

The Lacanian Graph Hidden Behind Žižek's Project of Critique of Ideology

Philippe Augusto Carvalho Campos, Federal University of
Rio de Janeiro, Brasil

ABSTRACT:

In his article *How Did Marx Invent the Symptom?* Žižek discusses his project of a critique of ideology, he proposes, since the concept of real abstraction by Sohn-Rethel, that are a virtual dimension that structure the practices, which, in turn, the beliefs or the subjectivity is submitted to. On contrary to the classical critique of ideology, that step in the levels of practices or the subjectivity, in Žižek's project the subjectivity is just a rebound effect of the practices and the the practice is what are ideological, then the critique of ideology must to act over the practices, nor on the believes. And, the way to do this is acting over the real abstraction, or, the phantasy, the ideological phantasy. Our propose in this article is to show how this project of a critique of ideology fits in the lacanian structure known as Graph of Desire. In this way, the lacanian graph will be a generic topology (logic of places) to a critique of ideology or phantasy.

KEY WORDS: graph of desire; critique of ideology; phantasy; real abstraction

INTRODUCTION

In despite of presence of the Graph of Desire in a large part of Lacan's work, if we compare it with another topological structures, the Borromean Knots and Four Discourses, we will find a much smaller volume of material available. However, in fact, there is only one work with more than a few pages dedicated to the graph, a compilation of classes taught by the Argentine theoretician Alfredo Eidelsztein (2009), that was published in a book intitulated Graph of Desire in 2009. It's curious to note this negligence, but here, we will not speculate about the reasons. By other side, we don't think that Eidelsztein's book is useful for this article, although his effort to illuminate the graph – Eidelsztein comments one by one the operators presents in graph, and suggests some reading keys and theoretical innovations –, I believe that is missing there a global point of view, such we pretend to articulate in this work through the Žižek's project of a critique of ideology.

Reading the article How Did Marx Invented the Symptom? (Žižek 1994) we can note how Žižek goes promoting a series of levels in which are articulated our beliefs and our practices, and if we order this levels we will find a structure with the same order that one of the Lacanian Graph of Desire. – Including, in the Žižek's work dedicated to graph, he quotes the Lacanian premisses of Marx as inventing the symptom (Žižek 1992: 125). Because of this is important in the reading we follow the schemes that I provide throughout the text.

The objective here is not give a systematic elaboration of the graph – work I started in another job (Campos 2018) – but suggests the structural analogy between Žižek's project of a critique of ideology and the lacanian topological structure of Graph of desire. In this way, not always I will deduce the operators or the concepts, but just appoint the relation.

REAL ABSTRACTION: ON FREUD AND MARX


The first question in with Žižek incides is about the homology between the interpretative methods in Marx and Freud, that is, the analysis of commodity and the dream. The conclusion is that, in both cases, there is not a kind of secret, a hidden object, that we reach by analysis, but, what is importante is the medium; what is the structure of mediation that allows us to produce a dream or a commodity? – Let's remember that Foucault (1986), in praising Marx, Freud and Nietzsche by the inventing the modern hermeneutic, say that, trough this authors, the interpretation became an infinite activity, whereas, if we tend to interpret in the middle age, we end up with the solidity of a transcendental symbol before which we can not continue, the king and his

genealogy, divine will etc. –. So, by this modern hermeneutics, we arrive in a point that the infinite possibility of interpretation is given by the medium through what the dream and the commodity come afford, in other words, the form of a dream related to the Freudian primary repressed, and the commodity-form. Thus, Žižek suggests the homology between the two process: First we assume that, both commodity and dream are not pure contingency, they have a meaning, second, the meaning is not a hidden one (the true valor of commodity, the true meaning of the dream), but its the fom in self, the mediation process that allows the emergence of a thing called dream, and other one called commodity (Žižek 1994: 299- 300).

Žižek continues making use of a not so well known frankfurtian called Sohn-Rethel. The central argument of this philosopher is that, exist a kind of transcendental structure that permit us to perceive something by a category or another – that is, we need the maths to see or measure some object speed, we need something like categorical imperative to perceive some act as moral – and, this transcendental structure already is in act, or we enact this abstract structure when we trade commodities:

Before thought could arrive at the idea of a purely quantitative determination, a sine qua non of the modern science of nature, pure quantity was already at work in money, that commodity which renders possible the commensurability of the value of all other commodities notwithstanding their particular qualitative determination” (Ibid.: 302).

In this way, the Kantian transcendental subject finds his conditions in a sublunar world, Sohn-Rethel call this material condition of possibility of a given multiplicity in a determinate context by *real abstraction*, an abstraction that is in operation in reality. Let’s draw this:



Žižek, through Sohn-Rethel, will say that this real abstraction has “the form of thought whose ontological status is not that of thought” (Ibid.: 304). But here, Žižek make a little temporary confusion. He confunds the freudian “Other Scene” with the Lacanian symbolic order. The point is that Žižek say that symbolic order is a formal order in with the thinking is previously articulated. But we must not confund the

symbolic order properly – s(A) in graph¹ –, whose can be exemplified by the court, the church, the classroom and some social contexts with implicit or/and explicit rules, that, in fact, causes our thinking or our behavior, with the phantasy algorithm – $\$ \diamond a$ –, with another instance that, in between this symbolic order, too causes our think, this is proper the Lacanian's Other Scene (we will see it below) (Ibid.: 304).

CLASSICAL CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY

The classical critique of ideology stands in a certain agent's ignorance about the essence of reality, so, "Ideological' is not the 'false consciousness' of a (social) being but this being itself in so far as it is supported by false consciousness" (Ibid.: 305). Since this, we can read the social symptom by the identification of a certain fissure in a established knowledge properly, that is, the main point is that the negation is "strictly internal" (Ibid.: 307) to such knowledge, or, is not necessary an agent to promote another universal structure that supersede this one, the universal produces its negation immanently. Žižek exemplifies:

the logic of the Marxian critique of Hegel, of the Hegelian notion of society as a rational totality: as soon as we try to conceive the existing social order as a rational totality, we must include in it a paradoxical element which, without ceasing to be its internal constituent, functions as its symptom — subverts the very universal rational principle of this totality. For Marx, this 'irrational' element of the existing society was, of course, the proletariat, 'the unreason of reason itself (Marx), the point at which the Reason embodied in the existing social order encounters its own unreason (Ibid.: 307).

In capitalism the symptom stands in a certain unawareness of the structured net of production moved by the people, and just its ossification is in commodity, "as if this property also belongs to it outside its relation with other elements" (Ibid.: 308). Thereby, whereas in the middle age the fetichism was between the people (the king has a value in itself because he has a touch of divinity), in capitalism, while de the relations of domination and bondage are formally repressed (in todays, someone could be everything he want, there is no more a servant or a slave confined in its condition), this repressed truth return in a commodity. Are the things that have magnitude, not the people, that are all formally equals. We can remember here the emblematic phrase in end of Orwell's Animal Farm: "ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL/ BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS" (Orwell 1945: 51- 52), it means that formal equality does not guarantee na effective equality. In the animal farm the element of


¹ In the end of article we offer the graph drawn.

inequality was the grade in the bureaucratic system, in the capitalist society is the money.

So, now appears an exemplary way to denounce, to criticize such structure. You can laugh of the capitalist structure, you can make a joke on it – the Humberto Eco thesis of liberating, force of laughter –, but, inversely of in societies were the fetishism of the people operates (the sumptuousness of the king, the spotless of a priest, are sustained by constraining, by the inhibition provoked by na transcendental ou Ideal element in the symbolic order – s(A)), in contemporary capitalism a cynical distance, an auto irony are part of the game, some powerful people assume their ruthless, everyone make a joke on it, today we can assume that in a dream someone is our mother (without the freudian “no” that lead us to mother (Freud 1961)). In such way, we are no more ingenuous ones that believe in the transcendental power of a judge, we, in a certain way, know that his is someone like us, that is corrupted or anything else. Because of this, Sloterdijk propose the thesys in which “ideology’s dominant mode of functioning is cynical” (Ibid.: 312). What makes impossible the classical critique of ideology, leading by the symptomal interpretation.


ŽIŽEK’S ELEMENTS TO A CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY

Taking this into account, where is the ideological dimension in today's, whereas it was not in a lack of comprehension? Žižek propose: we “are fetishists in practice, not in theory (Ibid.: 314- 315). So, we have an universal category of mediation that leads our practice, like the Capital. For example:




Now, the illusion is not asided by the knowledge, but in the practices. What people ignores, is not the reality, but the fantasy that structures the reality (our *practical belief* in capitalism attested by the practice). We must have an unconscious phantasy that structure our relation with reality, our relation with the rules of reality. In this way, we have, no more, an Universal commanding our practices, but an unconscious phantasy commanding our ideal of Universal and its fetichicized practices. I will now introduce a new word, I say: “we have an *axiom* that leads ours construction of an Universal and our practices”; “axiom” is the word used by Lacan to define the status of phantasy (Lacan 2011a). Thus, phantasy is an initial hypothesis from which other

statements are derived, and therefore, can't be proven, it is a kind of reinforcement or generator and perpetuator of the symbolic order – s(A). So, the symbolic is submitted to it. Now, the “Universal” or “Capital/ commodity form” are lowered:




Note that, for now, the cynical distance is too situated in downstairs, is one of the various ways to maintain the ideological phantasy working: “even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we are still *doing them*” (Žižek 1994: 316).

If the illusion was asided by knowledge, the cynicism in nowadays will be post-ideological, but Žižek takes over the ideological critique by the practice, keeping its status alive. An example of Marx quoted by Žižek: “He knows very well that Roman law and German law are just two kinds of law, but in his practice, he acts as if the Law itself, this abstract entity, realizes itself in Roman law and in German law (Ibid.: 315)”. In our scheme:




In this view of Žižek, no matter in what the subject think he believes, since he enact the practice, the ideological practice; if is the practice that attest the ideological phantasy: a) the agents subjectivity is, in one way, submitted to his practice, and b) by another side, the agent is free to believe in what he want. Let's draw this in the diagram:




Thus, “*The point of Marx's analysis is that things (commodities) themselves believe in the place of subjects*” (Ibid.: 317). Since this, we have two levels of believes, the faith in structures attested by the practices, and the particular believes that, in some way, are settled to the practices, the external believe.

By this view, Žižek can read the Kafkian literature in a following line: what happen in Kafka’s *The Trial* is that K. is in a limbo, he is both entangled, by the bureaucracy machinery – s(A) – that orients his practice, and by the unconscious phantasy – $\$ \diamond a$ – that does not allow K. to escape from that bureaucratic net. But K. don’t see any sense in bureaucratic machinery, what means that the process of subjectivation is not settled by his practices. In our diagram we can draw like this:




This scheme of practical truth, the truth revealed by the behaviors, refer us to the believes is the Pascal’s *habitus* theory. Pascal will say that what compose a true belive is our practical engagement; according we enact some ritual, this enacting is slowly automating, until it transforms in a complete *automaton*. That is, our body makes a behavior oriented by an inscribed *automaton* (the Lacanian signifier as letter in unconscious (Lacan 2005a), while we have our mind free to think in what we want. In this way, there are no truths hidden behind the law, behind the words in a sacred book, except the fact that the truth *in believe* in thats words or the Law; we are taken in believe so much until we no longer need to think about our belief, believe until it was an *automaton*. In our diagram:



So, the repressed is not some traumatic event, of some obscure origin, of some genetic process of the Law or the divine words, but the very fact that the Law and the

Holy Spirit are not to be accepted as true, only as necessary – the fact is that *its authority is without truth* (Žižek 1994: 319). Let's turning back to the beginning, the truth is not a hidden truth behind the facts, but the form of the facts in itself. The repressed, the traumatic is the necessity of form. In this way, is necessary an antecedent level before the believes, "a paradoxical *status* of a *believe before believe* by following a custom, the subject believes without knowing it, so that the final conversion is merely a formal act by means of which we recognize what we have already believed" (Ibid.: 321). The unconscious, in this way, is the place where is located our most intimate believes, and this unconscious beliefs are represented externally, in our symptoms, practices, rituals etc.




Žižek will say that the lack of Althusser's Ideological State Apparatuses (Althusser 1994) is the non elucidation of how this apparatuses are internalized by the subject. The answer is that the symbolic order, the Jakobson's code and the message (some contextual understand of words) given by the lacanian mathem $s(A)$, is sustained by an unconscious phantasy that gives a primary context to a symbolic order. But this primary context is not full operating unless by an act of faith that validates it, that is, places as truth the symbolic order. This act is what is a *plus* in an ideological phantasy. Is exactly because this structural leftover that the big Other of the symbolic order is perceived as omnipotente. The element of the omnipotences' big Other is the leftover as faith, and, the element of the (possible) inconsistency, the lack of the big Other is too, the fatih – Lacan call this "obscure authority" (Lacan 2005b: 684). Thus,

*far from hindering the full submission of the subject to the ideological command, is the very condition of it: it is precisely this non-integrated surplus of senseless traumatism which confers on the Law its unconditional authority: in other words, which — in so far as it escapes ideological sense — sustains what we might call the ideological *jouis-sense*, enjoyment-in-sense (enjoy-meant), proper to ideology" (Žižek 1994: 321- 322).*

So, we can say, even that the subject don't enjoy with his practices, someone is enjoying, the big Other is enjoying by the act of faith laided up in him by the subject. In the example of Kafka, we can see K. totally suffocated, suffering by the Law, but the

point is that, if K. don't enjoy, the big Other of the Law *sustained by his creed* in the omnipotence of the Law, enjoy in its place.

Not for nothing Lacan will write: "This latter signifier [the leftover, S(A)] is therefore the signifier to which all the other signifiers represent the subject – which means that if this signifier is missing, all the other signifiers represent nothing" (Lacan 2005b: 694), in other words, without the act of faith, the signifier that asserts the power of the big Other, all the symbolic order dissolves. In our diagram:



The Lacanian's name for this leftover is *object a*. in the level of phantasy, the object *a* operates as an enigma (a lack), the subject walks through the symbolic order, through the representations, (coming back to the beginning) through the figures (rebus) of a dream or the commodities looking for the secret. He questions: "what is the real meaning of this dream?", "what is the true value of this commodity or the money?". And then, when he comes too close to the truth, "I dream this dream because, in some sense, I want to dream this dream", he wakes up – Žižek's exemple is about a dream exposed by Freud and commented by Lacan; follows:

A father had been watching beside his child's sick-bed for days and nights on end. After the child had died, he went into the next room to lie down, but left the door open so that he could see from his bedroom into the room in which his child's body was laid out, with tall candles standing round it. An old man had been engaged to keep watch over it, and sat beside the body murmuring prayers. After a few hours' sleep, the father had a dream that *his child was standing beside his bed, caught him by the arm and whispered to him reproach fully: 'Father, don't you see I'm burning?'* He woke up, noticed a bright glare of light from the next room, hurried into it and found the old watchman had dropped off to sleep and that the wrappings and one of the arms of his beloved child's dead body had been burned by a lighted candle that had fallen on them (Žižek 1994: 322- 323).

The Lacanian interpretation for this dream is that the man awake in the moment that his is too close to the truth of his desire: the man, in the Real of his desire, want the death of his son, the man blame yourself for this, for a desire of this kind, the frase, "*Father, don't you see I'm burning?*" asks for a responce like this: "yeah, I see, but it's

time to die and end up with all the suffering”, but is exactly this moment that has to be repressed – a dad can’t desire the death of his own son.

For the commodities, we can exemplify with the crises. In the moment that the shares of stock Exchange are dramatically depreciate, the men jump over the Windows. The dream of wealth, placed in his phantasy, they craved to live, blows up. Then, they discovers that his act of faith in money, the value of money only exists because is sustained by their phantasy. So, as soon as the Money, “the signifier to which all the other signifiers represent the subject”, is exploded, the men are reduced to nothingness.


We can see through this examples that, if in the phantasy the object *a* operates as a lack in structure, in the level of the enjoyment, in the level of the traumatic leftover, the object operates as an excess, a traumatic excess, qua an act of faith directed to the big Other, that sustain the search, the pursuit, in the symbolic order for some lack. Lacan call this act of faith by “signifier of the barred Other” – $S(\bar{A})$ –, the signifier that means that beyond it, there is nothing. The Other is a faced supported by a signifier of faith. Or, in Lacan words: “there is no Other of Other”.

ŽIŽEK’S CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY PROPERLY

We now will examine the *status* of the phantasy in Žižek or Lacan. In Lacan, the subject can’t be reduced to a kind of net of relations, as a product of environment, exactly because the agency of unconscious desire or phantasy, laied up in a grammar of desire ($\$ \diamond a$); that is, a *barred subject* ($\$$) – a subject that, like the Other, have no positive contente, he is *barred* about the interior – looking for an object that completes him, the Freudian lost object, the object of pulsion, or, for an object that signifies him, what Lacan calls metonymic object in his fifth seminar. In short, a barred subject in a relation of conjunction and disjunction (\wedge, \vee), and, that is more and less ($<, >$) that object (because of this, the little square (\diamond) in formula). So, the phantasy is the very reference sice with the subject relates with the reality, is the “Real” of the symbolic order. Let’s examine this via an exemple.

In the cyborg movies – IA, Blade Runner, Bicentenary Man – the cyborg is a human being *because* of his looking for his human essence. In the level of subjectivation, he made existential questioning about his essence, in the level of symbolic, he is denominated as robot, in the level of phantasy, his journey is to find his essence as the human essence, and, in the level of the traumatic leftover or the signifier of the barred Other, he expect of the Other (generally that one that projected the cyborg) the answer about his essence – without know that the answer is the

properly questioning about existence. Hence, the lesson that we must conclude of this movies is that there is no answer but the journey itself, what makes the cyborg (or a human) a human being is exactly the doubt about his humanity. If we psicanalise a cyborg he will reach the conclusion that he is already a human, and then, he will stop to expect of the Other (the creator) the final answer or the final act that crowded him as human. In our diagram:



The whole problem with the critique is that, in general:

- a) We apellate to *ad hominem* arguments, that is: that politician speaks of the good of the nation, but he is interested is in his own goods; the structure of this argument is that, behind a faced of an universal argument, has an auto interest involved. So, here we have a false universal, a particular masked by an universal. This kind of critique operates in the level of symbolic order.
- b) We criticize the proper structure that generate some kind of subjectivity. We say: Is the Ideological State Apparatuses the promotes a domestic subordinate class, we must change this apparatuses. This critique, too, operates in the second level, the level of symbolic order.
- c) We try to convince our interlocutor that he has a false point of view. His sight is not the true one, he don't perceives that such a symbolic order is producing a domestic subordinated class. This one operates in the first level, the level of subjectification.
- d) Lastly, we have the denounce. We appoint to a event that contradicts the very principles of a true universal. We have a formally legal egalitarian law, but the black people, the poor people, the women are Always disadvantaged by this order. This one too operates in a second level.

By this summary taxonomy we can see how the critics of ideology operates just in the first and second levels (I like to mark that this four modes of critique of ideology are not exclusives, they operate together), without goes to the core of question, the phantasy that structures our reality, the phantasy that structures the symbolic order and


the subjectivation. To Žižek: “The only way to break the power of our ideological dream is to confront the Real of our desire which announces itself in this dream” (Žižek 1994: 325). The critique of ideology must act in the third level to rise up to the fourth, we have to criticize the ideological phantasy to found the core in with is the subject with his act of faith, with his desire, that maintains the symbolic order. “That is why we are also unable to shake so-called ideological prejudices by taking into account the pre-ideological level of everyday experience” (Ibid.: 326).

THE LACANIAN GRAPH HIDDEN BEHIND THE ŽIŽEK’S PROJECT OF CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY

Let’s say: Žižek maintain alive the critique of ideology because differently of: Debord’s Society of Spectacle (Debord 1994) – in which there is no exteriority because “the true is a moment of the false” –, Adorno’s Cultural Industry (Adorno 2005) or Negative Dialectics (Adorno 2009) – to which, “All post-Auschwitz culture, including its urgent critique, is garbage” (Ibid.: 367) – or Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man (Marcuse 1964), he find a kind of a bi-dimensional field in with is possible make a critique; some kind external point of view that makes a critique possible.

I will call the first and the second levels of this our schema of explicit field of reality and the third and fourth of implicit field of reality, because we can’t see the phantasy or the leftover explicitly how we can see the behaviors and opinions of people:


Zizek's projet




Lacan say, a lot of times, “there is no metalanguage”, one of the meanings of this phrase is that one can’t reach an ideal point that permit him to criticize or objectify a discourse. There is formalizations, like the graph, but “there is no truth about the truth, since the truth is in the one’s speech, and since not have other mean to do it” (Lacan 2011b). Is because of this that in a psychoanalytical treatment, don’t work if you explain to the patient his phantasy – “Would be taking undue advantage of the subject's docility to try to persuade him in every case that these feelings [transferential feelings] are a mere transferential repetition of the neurosis” (Lacan 2005c: 254). It is

necessary to reach the point in with the subject can capture the word of psychoanalyst as a word that, momentarily, reveals the dimension of unconscious or the desire. Said in another way, is through the speak of analysand that the psychoanalyst can glimpse the unconscious machinery, but not signify it. In this way, there is not properly a two dimension in psychoanalysis and in Žižek's project. We have one dimension the "explicit level" and a lack of this field that permits us to glimpse something that occurs in a kind of a lack of this field, that is, by definition, never explicit. Thus, we have more than one dimension and less than two.


Another point. Lacan associates the subjectivation with the imaginary, or the axis i(a)-m on graph, he will say "those with whom one speaks are also those with whom one identifies himself" (Lacan 1985: 308). The symbolic order is the daily bureaucracy, tacit rules, common-sense that we must to obey. The Lacanian Real refer to the domain that we can't access directly, but is manifested by the formations of the unconscious in the language gaps. And, the leftover is the lack of phantasy that appears in signifier of barred Other as excess. Thereby, in our scheme we can represent like this:




But, as we see, the imaginary, the subjectification, is submitted by the symbolic. The symbolic is not properly submitted to the phantasy, but the phantasy must to find an anchor in the symbolic, or, the symbolic order is here before the subject, and the subject comes to penetrate the symbolic order with his phantasy, that maintain this order. Lastly, the phantasy is submitted to the leftover, submitted to the enjoyment, because the phantasy depends on the act of faith deposited in big Other. So, we can draw our scheme like this:



Now, if we add the course of the subject by this different levels, we have something like this:



And that is the same structure of Lacan's graph of desire:



Finally, what what allows us to add the subject vector to the structure of the different levels so far assembled?

If we analyse some different concepts of XX's century thinkers that designate how the subjectivity, or it's illusion, is produced, we will find, almost ever, an one-way direction, to structure towards the (illusion of) subjectivity. The subjectivity as an

epiphenomenon of structure. This is the case of Bourdieu (2009) with the concept of field; Foucault (Revell 2011) and dispositive; Althusser (1992) and the "Ideological State Apparatus"; and even Levi-Strauss (1996), with the concept of structure. Lacan also possesses his, the, already alluded, big Other. With the exception of Lacan, one finds in these concepts the primacy or exclusivity of the mechanical aspect, the field in Bourdieu is composed of more or less explicit rules; the dispositive in Foucault yields practices and discourses of subjection; the "ideological apparatuses of the state" are, as the name implies, "apparatuses", which are deposited in instances of social conformation (school, church, etc.) and create the illusion of a self, of a subject – though Ideology speaks to the subject, it says, "Hey you!", it is itself only a mechanism, an apparatus (Althusser 1994).

On contrary, the big Other in Lacan is not an one-way direction, in despite the phantasy and the symbolic order undertake the subjectivation process, the psychoanalysis is the proper name to reverse this path. By means of a psychoanalytic process the subject is allowed to find its traumatic core from which his reality is structured, that is, the signifier of the barred Other. In other words, in the case of Lacan, we can interfere in the way our subjectivity is produced and this action is properly the subject of psychoanalysis – this is one of the meanings to the Lacanian translation of Freud's phrase, "Wo Es war, soll Ich werden" (Freud 1932/1999: 86), he translates as: "Where it [in our case, the mechanism] was, there must I come to be as a subject" (Lacan 2005d: 734).

Žižek recurring to Lacanian psychoanalysis propose the frame of ideological critique, but the question is how to apply the ideological critique effectively. How to psychanalyse the society, or, at least, the left (presumably his interlocutor)?

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

In this article, we don't propose to make a fine deduction of the Lacanian graph, nor, to explain all the operators in the graph, but just to present the analogy between the Žižek's project of a critique of ideology and that one that is the most present formalization in the Lacan's work.

But, what is the graph? The graph is a topological structure that Lacan uses to metaphorize the relation of the subject with the signifier. The signifier has a double inscription in the subject. First, as language, the signifier is the signifier of linguistics, the signifier that found the world, a world composed by words, through the differential valuation system of the linguistic sign, like Saussure (1966) understand it. In this field

we have words that designate another words in a differential system, whose raw material would be phonemes. Second we have a signifier that structure the jouissance domain, as we seem, in the level of barred Other with the act of faith that sustain the phantasy; and, in the level of pulsion ($\$ \diamond D$), as a grammar of object a, the forms of object a through which the subject enjoys – like in the Seminar X, oral, anal, phallic, glance and voice (superego) (Lacan 2014) –, in this way, we have the signifier as letter in unconscious (Lacan 2005a). For this second case, is the Jouissance that is the raw material. Lastly, crossing this two fields we have the subject. The subject is that one who capt the signifiers of big Other (in A, in graph) in order to fill the grammar of pulsion, and, that one who enact, in the Other Scene, his phantasy while he performs his obligations in the front scene.

In Žižek's *The Parallax View* (Žižek 2009), through an example of Lèvi-Strauss, he describes the Real as a generator of antagonisms, this antagonic structure is due thanks to the missing object around which the language is gavitates (the pulsion ($\$ \diamond D$)) to form a phantasy, na axiomatic frame in with the desire is articulated. But, this object is not a positive one, and is precisely his negativity that makes that, what is missing for one, is don't missed to another, in better ways, we have different nothingness different frames in in which the lack is articulated. And too, what is missed to one, is because the other usurp it to his; we have a nothingness that is Less than Nothing, that is, a robbed nothing sustained just by our phantasy.

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