Struggling with Žižek's Ideology: The Deleuzian Complaint, Or, Why is Žižek a Disguised Deleuzian in Denial?

Jan Jagodzinski – University of Alberta, Canada

Überblick

The territory of analysis and commentary concerning Žižek’s ‘spectral’ confrontation with ideology is well trodden and already overdetermined. I am faced with the proverbial problem of starring at the white canvass, attempting to intervene in the heavily congested palimpsest of traces that are already in play, but remain invisible. In-depth attempts of addressing his reconceptualization of ideology have already been written by Matthew Sharpe (2004, 2006), Jodi Dean (2005), Tim Dean (2002), Fabio Vighi and Heiko Feldner (2007a,b,c), to name those I found most accomplished and helpful. What can be said that has not already been said? The charges of “inconsistency” or “oscillation” (Žižek 2005a, 219-220) means very little when addressing this question, since the very delirium of Žižek’s style is meant to be explorative and thought provoking, a work in perpetual progress as with any philosopher/artist/scientist who toils at the brink of the unknown and the unthought. Inconsistency is part of his “obsession” as a "thinking machine" (Olson & Worsham 2001, 253), built into the very unfolding of his thought. Given that the Real is an “inruption” of nonsense into the signifying system, which can never be signified, a ‘nothing’ that becomes detectable only after the event of its effects are constructed
backwards to paraphrase Eagleton (2001, 42), so it is with Žižek’s address on ideology. His ‘logical’ inconsistencies are those moments of inruption. Staying on track and going off-road are part of the same process. His writing remains a paradoxical affair, as ideology itself becomes a master signifier, acting like a spectral Joker that can take on multiple masks depending on which card game is being played. Yet, at the same time, ideology must minimally bear the weight of critique so that it remains politically enabling—exposing some aspect of the game itself. Without such a proviso the necessity of updating the force of this Marxist concept within a global capitalist neoliberal order could not be possible, and the concept of ideology itself becomes useless, empty or greatly reduced in its effect since there are conservatives who argue that in a multi-mediated society ‘everything’ is already ideological and therefore its an outdated concept.

Žižek concurs with this last premise: everything is already ideological, but not, of course, along representational grounds as argued earlier by such theorists as Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1980, 1990). As has now become his ‘signature’ formulation, the ‘ground’ of ideology has shifted to the unconscious level of beliefs that support the reproduction of practices that form social reality. Ideology is displaced from the consciousness to the unconscious libidinal realm of jouissance, the realm of the Real as it is played out in the logic of desire in the Symbolic and the logic of demand in the Imaginary. The ‘truth’ of this is already ‘out there’ in the exteriorizations of social relations themselves, in ‘plain view’ like Poe’s purloined letter. Žižek thus makes the broad claim, which established his reputation in the early 90s, that cynicism as “enlightened false consciousness,” is the symptom of our times. Social reality is structured by an ideological fantasy as the disconnect between belief and action by way of a disavowal of knowledge: the famous formulation articulated in For They Know Not What they Do (1991, 248-249)—written in French before The Sublime Object of Ideology was published in 1989—as a political subjectivity based on the structuration of fetishism within consumerist societies (“I know very well, but nevertheless …”). Knowledge is overridden by belief through others and/or in the hegemony of a political system (big Other).

To arrive at this particular formulation, Žižek’s (2005b) ‘mapping’ of ideology—as an assessment of it—is made along three (Hegelian-inspired) classifications: ideology in-itself as ‘false consciousness’ (Marx-Habermas), ideology for-itself as ideological state apparatuses (Gramsci-Althusser) and ideology in-and-for itself (Lukacs-Adorno). All three realms remain representational and in flux with representatives continuing these particular traditions. Habermas’ “ideal speech situation” answering ideology in-itself and Althusser’s project of a structuralist (scientific) Marxism, answering ideology for-itself, continued to mark out a territory ‘outside’ the social order to provide ideology critique. The last category of ideology (in-and-of
itself) is a collapse of the first two into each another as the disappearance of base (in-itself) and superstructure (for-itself). Everyday life becomes ideological so that it appears as if ideology has ‘vanished,’ as if we live in a post-ideological society. There is no longer an outside from which to critique the social order, and it might be best to call this the arrival of an ideology for-All (für Alle) to remain consistent with Žižek’s Hegelian scheme. Capitalist ideology has penetrated all aspects of our lives and now, as they say, it is ‘the only game in town.’ Left at the level of representation, this last position that offers no ‘outside,’ leads in the direction of the various post-structuralist ‘solutions’ where all there is, is a plurality of subject positions—hence the claim of a ‘post-ideological’ society.

Jean Baudrillard, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault became the main figures here in response to this condition. Baudrillard reduces everything to simulacra—everyday life is an illusionary world lived on the Imaginary level—there is no escape; Derrida offered us the play of signifiers as différance—the free-fall of the symbolic order as archi-writing (the becoming-space of time/the becoming-time of space) as difference and deferral toward the transcendental signified of his own particular spiritual vision of a future to come, the messianic promise of justice. And, Foucault, of course, the main figure who did not use the term ‘ideology’ since he offered yet another way out in a post-ideological word: the power/knowledge couplet of discourse analysis that plays out in the micropolitics of everyday life given that authority seemed to have become decentralized, more and more difficult to ‘finger.’ Foucault’s nuanced theory on the workings of power, the ‘technologies of the self’, the role of ‘resistance,’ and his ‘governmentality’ thesis have all been ‘leveled;’ that is, flattened and reduced by their Anglo-reception as various forms of semantically based discourse methodologies. However, the worst response to the post-ideological condition were made by the academic influx of cultural studies advocates where the fall was into cultural relativism—the proviso being that spectators are no longer dupes, but articulate and savvy, who resist through forms of tactics and strategies. And identity politics, where questions as to ‘who’ represents ‘who’ has led to antagonisms and divisiveness—infighting within feminist, queer and postcolonial ‘camps.’ Žižek would have none of this, rejecting the Foucauldian (see Heiko, 2007), Baudrilardian (“fake is original”) and Derridean directions by staunchly keeping ideology ‘alive’ through his particular appropriation of the Lacanian Real as the possibility of exposing ‘truth’ in the way a subject ‘enjoys’ in capitalist consumerism, smoothing out the fundamental class antagonisms, by way of the ‘discourse of the analyst’ (a crucial point I shall return to below).

This has been possible by mining the realm that is ‘beyond’ representation, or put another way, what is ‘beyond’ the Law. A non-representational theory of ideology at the level of
the psychic Real has enabled Žižek to reinstate the workings of authority via the superego’s ambivalent and paradoxical demand to be obeyed as well as transgressed as a ‘free choice’ to answer the paradox of voluntary servitude. His explorations of paranoia, obsession, perversion, hysteria, narcissism, cynicism, anxiety, and so on as informed by a particular relation to jouissance within the workings of socio-political relations have been enabled by his brilliant appropriation of the Kantian sublime—ideology becomes a transcendental object that exceeds a subject’s confrontation with it to the extent that there is a recognition of its incomprehensibility at the superegoic level in relation to the insignificance of the ego; this then yields an affect of the ambivalence of pleasure-pain, another name for jouissance. To generate consensual hegemony there has to be an elevation of Things to a sublime transcendental status—as sublime objects that act as empty Master Signifiers functioning below the level of language and the imagination to shape and frame an ‘ideological fantasy’. Such a foundational fantasy has to erase the violent founding of the Law, the Nation, and so on to justify the present socio-political order and differentiate it from rival positions that may threaten it. To the extent that there is belief in the sublime objects offered that remain incomprehensible, ineffable and therefore superegoic (God, the Great Leader, Democracy, Freedom, the Party), the subject remains interpellated within the system through desire to belong in it, willing to sacrifice its jouissance so as to participate in its shared jouissance. To the extent that certain issues remain too important to question since social cohesion depends on them, subjectivization sticks since the confrontation with the Real, which is the subject of jouissance (enjoyment), is evaded. The symbolic and the Imaginary remain in tune with each other—the result is political acquiescence. With Žižek, the disappearance (or ‘end’) of ideology as once celebrated by Daniel Bell and Francis Fukuyama has now been inverted into its opposite: ‘everything’ is ideological by way of the symptom, or rather sinthome (see Dean, 2002), which is consistent with the late Lacan who concluded that there is no subject without a symptom.

Delirium

The shift towards a non-representational theory of ideology that Žižek makes to save the space of ideology critique, also means the recognition that he himself is caught by ideology at the non-representational level. That being the case, what’s his way out? Obviously, by positing a void in the symbolic as the impossible kernel of truth, a constitutive gap of the Real, an “enabling” or “productive lack” as he sometimes calls it, avoids the pitfalls of endless semiosis—the proliferation of interpretations. As a self-acclaimed “‘ideologist,” Žižek mobilizes the “discourse of
the analyst,” but does so in a delirious way. By occupying the unsaid and the unthought, as the objet a of the social order, Žižek seemingly escapes all criticism that can ‘stick’ to him through repartees that range from being simply dismissive to flurries of attack that turn the argument around, and then displaces it on some other plane. Bruno Bosteels (2006,163 n29) maintains that it is impossible to offer a coherent overall interpretation, while Laclau’s (2004) complaint is that “there is no valid emancipatory struggle except one that is fully and directly anti-capitalist. … The problem, however, is this: he gives no indication of what an anti-capitalist struggle might be” (34). All these complaints, and more (see footnote 1), may well be true. But, perhaps they miss the mark. Back in 1998, Denise Gigante, when discussing Žižek’s “vortex of madness,” concludes that “he fundamentally has no position,” and that he is “almost impossible to pin down.” Gigante concludes that “his subjective transparency is precisely the point” for this is a demonstration of “the dialectics of critical self-creation.” The Indivisible Remainder (1996) and The Abyss of Freedom (1997) present, it seems, a working out of an approach for him to address his own sinthome via his rewriting of the German idealist, F.W. J. von Schelling, turning him into a materialist! To enter “the abyss of freedom” means changing orientations from desire to the drive, the very move that Lacan himself made late in his career when he moved from the symptom to the sinthome. As Žižek puts it in The Abyss of Freedom, “[W]e conceive the conclusion of the [psychoanalytic] cure as the assertion of the subject’s radical openness to the enigma of the Other’s desire no longer veiled by fantasmatic formulations, or we risk the step beyond desire itself and adopt the position of the saint who is no longer bothered by the Other’s desire as its decentered cause. In the case of the saint, the subject, in an unheard-of way, ‘causes itself,’ becomes its own cause: its cause is no longer decentered; that is, the enigma of the Other’s desire no longer has any hold over it” (79, added emphasis).

This passage directly relates to Lacan’s Television seminar of 1974 where he evokes the trope of the saint (Lacan, 1990, 15-16), which alludes to the sinthome —the neologism comprised of symptôme (symptom), saint homme (holy man, saint), Saint Thomas—as the one who didn’t believe Christ (as Other), but went for the Real Thing! Žižek’s endeavor to interpret Schelling’s story as to how the Absolute goes about creating Himself ends up being a description of an artistic inventive process that taps into the pulsating vortex of the presymbolic drives. Here, the contradictions that surround the birth pangs become evident. The Real of giving birth to oneself by going into the unknown—into the “abyss of pure freedom” —means that the critically ‘constructed’ identity necessarily throws one “out-of-joint” with oneself. So, there is a certain madness about this process, which posits a conflict between self-assertion and then withdrawal, between assuming an identity and yet remaining “true to the formlessness that
cannot be expressed” (Gigante 1998, 161). There may well be a fall into madness when connecting to the primal abyss of freedom (e.g., Nietzsche). “The critic either never emerges from the ever-becoming vortex of the drives qua theoretical impulses, or else asserts himself or herself as a free critical subject against the ‘freedom’ of those unformed impulses at the constitutive center of the self” (ibid). In this way the New can emerge. The moment of deepest critical insights are those where the subject of the unconscious ‘thinks’ as an acephalic ‘will-less will’ that seemingly “wants absolutely nothing for itself qua subject. The paradox is this: only when one assumes no position, pretends to no argument, does one remain true to oneself as critic” (ibid). The moment of self-creation is a moment of madness, and again a certain violence is at work in what then becomes a foundational logos, the enabling ‘irrational’ vortex of drives must perform the initial gesture and then ‘vanish’ having done their mediating work (Žižek’s “vanishing mediator”). Hence, it can be said that Žižek is continually experimenting, combining philosophies that are usually never taken together, performing a Freudian-like ‘free association’ as his mind wonders over and catches short stories, popular culture, films, only some television, along with ‘illuminating’ passages from a cadre of select philosophers—Lacan, Hegel, Kant, Marx, Lenin, moving into new territories—like theology, to try out new possibilities and thought-experiments for the Left by performing “spaghetti psychoanalysis” as Dean (2002, 22) characterizes it.

There are few reviewers who have not commented on this feverish style. James S. Hurely (1998) in his review of The Plague of Fantasies summarizes the style very well: “Žižek’s mode of theorizing has grown increasingly urgent and frenetic, the collage-like argumentational strategies of the earlier books becoming in the later well-nigh kaleidoscopic […] his argumentational zigzags and narratological discontinuities here become positively veritiginous, to the point where the text effectively forestalls accurate or even adequate summary, snaking away from all attempts at synoptic grasp. If this book [Plague of Fantasies] is systematic, it is so according to a rather eccentric systemic logic” (para. 3). In contrast Robert Samuels (2002) attempts to ‘contain’ Žižek’s rhetoric by pinning his argumentation into a four-part logical structure: “[H]e begins by paraphrasing the ‘common’ or ‘standard’ academic understanding of a certain problem; he then shows that our understanding of the original problem is wrong and that Lacanian theory or Hegelian dialectics can provide a true interpretation; he next turns to the realm of popular culture and/or everyday experience to provide proof for his interpretation; and he then returns to a combination of Hegelian philosophy and Lacanian theory to make a universalizing claim about the original problem. In fact, this final stage of his rhetorical strategy often presents a notion of universal negativity and meaninglessness, which acts to absorb all of
the previous stages into a globalizing and self-negating argument” (335-336). Samules makes the same charge that Žižek never offers us any solutions, only academic talk (perhaps like the charge against President Obama, only eloquent talks but no ‘real’ action?). Robert Pfaller (2007), on the other hand, praises Žižek’s genius for the way his examples do “joke-work,” which function as a theoretical tool. His examples are therefore performative. They are not there simply to illustrate what can be seen, nor are they an illustration of an idea, but are “a caricature of another example,” which then enables an estrangement or deframing to take place that illuminates a theoretical point or provides criticism of the idea that is usually connected to the example.

This array of responses that address his style identifies a very curious phenomenon, which is consistent with the ‘discourse of the analyst’ performing an ideology critique on himself, and that is simply the ‘disappearance’ of Žižek’s own subjectivity. He becomes ‘an object’ to himself in the delirium of self-reflexion. How can that be? Anyone who has attended a Žižekian lecture knows that it will be highly entertaining, animated and intriguing. The “joke-work” will emerge. But Žižek is continually performing a “subjective destitution” aimed at himself. He is performing (and writing) as if he did not exist. He is the saint—the cause of his own desire. The paradox of this self-reflexive method being that the truth is ‘out there’—the reality outside does exist, but that he himself does not exist.

Žižek is very deprecating in his own writing. It is not self-assured in anyway as stated so above. Often he quotes long tracks from Lacan, Kant, Hegel and Marx, as if to assure himself that it is ‘they’ who have made this point. To a feverish degree he rephrases, reframes, repositions virtually every point of his argument, talking to himself through declaratives like, “No!” and explicative’s like “that is to say,” “in other words,” “to put this another way.” He is also very deprecating in public, maintaining that his popularity depends on his “dirty jokes, popular culture, and a little bit of politics” … and on “cheap, obscene tricks” (Olson and Worsham 2001, 284, 285). Or better still: “Why do I resort so often to examples from popular culture? The simple answer is to avoid a kind of jargon, and to achieve the greatest possible clarity, not only for my readers but also for myself. That is to say, the idiot for whom I endeavor to formulate a theoretical point as clearly as possible is ultimately myself (Žižek, 2005c, 59, added emphasis). The address is to the “idiot” within himself, the acephalic Real.

Dany Nobus (2007) relates the story of how Žižek, caught in a moment of ignorance regarding a painting in an art gallery, improvised a sophisticated theory as to how the frame works, only to be applauded for the hoax that he staged. This “dimension-in-between-the-two-frames” promptly appeared in The Parallax View, presented as a serious theoretical position.
Perhaps, Nobus asks, this is precisely how we should understand the question formulated by the journalist from The New Yorker, “Is Slavoj Žižek an academic or a comedian?” This stance presents a further deprecation by playing—the right terms here should be taken from Friedrich Schiller as Spieltrieb—the fool, clown, performer, and ‘idiot.’ It identifies Žižek’s sinthome with Harpo dis-possession of the Phallus. The clown and the fool have a perverted position to authority and the Law; they show a weakness and vulnerability of the body. “Comedy is the eruption of materiality into the spiritual purity of tragic action and desire” (Critchley 1999, 230). The response of the insignificance of the ego to the big Other is one of subversion. “A fool is a thing—an uncanny mixture of perversity and simplicity, of wisdom and stupidity, of familiarity and strangeness—who speaks the truth […] to power, that speaks in refusing speech, that subverts protocols of everyday, polite language” (ibid). Sound like Žižek? So, when he wants to be ‘clear’ with his examples and jokes, to ‘reach out’ as it were, in sensus communis, “to the very ordinariness of the ordinary” (Critchley, 235-236), his “joke-work” does Freud one better—not only does it indicate anamorphically the source of ideology through the affect they produce, but what follows the joke is what we pay attention to. There is not a consoling sedation of jouissance like a Jerry Seinfeld, but most often the abyss of the Real opens up, like Bill Maher did with his statement shortly after 9/11 that the ‘real’ cowards have been the U.S. lobbying missiles, whereas the suicide bombers was not a cowardly act (Blackwood, 2003, para.5), or Borat’s kynical over-the-top skits that question U.S. patriotism and racism.

Enough praise.

**Living up to the first part of the title – the ‘act’**

The single retort that he offers in response to his critics concerns Deleuze’s link with Carl Jung via his work on Sacher-Masoch (1961), a link that has been recently mined for all its worth by Christian Kerslake (2006, 2007) given that Jung appears only twice in *Difference and Repetition*, mostly in a footnote. However, this single remark in the direction of Jung is revealing and will be taken up below. Apart from that, there are only scattered remarks by Žižek, including a surprising spirited paragraph in support of *Anti-Oedipus* as a book that did “not simply fit a given standard, but (re)define[d] this standard” (2003a, 499).

To echo Žižek’s (2005c) line regarding Deleuze being traumatized by Hegel: “True. I claim Žižek is traumatized by Deleuze, and treats Deleuze as an exception; but this is for me the obverse of Žižek’s greatness—it is only such a reading that enables us to access the innermost tension of Žižek’s edifice (231).” However, no “buggery” will be performed when attempting this. The shift in Lacan’s late work, which Žižek has embraced—from symptom to sinthome, from desire to drive, took place around seminar 1973-1974 (Seminar 21, Les Non-Dupes Errent—delivered after his expulsion from IPA, consisted of only one lesson) and Seminar 22 (R.I.S.) in 1974-1975, culminating in Seminar 23 Joyce and the Sinthome (1975-76). These three seminars were in response to the impact that Anti-Oedipus, published in 1972, had made on him—as Daniel Smith’s (2004) assessment of Lacan’s admiration for Deleuze/Guattari admirably shows. Lacan retained his typology (reworked in Seminar 22, R.I.S. where the purified symptom becomes objet a or the drive in its pure form, and where he introduced the concept of the “letter” as the Real of the master signifier—S1) in response to a more productive understanding of desire wherein the subject makes the choice to identify with the Real kernel of his symptom or object a. As he states in Seminar 24 L’insu que sait … “to know what to do with the symptom, that is the end of the analysis” (qtd. in Verhaeghe and Declercq 2002, 68).

Deleuze /Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* note (1983, 27 ftd. asterisk) that Lacan had two notions of desire that oscillated back and forth: as lack—i.e., the desire of the Other and as objet a—i.e., as a ‘desiring machine.’ The sinthome, therefore, is Lacan’s way out of (fetishistic) ideology—the way out of the ‘lack’ in the Other, one would add, as created by designer capitalism—through a ‘suppletion’ by way of an identification with the Real of one’s own desire. For it is here where the distortion lies, where the awry look must be taken. A true creation ex nihilo (something from nothing) is called for—the advent of the New. One way to do this was by traversing the fantasy as a form of subjective destitution, which Lacan never elaborated on, but which Žižek (2000a) has tried by way of the proper ‘act.’ In other words, a psychoanalytic understanding of ideology based on lack where belief in one’s symptom remains operative is caught by the desire of the Other (capitalism). Ideology consists in the belief of a final signifier.
(S2/Other) that reveals the ultimate signification and sense of S1. One can take a hysterical position by not buying into S2 as Other, or take a perverted position by playing out what S2 as Other desires, and so on, but these are yet other ideological entrapments that simply attempt to subvert authority, but not change the symbolic order. Žižek’s attempt to identify (and not believe) with his own sinthome, to encounter the Real, to transverse his own fantasy, has been by way of German idealism—Kant, Hegel and Schelling—whom he tried to ‘materialize’ by way of ‘grounding’ the Absolute (universality) by conflating transcendence and immanence via Schelling and by addressing the split/antagonism within himself as ‘productive lack’ to produce the ‘authentic’ act of a ‘truth-event.’ For Žižek, this means such an excessive gesture, which is not grounded in any symbolic referent, carries the weight of the death-drive—negativity in it most pure sense. The ‘act’ as a limit-experience is presented as a zero-ground or ground-zero, a type of suspension of the big Other—the “‘zero point’ of symbolic suicide” (Žižek 1992, 44) where all the coordinates seem to vanish, thereby radically transforming the agent. Furthermore, such an act is by definition transgressive, feminine, and ethical for the superego no longer has a hold. At this level diabolical/radical evil cannot be distinguished from the good, suggesting that the violence that is associated with creation ex nihilo ushers in a redefinition as a legal norm—a new universal and hence a ‘truth event.’

This notion of the ‘act’ as subjective destitution has been criticized for its many questions and failings, especially concerning Žižek’s arch example, Antigone (Grigg, 2001; also Kay 2003,152-156). Once this purely subjective transformation happens, the political and practical consequences remain very vague. If universality is at stake, how are new relations to be established when all ideological identifications have been severed? But that doesn’t seem to deter Žižek. He continues to recirculate a hand full of examples, one of which (in The Parallax View 2006b, 381-385) becomes the ultra-passivity of Bartleby ‘the scrivener’ non-productive model of political resistance as subtraction and withdraw—“I would prefer not to,” which drew the ire of Jodi Dean (2006, 130-131; see also Vighi and Feldner, 2009). Bartleby’s refusal is, however, a decision not to enjoy. Presumably, there is transference of love to the one who has performed the ethical revolutionary act by those who want change so that a revolutionary movement might be started. Bartleby however dies. These examples given do not suggest, nor give us hope for change. They remain in the realm of fiction rather than in any hard analysis, which presumably would not yield the moment of revolutionary change anyway. It remains a tragic and impossible gesture. Traversing the fantasy as a process is obviously extraordinary difficult. Following Žižek’s direction, politically, this ‘way out’ seems to be less than promising, a dead end or simply the best of the worst that can be expected in the globalized climate. What’s
another way?

OwB

In *Organs without Bodies*, Žižek clearly sides with the Deleuze of the *Logic of Sense* rather than *Anti-Oedipus*, ‘bending him’ from behind to suite his own ‘Hegelio-Lacanian’ position. The Deleuze of Logic of Sense has many references to Lacan throughout, enabling Žižek to set up equivalences (wrongly or rightly) between the ‘quasi-cause’ as the ‘pure agency of transcendental causality,’ which overcomes the apparent deadlock between virtual/actual (becoming/being), and the objet a. The virtual domain conflated with the ‘plane of immanence’ now becomes the equivalency of the Real, while the “dark precursor” is none other than the phallus (81). Deleuze is read as offering an aporia between two theorizations of becoming in relation to the virtual and actual, which (unfortunately) is always discussed in oppositional either/or terms, never accepting that they lie in a both/and position, as a disjunctive synthesis on the same immanent plane. The succinct thesis is presented as follows: “… either this immaterial affect is generated by interacting bodies as a sterile surface of pure Becoming or it is part of the virtual intensities out of which bodies emerge through actualization (the passage from Becoming to Being). And, is this opposition not, yet again, that of materialism versus idealism? In Deleuze this means *The Logic of Sense* versus *Anti-Oedipus*. Either the Sense-Event, the flow of pure Becoming, is the immaterial effect (neutral, neither active nor passive) of the intrication of bodily-material causes or the positive bodily entities are themselves the product of the pure flow of Becoming. Either the infinite field of virtuality is an immaterial effect of the interacting bodies or the bodies themselves emerge, actualize themselves, from this field of virtuality” (21-22, original emphasis). So, idealism or materialism—take your choice. Do material causes generate the mental, or is it the mental that generates the material?

The seemingly more materialist understanding of ‘becoming’ in Anti-Oedipus where the production and generation of the actual emerges from the potential of multiple virtual intensities is inverted as a form of idealist vitalism (“humid material”). Žižek therefore disregards or ignores Deleuze’s claim that the virtual is ‘real,’ a key theoretical point. There is no doubling of excess once the actual and virtual are placed in the plane of immanence. Despite the Deleuzian disjunctive series that offer no ‘autopoietic’ mediation, he is milked for his hidden dialectic. Becoming as theorized in the *Logic of Sense/Difference and Repetition*, where the sense-event is an ‘impassive’ effect of bodily-material causes and processes, is for Žižek the more palatable position. This seemingly more idealist position is actually inverted as being more materialist,
explainable by its affinity with the ‘materialism’ of the void. This appropriation installs the (Lacanian) representational signifier (see Demers 2006, 155-156). BwO is attributed to Anti-Oedipus while OwB leans on the side of Logic of Sense—names the ‘organ’ that has now become the signifier from the ‘body in pieces.’ The Cheshire smile becomes the signifier that stands in for the body of the cat.

In this way, Žižek’s ability to conflate and reverse immanence with transcendentalism, materialism with idealism, as he demonstrates by reading Hegel and Schelling, creates a new form of ‘psychoanalytic materialism’ — the void as a ‘perfect vacuum,’ a materialism without matter so to speak, if I can put it that way. This strategy is now applied to Deleuze to ‘reel’ him in. Žižek, as someone who is true to the late Lacan, is desperately searching for a way to come to terms with Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus/Thousand Plateau formulations, restaging in effect, the late Lacan’s own attempt to come to terms with Deleuze & Guattari. Žižek’s encounter with Deleuze, in effect, exposes Lacan’s own failure to adequately answer their complaint, despite reworking his own edifice (Seminars 20-24), which resulted in having to dissolve his own school as an ‘act’ of subjective destitution. Beginning with Seminar XX, Encore when Lacan had to face the hysterical response of Luce Irigaray (whose position has affinities with Deleuze10), offering a ‘love letter’ wherein his ‘formulae of sexuation’ makes a place for feminine jouissance, a recognition that the feminine masquerade as opposed to the masculine mask, presents a way to stage her own desire against the phallic signifiers of the Other. This led to developing his ‘feminine’ approach to the sinthome. But this was just not enough to answer the necessary reorientation to an ethico-politics of an affirmative ‘machinic’ approach to desire that presents potentially another ‘way’ of responding to the territorialized globe of capitalism other than that of the ‘act.’ This I shall return to.

Berressem, Sinnerbrink, Smith and Demers all deftly point out how Žižek goes about appropriating Deleuze into his own camp. Each shows Žižek’s particular ‘failure’ in his response at doing this. There is no need to rehearse and summarize their arguments here. They would all be no doubt dismissed as simply Deleuzian disciples—or a law firm defending Deleuze. What interests me is another matter that speaks to Žižek’s own unacknowledged fear—his own disguised affinity to Deleuze as the perverse homoerotic contradiction between betrayal and buggery in his approach to the Deleuzian ‘body.’ The first, Žižek claims is done out of ‘love;’ the second, a form of violence without consent. Together they form an act of necessary evil: I love you but I will still fuck you in the ass, even if it hurts you’ll eventually come to like it for I am doing this for your own ‘good,’ pointing out the ‘error’ of your ways for a greater Cause. More is the irony of Žižek’s title of his response to his critics: “notes on a debate ‘from within the people’."
There is no debate and Deleuze never debated, and it certainly is not ‘within the people,’ but the stroking of phallic jouissance. The key pages of the book for me are 49-50 where, nodding to the presence of Catherine Malabou (1996), he performs the buggery (anal interpretation): “Deleuze equals Hegel.” To echo his words in reverse: “What if this exceptional role of Deleuze, this refusal to take him from behind, betrays a fear of excessive proximity? What if Žižek has to elevate Deleuze into an absolute Other who cannot be appropriated by free indirect speech because taking Deleuze from behind would produce a monster unbearable for Žižek himself?” No such fear exists here. There is a homoerotic embrace so that the ‘master’ can be assfucked out of love—the Judas card as played in The Puppet and the Dwarf (2003b) and the Fragile Absolute (2000b), who does this out of necessity to see the ‘bigger’ revolutionary project through at the expense of his own death—the sacrifice that comes with the death drive, the ‘stroke’ of radical evil. Eventually, the ‘act’ of St. Paul, the other hero, will emerge to lead the revolutionary charge. The changed proviso of today, however, is that this requires a non-heroic act of ‘symbolic’ death. It’s no longer sacrifice in the old sense as much as it is performing an ethical act in the face of the Real. I think it is fair to say that this is the position of an avant-garde without authority, with which I am very much in agreement, but like the ‘old’ avant-garde, there are now many mutant monsters emerging—who are not about to form a ‘league’ against global designer capitalism. Not even Negri and Hardt are given a free ride for offering a ‘new’ Communist Manifesto. How is one to choose? For the dialectic or against it? For difference in Sameness or difference in-and-of itself? For representation or its ruin? For psychoanalysis or schizoanalysis? For negation or affirmation? For Jouissance or affect? For immanence or transcendence? For a-signifiers or signifiers? For unconscious theatre or its factory? For the ‘act’ or what a body can do? … Must we even decide? There are enough lessons by now to show that such binaries don’t hold.

If Žižek had ‘truly’ performed a betrayal, he would have had to ‘dis(solve)’ himself to enable the (divine) Event to come. Commit subjective destitution. But, his buggery leads to something quite different: his continued passionate attachment to continue to nurture the mutant of his own creation: ‘Hegelio-Lacan.’ So, let’s put it another way: Deleuze does not escape the charge of buggery either. If Žižek is producing monsters by buggering Hegel with Lacan (which, according to Žižek, Deleuze forgot to do given all of philosophy is stretched out on the same plate with its ass up), then it becomes a question of assessing the mutant monsters that are now proliferating, including Deleuze /Guattari’s own. Have ‘Star Wars’ now been replaced with the coming of ‘Mutant Monsters,’ D.C. comics replaced by Marvel? Perhaps these are all Frankenstein’s … ‘becoming woman’ has not as yet started, or perhaps it already has with the
likes of Rosi Braidotti while the boys keep buggering themselves?

**Mutant Monsters**

It may well be that this irreconcilable deadlock takes us back to the Kantian crossroads where, it seems every philosopher worth his or her salt has to pay a visit, since the kernel of the Enlightenment still sits there burning for resolution as Foucault and Habermas showed in their visitations. As have Lyotard and Deleuze. As a broad, and perhaps misguided speculation, it seems the schism between the camps is based on the antinomy within the sublime itself, which leads to quite different stances towards infinity, and quite different ontological positions. Žižek (as well as Joan Copjec, 2002) explored this antinomy in *Tarrying with the Negative* (1993) where the mathematical sublime and the dynamic sublime were discussed in terms of sexual difference. Their exploration was a result of Lacan’s formulae of sexuation, which are entangled up with the same Kantian antinomies. I want to suggest that depending which side of the sublime is taken up, yields quite different monstrosities and the politics that go with them. The sexuation formulae offer up one particular ‘solution’ to the interface of open and closed systems—but the paradox is that there is only an open system—a continuous becoming to infinity. Luce Irigaray’s (1985) complaint of phallocentricism I believe is quite in order here. Presenting her own transcendental signifiers—two lips, mucus—to mark the sexual jouissance that was missing ‘simply’ but invaluably offered the ‘other side’ to Lacan. Žižek’s reconceptualization of ideology, as displaced onto the void of the Real, the negativity of Nothing, universalized by a materialist reading of Hegel’s Notion, ontologizes the mathematical sublime. This strikes me as failed solution in its attempt to address the not-all—the dialectic of the Limit and its Beyond. Woman always finds herself as this Limit. This fundamental premise continues to appear throughout his texts to this day. The special case of her jouissance and the ‘feminine’ sinthome turn out to be inadequate responses. The insistence of the drive and the acceptance of its necessary ‘ethical’ violence is a gambit taken when the symbolic has become unbearable—reached its limit, and if it dissipates there is some other mechanism at work that far outstrips any ‘act.’ What the ‘act’ shows is how desperate the need is to ‘believe’ in the world. If Buddhist emptiness—not the ‘western’ kind that Žižek scorns—is followed, where the draining away of desire has no affinities with Bartleby’s refusal, there is surely another understanding of the void as it becomes completely full—perhaps this points to the more affirmative, more joyous stance to our mortality. Perhaps this is the Deleuzian way—a grasp of “a life”?

Of all theorists (for me), it is Berressem (2005, 2005/6, 2007) who has gone the furthest
to show that the topologics and the chronologics of the Deleuze/Guattarian system require an understanding of an order of mathematical systems (as explored in Simon Duffy, 2006) quite different from Lacan/Badiou. The gap of the void becomes unnecessary, replaced by an irrational cut, eliminating the transcendental hierarchy that negativity sets up via Hegelian logics, forwarding immanence. His topologics taken from Leibnitz where the fold and the cut are operable in his differential logics, lead to a mathematics of ‘problematics’ rather than ‘axiomatics’ (Smith 2006a,b). They point to the multiplicity of the immanent ‘postmodern’ dynamic sublime that can be misread as simply yet another retention of the multiple as One, as Badiou and Žižek do, by failing to grasp the significance of non-Euclidean ‘projective plane’ (Berressem 2005/6, para. 3-4). It is not the formlessness that the sublime implies as the limit of form, rather it is the very proliferation of forms, rather than their absence that is at issue (Crockett 2007). This is the dynamic sublime that Deleuze reveals to us—the unconscious of the BwO— the non-repressed dimension of physics as opposed to psyche, where machinic coupling by ‘intelligent’ matter comes together through the complexities of connective, disjunctive and conjunctive syntheses. It offers a space/time of unbelief through the proliferation of potentialities rather than possibilities. Badiou and Žižek can form a road team, disputing each other, but nevertheless remain travelling companions since there is an agreement on the void, of creation ex nihilo and the positivization of negativity—‘subtraction’ in Badiou’s system, but Deleuze can’t join them. Badiou’s topologists retain Lacan’s set theory, rather they update Lacan’s own arsenal of Venn diagrams, Möbius strip, the klein bottle, the torus, and Borromean knot by harnessing the set theories of Cantor-Grothendieck-Cohen, which speak to the mathematical ontological sublime of the multiple. We have inverse positions: the Hegelio-Lacan mutant vs. the Spinoza-Bergson-Hume-Nietzschean Mutant. Primordial creation of the Absolute à la Schelling/Hegel —OwB vs. BwO—the Bergsonian élan vital of creative evolution as the starring into the void of Nothing vs. starring at Something.  

From where do these mutants arise? The Deleuze/Guattari mutants emerge from a productive sense of desire while busily working in the factory. Where is this factory? At zero level of BwO—the level of the physical molecular body of affect, which is the level of imperceptible multiplicities and intensities. This is as the location of the non-subjective unconscious of the dynamic sublime (see Campbell 2006). This strikes me as the feminine space of Kristeva’s chora; its flows are the ‘part’ object relations as theorized by Melaine Klein, the half-open threshold of Irigaray’s ‘mucous,’ and the skin ego of Didier Anzieu (1989) and Esther Bick (1968). It is also the place of abject (the Lacanian lamella) and not an object of the signifier (Berressem 2007). It is the spacio-temporal dimension of primary narcissism prior to
repression, a time of Aion not Chronos—a place of creative a-significations and potentialities. It is the sublimity of wonder, not yet the sublime terror of the Thing—but thing-ness in its becoming. It is a place of laughing and crying by a non-differentiated embodied pre-ego—zoë as opposed to bios. We tap into this dimension through the Spieltriebe wherein the viscera and nerves become affected. It is a place of memory traces and loss. The lalangue of the mother tongue is felt here as well—as the grain in the voice. The ‘autonomy’ of aesthesis from where the New can emerge is potentially here too. There is a lack of limit — the non-all of a body in differently distributed variations where the process of becoming is continuously happening. This is not a phenomenological space as a consciousness of something; this is the felt unconscious of things themselves—unmediated. Such a ‘void’ for Lacan/Žižek, as the kernel of the Real, remains negative, a no ‘fly’ zone. Perhaps this is why Tim Dean’s (2002, 30) complaint about Žižek’s inability to cope with aesthetics (I would term it aesthesis) since art most often is recuperated under the signifier?

The Fright of Real Tears (2001), his work on Kieslowski’s films, seems to me the closest he comes to touching this realm.

The BwO (virtual—multiplicity of the affirmative Real) is in constant simultaneous communication with the OwB of representation (actual—Imaginary/Symbolic) that traps and territorializes these potential virtual becomings, which in turn are de-territorialized and reterritorialized in a process of serialization There is no gap being filled in by fantasy. This is always already fantasmatic experience. Maria Walsh (2008) offers a feminine sublime drawing on this Deleuzian form of subjectivity. Rather than ‘subjective destitution’ there is a “momentary contraction of the partial objects that move through and beyond it […] moments that are distinct and indeterminate […] experienced as a series of repeated self-differences that emerge from the virtual and are contracted in the actual to produce a sense of continuity in the face of absence” (para. 18). Rather than an abyss there is an encounter with the non-coincidence with the self that one thinks one was, and this “opens up subjectivity to the pleasures of immanence” (ibid.). It is the place of the possibility of ‘unbelief.’

This feminine space/time, which is why Carl Jung has become of interest to Deleuzians and rejected by Žižek in his remarks to Daniel Smith, opens up another notion of ‘disavowal,’ much different from the ideology of disavowal Žižek mobilizes. Deleuze (1989) writes:

It might seem that a disavowal is, generally speaking, much more superficial than a negation or even a partial destruction. But this is not so, for it represents an entirely different operation. Disavowal should perhaps be understood as the point of departure of an operation that consists neither in negating nor even destroying, but rather in radically contesting the validity of that which is: it suspends belief in and neutralizes the given in such a way that a new
This seems to be at least one ‘solution’ against the Žižekian act. Rather than the disavowal of belief, Deleuze gives us the potential of unbelief. The disavowal that comes from the feminine dynamic sublime as Walsh was describing it. Ideology rethought from a Deleuzian perspective is well on its way by the writing of Massumi (2002), Eugene Holland (1999) and Ian Buchanan (2008), to name the ones I am aware of who are specifically reviving the radicality of Anti-Oedipus/Thousand Plateaus. Rather than the psychoanalytic transference, it is Guattarian transversality that is sought (see Genosko, 2002) to grasp the way bodily affect becomes infectious and the voice suggestive. The non-ideological means by which ideology is produced is theorized along the lines of “induction” and “transduction” (Massumi 2002, 42). Induction is the “triggering of a qualification, of a containment.” It is an actualization of a virtual affect. While transduction (as transversality) is the “transmission of an impulse of virtuality from one actualization to another. These affective transversals are linked to various forms of image reception, “images as the conveyors of forces of emergence, as vehicles for existential potentialization and transfer” (43). This ‘affective-theory of capitalist power’ is illustrated through Massumi’s analysis of how it was that a staunch conservative like Ronald Reagan managed to have the following that he did (46-67).

the title’s shadow

It seems like a brash thing to say: Žižek is a Disguised Deleuzian in Denial especially within the confines of a Žižekian journal. Their distance does seem irreconcilable, unless the path is taken that Daniel Smith has began to outline to show the affinities between Lacan and Anti-Oedipus that are in place, but that other political potentialities, not only those of Negri and Hardt, can be created. Holland, Buchanan, Massumi and others have started that work. The shadow title is meant sincerely for it seems to me there are many unacknowledged touchstones that present Žižek’s madness as a form of schizophrenia—the delirium of him as a writing machine. His work is systematically rhizomatic to use an oxymoron, leaving his own singular trail as he gropes for the unknown and the unsaid. By taking on the role of the analyst he seems to be performing what Deleuze called ‘becoming imperceptible,’ a process of transformative encounters that charts his own becomings. Finally, anyone who has met or heard Žižek talk, the role of the academic clown/fool presents, oddly enough, the very opposition to the thrust of his mutant Hegelio-Lacan figure. It is of course, his avatar that does the fantasmatic work in the Star Wars, who seems to be his immortal spectral figure. Through his laughter and the will of his Spieltrieb, through his dirty jokes and sexual innuendos, the affect of his body spewing the materiality of
the dynamic sublime as it were, doesn’t he exhibit the very joy and the laugh of Zarathustra that Deleuze embraced? In this sense he does live out the singularity of his sinthome.

Notes
Yet, Tim Dean (2002, 33) maintains that despite Žižek’s claim that psychoanalytic interpretation remains irreducible to demystification, he goes about the business of unmasking anyway. Such a charge would position Žižek as repeating the cynical structure he himself has exposed: “I know very well that the impossible kernel of the Real cannot be deciphered, nevertheless I will go about doing this anyway.” The situation may be more complex than this as I argue latter.

Of course, this changed with the late Lacan of the sinthome, which binds the subject to his or her jouissance, requiring that one accept and ‘live’ with one’s symptom, a development I discuss further below.

For example, Gramsci’s work has been taken up with different inflections and incorporated by Maurizio Lazzarato, Paul Virno, Antonio Negri and members of Fondazione Instituo Gramsci. The journal Das Argument under Frigga Haug and Wolfgang Fritz Haug continues to explore class differentiations centered on more mainstream Marxist issues, while their labor of love, The Historical Critical Dictionary (Historisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch) attempts to provide a history of key Marxist concepts.

I pick up Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari later to make my point concerning Žižek, but figures such as Deleuze, Lyotard, and certainly Jacques Rancière were not given the same attention by the academy as these three during the 90s.

As worked out in Žižek (2006a) where he maintains that Derrida theology is not radical enough when it comes to his belief as to the messianic promise of justice that will arrive in the unknowable future. Such a position reduces theology to a pure form without ontological content. Žižek on the other hand retains the necessary structural, constitutive ontological gap by maintaining a theology of abandonment where the Messiah has already arrived enabling politics to be redemptive so as to recover the Communist core of the Christian ethical revolution as an atheist (see Crockett, 2007; Pound, 2008).

I am capitalizing the X here to graphically distinguish this particular form from the more common usage in post-structuralist discourse —self-reflexion that supplanted the representational discourses of self-reflection.

The Kantian dualism between phenomenal and noumenal aspects of experience is worked out by Schellings’ complementarity between the philosophy of nature (materialism) and the philosophy of the spirit (idealism), taken up by Hegel whom Žižek reads not as the philosopher of the Same, identity, and the Absolute, but as someone who is also a practitioner of subjective destitution. The dialectic is all about the ‘failure’ of absolute knowledge (Žižek 1989, 6). Marx got him wrong, which is why Hegel is the first post-Marxist.

To keep following this line of argument obviously leads into the various disputes between Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek as to what the process that leads to the Event. For a review of this argumentation see Vighi and Feldner’s “Žižek Against Badiou: The Real Beyond the Event” in their Žižek: Beyond Foucault (2007c). Of course, Deleuze is dismissed from this conversation since Žižek draws from Badiou’s critique of Deleuze in the Clamour of Being as the philosopher of the
One.

9 Not mentioned is Deleuze’s (1997) own meditation on Bartleby, which revolves around themes of indeterminacy, non(particularity) and potentiality, as well as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s appropriation of Bartleby for their own political ends.

10 Lorraine Tasmin’s (1999) has explored this connection.

11 The relationship of the Limit and what lies Beyond where that which is incomplete ‘causes’ a completion can slip in all possible excuses in the name of equality and democracy as an ideal state that will eventually be reached (Perfection). All there is, is perpetual struggle and it is ‘this’ moment that marks the best that can be achieved. What is yet to be incorporated—the ‘constitutive outside’ as theorized by Ernesto Laclau and adopted at times by Judith Butler, has that danger about it—an ontological priority is given to what is excluded, that has no visibility or voice, rights and so on (woman, queer, ‘colored’) with the claim that once they are incorporated progress will have been made. The worry is that the benevolence of the system is always counted on and excused but not changed—a progressive form of politics is the best we have.

12 The primitiveness of these formulations maybe somewhat embarrassing, for refinement and elegance as to the difficulties between these ontological positions it’s best to read John Mullarkey’s elegant Post-Continental Philosophy: An Outline (2006).

References
www.electronicbookreview.com/thread/endconstruction/stringency
www.rhizomes.net/issue11/berressem/index.html
Bosteels, Bruno (2006) “Alain Badiou’s Theory of the Subject: The Recomencement of


Žižek, Slavoj (2001). The Fright of Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieslowski between Theory and Post-
Žižek, Slavoj (2005c) Interrogating the Real. Rex Butler and Scott Stephens (eds.). London and New York: Continuum