use first of Lacanian algebra and subsequent
elaboration in the topological work of the various schemas, ending famously in the work of
the 1970s on knot theory.

Lacan, like Freud before him, is very much concerned with the scientific status of
psychoanalysis. While Freud concentrated on the empiricism of analysis along with
speculative biology and anthropology² to achieve this, Lacan first hedges his bet that it is
through structural linguistics that psychoanalysis will be shown to be scientific. From
linguistics, Lacan is able to also connect his work to the structural anthropology of Lévi-
Strauss, further formalizing psychoanalytic theory before moving to the hyper-formalism of
topology: Borromean knots, the torus, and the moebius strip. The move here is not
arbitrary but is best thought of in terms of the question of ontology posed above, the
search for a way to think structure-as-such. This is the end goal of Lacan’s formal
ontology, as Lacan remarked in Seminar XX: Encore: “mathematical formalization is our
goal, our ideal” (Lacan 1998: 119). Jean-Claude Milner notes that the famous phrase “the
unconscious is structured like a language” is actually redundant since ‘language’ here
simply means structured (Milner 1995: 104). It is not the case that the unconscious is
structured similarly to language, but that it is simply structured, as is language. We should
simply say then that “the unconscious is structured.” The formalization of psychoanalysis
means the study of structure. Especially during the 1970s, Lacan attempted to formalize psychoanalytic theory so as to make it indistinguishable from mathematics, transforming it from an art that critics contended was based more on charisma than science, into a formal logic of relations, in other words, the study of structure. This set of logical relations depended first on the familiar Lacanian algebra and the various schemata before the attempt was made to move from language altogether, as seen in the infamous seminars of the ‘70s that had Lacan in almost complete silence as he constructed knots and drew diagrams. This attempt to move away from linguistics is evident in the schemata of the ‘50s but becomes clearer in light of the seminar of 1964. It is here that Lacan begins to fully articulate the importance of the Real as the residue of castration and therefore as necessary for the formation of subjectivity. In order to understand the structure of the Subject, one must grasp the non-lingual, the extra-Symbolic. In the formal theory of the ‘70s, Lacan grounds his topological theory in mathematical structures that are based on a hollow centre, that we could say are grounded in the void. This void is the structuring gap which the Symbolic Order envelops. From this we understand the relation of the Symbolic to the Real and the Subjective in purely formal terms. This purely formal theory of relations should be understood in relation to the other side of Lacan, to the phenomenological understanding of subjectivity.

By phenomenological, I mean Lacan’s writings as they pertain to the experience of subjectivity, the sensation of the Real as trauma and the experience of the limits of language. In Seminar XI, there is a clear engagement with phenomenology through his discussion of Merleau-Ponty and the gaze. Beyond this engagement with phenomenology properly understood, much of Lacan’s work could (and should) be understood as a variety or species of phenomenology, not in the vein of Husserl or Heidegger, but rather in the Kantian-Hegelian tradition. Much of Lacan’s work on the relation between the Symbolic and the Real, that is, on the limits of linguistic symbolization and the trauma that comes with bumping against these limits, mirrors the Kantian demand to exhaustively account for the limitations of thought. In the case of Lacan, it is an account of the limitations of language and experience qua symbolic representation. The encounter with the Real sheds light on the very structure of representation since it is that which fails at representation either through lack or excess. It is this Lacan that Slavoj Žižek attaches himself to, to the modernity of critique and the investigation of limits and transgressions. While he may not align himself as closely to structural linguistics as Lacan, he remains faithful to the exposition of the limitations of symbolic representation, especially in his examples drawn
from film such as those related to the death drive and partial objects, the undead being his most horrifying case. In *Seminar XI*, this horror of the unrepresentable shows itself in Lacan’s “myth of the lamella,” as clear an attempt as any to convey the unrepresentable in almost Lovecraftian fashion, creating an image that becomes almost impossible to represent except by way of confusion and horror. The image of a large single-celled organism that “comes and envelops your face as you are quietly asleep” (Lacan 1978: 197) is perhaps the polar opposite of what we will outline first, the formal theory of ontology of Badiou and its relation to Lacan’s use of structure in the form of algebra, mathemes, schemata and topoi in the quest for a purely formal presentation of the structure of the psyche.

**Badiou and the Formal Ontology of Mathematics**

It is perhaps no accident that both *Being and Event* (2006/1988) and *Logics of Worlds* (2009/2006) end with a discussion of Lacan. Since his first book in 1969 Badiou has shown himself to be a philosopher who takes Lacan more seriously than most and this is only furthered in his two “big books.” *Being and Event* presents us with the beginnings of Badiou’s formal ontology, Being understood as pure multiplicity, continued through the logic of appearance in *Logics of Worlds*. There are essentially two forces at play in Badiou’s minimalist metaphysics, two names that we could say ground Badiou’s ontological thought. I am thinking here of Lacan and Heidegger.

From Lacan, we can see the basic structure of Badiou’s ontology: grounded in the void, the state of affairs maintains a relative stability until an excessive or deficient puncture forces itself upon the situation, causing a localised chaos until subjectivity is able to organize the emergent novelty and ground it into a new present. Such a vague presentation could be a description either of the relation of the Real and the Symbolic, whereby the latter maintains stability until the former thrusts itself into the scene until it is properly re-organized as part of the Symbolic Order, or, it could be a description of how events burst in to the system and create subjects who, out of their fidelity to the event, endeavour to universalize it in the form of a new present. Beyond this basic structure of a gap functioning as ground for structure-as-such, we can see the Badiouian subject’s relation to the Lacanian subject: both are grounded in a gap and are thus conditioned by that which is not only outside of themselves but outside of being. This is clear for instance in “Meditation Thirty-Seven” of *Being and Event* where Badiou discusses the Lacanian
reading of Descartes’ *cogito* as being primarily topological. Badiou shares Lacan’s drive to formalization, and it is here that Heidegger should be viewed as Badiou’s chief antagonist.

Heidegger serves in many ways as the ground of Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory. While the model of language in Lacanian theory is structuralist, the emphasis on language as the ground of the human comes from Heidegger (language is of course the house of Being; we could say that language is the horizon of Dasein, following Gadamer, who makes language the ground of tradition and thus history). The problem with Lacan, from the Badiouian perspective, is precisely this allegiance with linguistics, which lacks the universality of mathematical logic. Heideggerian poetry is a recurring foil for Badiou (matheme or poem?) and it is the connection between language and existence that serves as the battle cry of the Heideggerian.

The structural development of Badiou’s philosophy mirrors that of Lacan: Badiou begins his mature work with the claim that set theory is equivalent to ontology because only set theory deals with pure multiplicity as such (Being *qua* Being). This account of pure multiplicity has moved in recent years to account for appearance through an engagement with category theory. Category theory further abstracts Badiou’s work, no longer even relying necessarily on algebraic or logical variables as his work utilizing set theory does, but relies solely on points, arrows and geometric shapes. The parallel with Lacan’s move toward topology is clear; abstraction here is equated with formalization, it transforms the discourse in order to eliminate any possible contamination from cultural-linguistic bias or influence. Moving from language to mathematics means moving away from Heidegger and hermeneutics, and further attempts to distance theory from the exclusively human realm.

Being is a consistent multiplicity, the multiplicity of pure multiples. Ontology, as the study of Being *qua* Being, is “structured presentation,” (Badiou 2006: 25) that is to say, the presentation of structure-as-such. What is presented is multiplicity. Set theory provides us with a method of apprehending pure multiplicity, of grasping infinity, without positing a totalizing vantage point, without a move to transcendence. Rather, ontology is an entirely abstract, immanent ac-counting for Badiou, the grouping of multiplicities into sets. Set theory is, however, only grounded for Badiou by the empty set, the structuring gap that allows for the situating of all situations. It is from this gap that emerges the second half of Badiou’s first big book, the *event*.

The event serves as the injection of novelty into the situation which, by its nature, remains the same. It is only when nothingness breaks into Being that anything new can happen. This evental happening is also the source of subjectivity for Badiou, and it is here
where Lacan is explicitly cited in Being and Event, in the final meditation dealing with Lacan’s reading of the Cartesian cogito (Badiou 2006: 431-435). Lacan plays with the cogito in multiple ways, deconstructing it and reconstructing it, turning it inside out and refashioning it. It should be noted that there is an important connection between Lacan’s cogito and his re-reading of the Freudian “Wo es war,” as both convey the same ontological statement, that ultimately the Ego is false and grounded on the nothingness of the Real, “the core of our being” (Kern unseres Wesen) (Lacan 2006: 526). Lacan will continue by telling us that this core is more “my whims, aberrations, phobias, and fetishes than... my more or less civilized personage” (Ibid).

When Descartes says “I think therefore I am,” we should read this in light of the unconscious. What Descartes is concerned with is the Ego, the thinking thing that is the human subject as entirely transparent and transcendental. “I am thinking, therefore I am,” that is, insofar as I think, I am – absolutely. We can add further: “cogito ergo sum ubi cogito, ibi sum,” “I think therefore I am, where I think, there I am,” or perhaps better still, “I think therefor I am... where I think I am” both in the sense that I am where I think, but also I am only where I think I am in the illusory sense of merely thinking it. Or as Lacan will say, “this limits me to being there in my being only insofar as I think that I am in my thought” (Ibid: 516). To take Descartes at his word is to deny the psychoanalytic work of the unconscious, that there is at least a part of me (perhaps the only part that is truly “me”) that escapes my thinking, that in fact only shows itself, only has being, when I am not thinking. For this reason Lacan proposes a re-reading of Descartes in light of the truth of psychoanalysis. The cogito is transformed then, the foundational phrase becoming “I am thinking where I am not, therefore I am where I am not thinking” (I am thinking unconsciously in the void in my being, therefore I am most myself there where I am not thinking at all) or “I am not, where I am the plaything of my thought; I think about what I am where I do not think I am thinking” (Ibid: 517).

For Badiou, this topology of the subject, the fact that the subject is grounded in the void, in not only what they are not (Freud) but in what is not. The Symbolic Order is thus connected with the Real via subjectivity for Lacan in the same way that subjectivity connects Being and the event for Badiou. Structure emerges from the void, the count-as-one only being possible with the emergence of a novel multiplicity in the form of the event. This structuring is the fundamental act of subjective fidelity, the act of fidelity (by say, participating in a revolution) is a restructuring of an unstable situation, in the same way the Lacanian subject of analysis must cope with trauma (like the death of a loved one) by
restructuring their symbolic world with reference to the gap that has taken them hostage. Like Lacan however, Badiou is able to formalize the subject,9 to make him or her part of the formal presentation of situations or worlds. Even the void is able to be formalized for Badiou, the event made a part of his algebra, its trace written ε. The subject, despite being grounded in the nothingness of the event, is symbolised, is structured. Indeed, we could connect here the various structures of subjectivity put forward by Lacan, the obsessional neurotic for instance being a structure of subjectivity rather than a set of symptoms and the famed ‘barred subject’ ($) of Lacan having a place. In this formal presentation, nothing resists representation. This is what separates it from the phenomenological theory, which deals explicitly with the paradox of the presentation of the unspeakable.

Žižek and the Informal Ontology of Paradox

The key to understanding Žižek on the relation between the Symbolic and the Real is evident from his first English work, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (1989). Here, Žižek connects Marxist ideology critique with the practice of psychoanalysis, though not in the way proposed by the Frankfurt school or many other Freudo-Marxists who claim that what Freud is doing at the small scale of the individual can be extrapolated to larger populations as a whole, eventually to whole societies and civilizations. Instead Žižek connects the structural method of ideology critique with that of psychoanalysis; the analyst, like the critic, is tasked with the job of revealing to the analysand (the believer) what is impossible to see from their present vantage point; to articulate what they don’t know that they know. Žižek is not concerned with the structure of representation-as-such, as is perhaps the case with Badiou, but is concerned with the limits of these structures. He is concerned primarily with the repressed, that which is excluded from consciousness, representation, the Symbolic Order, etc, and the tendency inherent in the repressed to return, to haunt that order that excludes it.

Žižek’s ontology is, as I would say is the case for both Lacan and Badiou, structured on a gap, a structuring gap. The difference is seemingly slight but has great consequences. The emphasis for Žižek is not on the structuring but on that which is not structured or represented, the Real. The Real dominates Žižek’s thought, from his work on political ideology to his recommencement of the subject of German Idealism in psychoanalytic, materialist clothing. Unlike Badiou, who only draws on anything like the Real (the void, the event) in terms of subjectivity, it seems to have real import to ontology
for Žižek, as seen especially in his readings of Schelling and Hegel, as well as his version of the dialectic found in *The Parallax View* (2006).

As mentioned above, *Seminar XI* features a novel return of the objet a in the form of “the remainder” of symbolic castration, what is seen by the subject as having been removed from them upon entering the Symbolic Order. This “lost object” is the central drama of subjectivity as he or she aims for wholeness, attempting to fill the gap within themselves. This fundamental truth of subjectivity is found to have its origin in the work of F.W.J. Schelling.10 As Žižek’s title for his monograph on Schelling indicates, the central concept of Schellingian speculative metaphysics for Žižek is the “indivisible remainder.” Against the common view of Hegel’s totalizing system whereby all entities are subsumed, Schelling presents us with a non-totalizing system, a system that is in fact grounded on a fundamental split or gap. In any attempt to systematically represent the whole of the cosmos, there is always a remainder, always a repressed or excluded. This indivisible remainder is none other than the Lacanian objet a. The objet a is “the inaccessible ‘hard kernel’ around which the symbolization turns, which eludes it, the cause of its failure, and the very space of symbolization, its condition of possibility” (Žižek 1996: 145).11 This “hard kernel” is the necessarily externalized of subjectivity, or is it the other way around? The problem with Fichte is that the Other (Anstoß), the impetus of self-knowledge and thus ethical responsibility is entirely self-posed. If we were to try to read this in Lacanian terms, it would suggest that the Ego posits the Real as its own limitation to be overcome in the name of justice. This is not the case, and gives us some clue as to why Schelling is superior to Fichte on this point. At the beginning of *The Parallax View*, Žižek remarks that after the publication of *The Ticklish Subject* he has frequently been asked who or what is tickling the subject (Žižek 2006: 17). It is precisely the tickling object. For Schelling and Žižek, the remainder is equiprimordial with the subject, the two emerge simultaneously and only ever together. Objet a is not a self-limitation placed by the subject to be overcome, it is the impossibility of self-identity, the impossibility of the subject to account for a reality that includes itself. In Lacanian terms, the subject ($) is never encapsulated by any signification (S1) and so must be also represented by the object assumed to complete this representation (a). As soon as the subject is able to articulate herself, it becomes impossible (Žižek 1996: 46). One is not identical with oneself, someone only ever resembles themself (Žižek 2006: 44). This is precisely the point of objet a in *Seminar XI*, it is that which in some way guarantees adequate, accurate representation and yet, does not exist (Lacan 1978: 198-199).
In the closing section of *Seminar XI*, Lacan relates the *objet a*, to the *agalma* of *Seminar VII* devoted to transference. This connection is brought together through the discussion of love and gives us a clear view of the relation between the subject and *objet a*. The subject is tickled by the object (*a*); what does this mean for ontology? The difference is to be found in the divergence between Fichte and Schelling. For Fichte remember that the impasse (*a*) is posited by the subject. Schelling’s break with Fichte is to say that transcendental philosophy need not begin with subjectivity but with Nature (*Naturphilosophie*), that is, with the object. This is to say, change in the subject can be the result of a change in the object, thus “the roles are reversed (in terms of the standard notion of the active subject working on the passive object): the subject is defined by a fundamental passivity, and it is the object from which movement comes” (Žižek 2006: 17). For Lacan, this signifies the impossibility of love, since to love someone is to love the *objet a* within them, the promise of wholeness, when I say I love someone I say “*I love you, but, because inexplicable I love in you something more than you—the objet petit a—I mutilate you*” (Lacan 1978: 268). I am motivated entirely by the prospect of wholeness for myself, for completion, and not at all for the person standing before me. What I love is that which I see as missing from myself, the object of desire. Schelling is superior to Fichte because he emphasizes the incompleteness of the self, of the cosmos, of God. It is not that I posit myself as incomplete, but that I move in relation to the object, to Nature. My ground is the ground of the *objet a*, this gap before me that promises to (ful)fill me. Ontologically, this places primacy on the gap rather than the system around it. It is not that we are to systematically integrate the gap within representation, as Lacan attempted in his topological works, but should rather concentrate on the gap itself as paradox.

The primacy of paradox finds its place in Žižek’s work as the decisive element of the dialectic. Against the common *doxa* of Hegelianism, Žižek contends that the purpose of the dialectic is not to reconcile opposition by transforming the two sides into a new third term. The truth of the dialectic is to be found in Kant’s antinomies (Žižek 2006: 4, 20-28). The Kantian antinomies of reason present us with two opposing and irreconcilable answers to a question, “are we free or determined?” for instance. Logically, neither shows itself to be superior and the subject is confronted with an impasse to the most important questions of human existence, relating to freedom, God, life after death, the nature of the universe, etc. According to Žižek, this is precisely how the dialectic functions: the truth of the antinomy is not one side against the other, or both, or some third term that encompasses both in a systematic whole; the truth is the gap itself, the paradox, the irreconcilability (Ibid: 36).
Žižek’s ontology is not an attempt to systematically represent the world in purely formal terms. In *The Parallax View*, he contends that Kierkegaard should be read as a Hegelian (Ibid: 75-77) but the reverse might actually present us with a clearer view of Žižek’s ontology. Kierkegaard’s contention with Hegelianism is that it forgets singularity, in its grand synthesis of everything into the Concept, it forgets what it is to exist. Žižek’s dialectic though is entirely about this, it is a reading of Hegel based on the trinity of Kant-Kierkegaard-Lacan, where the emphasis is precisely on this finitude. Žižek’s ontology is grounded entirely on limits, the limits of knowledge, of representation, of articulation. What is primary is this gap, this inability of the subject to take account of itself in its entirety. Any attempt at a formal ontology, even one grounded and structured by a gap is doomed to fail because it presumes too much.

**To Conclude: The Two Sides of Lacan (Encore)**

What, finally, are we to conclude of this opposition between formal coherence and informal paradox? It is well-known that after the publication of *Anti-Oedipus*, Lacan solicited a meeting with Gilles Deleuze, seemingly in an attempt to convince him to become something of a disciple. Why did Lacan want Deleuze? Deleuze presents us with an interesting case; through his work with Guattari (which is first and foremost, indebted to Lacan and not a renunciation of him), we can see what is possible with Lacanian theory, we learn how to use it. Deleuze neither accepts nor denies Lacan, but used him. A quarter of a century ago, Lacan wanted a disciple, someone who was not purely a yes-man. Now, he has two. Žižek and Badiou present us with two different ontologies based on the question of Lacanian ontology, but first and foremost they show us how to read Lacan and even more, show us what is possible when one uses Lacanian theory for one’s own ends.
Notes

For an overview of this history see Nicholls and Liebscher (2010). This great work covers many
overlooked thinkers in the history of the unconscious like C.G. Carus and G.T. Fechner as well as
more well-known thinkers like Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud.

2 I am thinking here of works such as “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” and “Totem and Taboo.” In
the former, Freud constructs a myth of the origin of life in order to explain the conservative nature
of the drives, leading to the postulation of the death drive in opposition to the more well-known
pleasure principle. This opposition of drives provides Freud the ground for his topological model of
the mind of Id, Ego, and Super-Ego, revolutionizing psychoanalytic theory. “Totem and Taboo” on
the other hand provides a speculative anthropology of early humans in order to ground the Oedipal
complex. In both cases, Freud is working to ground psychoanalytic principles in biology or
anthropology.

3 Žižek provides us with two of the best commentary on Lacan’s myth in two essays (1995: 205-
220; 2007).

4 I realize this is a contentious claim. Why not Plato or Deleuze? Descartes or Hegel? What of
Marx? While there is certainly a canon of figures that Badiou situates himself with and against, I
will outline why I think we should understand Badiou as allying primarily with Lacan and as being
primarily against Heidegger.

5 This is true of the work up to 1963, after which Lacan begins the process of moving away from
language as the form of structure and begins to deal with structure-as-such. For a clear example of
refer to the French pagination.

6 While John Mullarkey’s criticism of Badiou on animals holds for Being and Event, it is not clearly
applicable to Logics of Worlds. Mullarkey maintains that Badiou’s account of subjectivity and its
relation to the event via truth procedures limits subjectivity to human beings despite the fact that
his criteria is mathematical (the count-as-One) and that Badiou should, in theory, have an account
of non-human subjectivity. In Logics of Worlds, Badiou will relate his theory of truth to Spinoza’s
account of attributes, claiming that “we will say that there are perhaps an infinity of types of truth
but we humans only know four [art, science, politics, and love],” (Badiou 2009: 71). For Mullarkey’s
critique see Mullarkey (2007: 118-121).

7 Cf. Lacan, (1993: 183): “a structure is in the first place a group of elements forming a covariant
8 On this see especially Mediations 16 and 17 in Being and Event.

9 See for instance Book I of Logics of Worlds, which does just that.

10 For the historical connection between Schelling and psychoanalysis, see McGrath (2011).

11 Italicized in the original.

12 Of the encounter with Lacan, Deleuze writes: “My only great encounter with him was after the appearance of Anti-Oedipus [1972]. I’m sure he took it badly. He must have held it against us, Félix and me. But finally, a few months later, he summoned me—there’s no other word for it. He wanted to see me. And so I went. He made me wait in his antechamber. It was filled with people, I didn’t know if they were patients, admirers, journalists…. He made me wait a long time—a little too long, all the same—and then he finally received me. He rolled out a list of all his disciples, and said that they were all worthless [nulls] (the only person he said nothing bad about was Jacques-Alain Miller). It made me smile, because I recalled Binswanger telling the story of a similar scene: Freud saying bad things about Jones, Abraham, etc. And Binswanger was shrewd enough to assume that Freud would say the same thing about him when he wasn't there. So Lacan was speaking, and everyone was condemned, except Miller. And then he said to me, ‘What I need is someone like you.’” Quoted in Smith (2004: 635-636).

References


Routledge.


