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Without Sex: An Appraisal of Žižek's Posthumanism

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Abstract

In this paper, I assess Žižek's article "No Sex, Please, We're Post-human!" as a provocative injunction to signal the posthuman ecstasy and deterrence. I seek to expose, rather than express, Žižek's posthumanist perspective as a paradoxical intertwining of different aspects of perspectivizing a post-human being from the view of the end of sexuality – the background that informs a posthuman future. Žižek's eluding the subject's confrontation with the question of sexual difference to the apex of the genome project touches the delicate coalescing of the notions of 'objectivity and subjectivity' and 'virtuality and reality' in the fate of the body. Ultimately, he renders this inception of this tarrying as a traumatic encounter that informs us of the existential birthright of a true posthuman.

Keywords: Žižek; Sex; Posthumanism; Sexual Difference; Genome; Trauma

The Posthuman Field day

Why the fuss with posthumanity? Donna Haraway, distinguished American Professor in the History of Consciousness, says: “the posthumanities—I think this is another word for ‘after monotheism’— require another kind of open. Pay attention. It’s about time (2008: 245).” The question about posthumanism comes to fore from tarrying with the advancement of humanity as a field day that accommodates perspectives from interdisciplinary to multicultural studies. That is to say, that the inscription that dictates the notion of what goes beyond what is human already is marking its way into the disciplines engaging in the field of current research. The possibilities that beckon the mystery of the human mind to grasp what is more than what it is – this has long been the trajectory that drives man’s fate beyond.

But what exactly is a posthuman? Waters (2006: 50) says that the question is impossible to answer definitively because the creation of such humanity does not yet exist, and there is little consensus among the thinkers who perceive it. But in spite of this complexity, the literature is wide about the topic. Pepperell (2003: iv) enumerated the number of things describing at once the word ‘posthuman’:

the word ‘posthuman’ is employed to describe a number of things at once. First, it is used to mark the end of that period of social development known as humanism, and so in this sense it means ‘after humanism’. Second, it refers to the fact that our traditional view of what constitutes a human being is now undergoing a profound transformation. It is argued that we can no longer think about being human in the same way we used to. Third, the term refers to the general convergence of biology and technology to the point where they are increasingly becoming indistinguishable. In this sense the term posthuman is preferable to ‘post-biological’ (the two terms are sometimes interchanged) insofar as the decaying category of ‘human’ can be seen merely a subset of an increasingly virulent ‘techno-biology’ of which we might be but a transient phase. The term ‘transhuman’ is also

widely used and carries some interesting implications not fully explored here, such as extended life and extra-terrestrial intelligence.

Furthermore, “as a cyberpunk-styled text, it is a way to explore the increasingly complicated boundaries between humans and machines, in what Fukuyama has called a ‘posthuman’ world. (Glover 2010: 140).” Fukuyama (2002) notes that this posthuman world, this posthuman future, as it were, basking in the ability to manipulate DNA will have terrible consequences in the political order even when it is undertaken with the best intentions. This is not surprising given that even in Fukuyama’s celebrated work *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992) where he argues of liberal democracy as the final form of government, he notes in one conference that even the best ideas can fail (Fukuyama 2014). Waters (2006) explains that the transport of man to the posthuman can happen in the other term called transhumanism. For him ‘transhumanism is a transitional movement dedicated to transforming humans into posthumans (2006: 50).’ The idea is that the condition of humans is fated, given his finitude and mortality. The ‘overriding goal,’ as it appears, ‘is to overcome these limitations through a series of progressive transformations. The most immediate challenge is to increase longevity (Ibid.).’

For Hayles (1999) however, posthumanism and the movement that leads to it evokes both terror and pleasure. On the one hand, it evokes terror because by then ‘humans can either go gently into that good night, joining the dinosaurs as a species that once ruled the earth but is now obsolete, or hang on for a while longer by becoming machines themselves (Hayles 1999: 283).’ On the other hand, regarding pleasure, the posthuman “evokes the exhilarating prospect of getting out of some of the old boxes and opening up new ways of thinking about what being human means (Hayles 1999: 285).” The posthuman project can be a breakthrough, but as in all transitions, it is an unknown field that is bound by an amalgamation of different but sometimes of differing possibilities.

In *Beyond Blood Identities*, Hill (2009: 16) closes his “Theorizing Posthumanity” by offering a ‘cosmopolitan understanding of human subjectivity’ and the way in which a cosmopolitan notion of intersubjectivity could inspire us to live lives beyond conventional

understandings of community.’ The landscape that the posthuman field day poses is one that is fraught with a complex understanding of what is to come. It is a field day of a futuristic outlook governed still with transitions, endings, and bug fixes we might not even be ready for.

In this paper, I review Slavoj Žižek’s take on posthumanism in the spectrum of the end of sexuality and its paradoxical consequences to the interplay of objectivity and subjectivity, virtuality and reality of the body. These are aspects that intertwine with each other in the advent of a truly posthuman being. Informed by his psychoanalytical methods, what is distinct about Žižek’s take is the assertion that the transition towards posthumanism, although operating within the confines of paradoxes, is a traumatic event, an encounter that still resides even after the process of objectification. The intertwining of the subject/object, virtual/real dichotomy into an overlapping moment opening the Pandora’s Box of paradoxes connotes an encounter that disturbs the original and neutral pacing of human stability. The arena where this takes place settles in the realm of sexuality or its eventual ending thereof.

The End of Sexuality and the Last Man

In one interview, Žižek was asked of two personal questions, to which he answered (in Slovene): ‘When did I last have sex – never. When will I next have sex – never. Really, let me tell you something...It is nice to sleep with a woman [*Of course to have sex rather than merely sleep*]... but isn’t it nice to sleep after sex? To hug each other and...Yes, that’s serious Leninist work because each person has some tricks to find a position in which you can spend the whole night...’ The short one-worded replies were explicit and one wonders if it is the senility talking or if it comes from the firm position of his thoughts. After all, was it not Žižek himself who disrupted the dichotomy of his being an academician or theoretician and being human, relaying the message that he is not wearing masks and that he is a monster (cf. *Zizek!*, 2005)?

In fact in a conversation with Paul Holdengrber on Surveillance and whistleblowers (2014), Žižek does not give the least care if he is being watched by the government or some private entity even when it borders on perverse voyeurism and threatens personal privacy, arguing instead of the allowance he permits anyone to do so with the thought in mind that the operators of such surveillances are idiots or in his words ‘Go ahead, perhaps they will learn something from me.’ In the same conversation, he thereby stressed that his actions will not change despite the surveillance. Here, one can connect his thoughts in synthetic sex and ‘being yourself.’

In *Big Think*, Žižek (2015) argues that in the advent of social media – where the platform likens itself to the way surveillances are handled, so that one can monitor the life of a person in either his timeline in Facebook or his posts in Instagram with the necessary details, location, date, friends, at the beck of one’s curiosity – he disdains the act of ‘self-commodification’ or ‘self-manipulation’ in order to appear ‘perfect,’ perfection being an illusion that is too good to be true. He further claims then that love should deal with being oneself minus the commodification or synthetically structured image and that only in imperfection can one truly love.

In his article “No Sex, Please, We’re Post-human,” (Žižek: Unpaginated; henceforth, ZNS) he tackles the common denominator of Michel Foucault’s *death of man* and Michel Houellebecq’s picture of ‘genetically modified asexual humanoids.’ The denominator is the disappearance of sexual difference. Why this disappearance? The significance of Foucault’s history of sexuality series underpin the dream of a careful observance of one’s practice of pleasures. In his *Use of Pleasure*, Foucault (1990) notes of practices where one can handle the pleasantries in relation to the self, a kind of *rapport Sui*. For Žižek, ‘Foucault envisioned the space of pleasures liberated from Sex’ via the ‘use of pleasure’ (ZNS). In Houellebecq’s picture, particularly in his celebrated bestseller *Les particules elementaires*, he contrasts two dispositions of the half-brothers Bruno and Michel. Bruno is an undersexed hedonist high school teacher who ended up in a psychiatric asylum after he tried to grasp the utter meaninglessness of sexual permissiveness looming in their time, the license of almost any emancipatory act that

caters to collective orgies. The two half-brothers were abandoned by their mother, and since their existential exile, if one may call it, no remedying outlook gave them the proper disposition to carry on, even the study of philosophy, marriage, and the consumption of pornography. Michel, being the brilliant biochemist that he is, invented a considerable panacea to the grotesque practices of sexual rampage at hand. He invents a gene that self-replicates, capable of sustaining a new humanity but with a twist in its genetic codification – this self-replicating gene can pave the way for a ‘desexualized entity,’ or ‘genetically modified asexual humanoids’ devoid of passions.

Žižek also explained the less known prototype of Alan Turing’s ‘imitation game’ that now is known to test whether a machine can think by juxtaposing two computer interfaces – one is human-operated and the other is computer generated – and comparing if there is any difference of the thoughts produced by man and machine. The less known prototype however is not operated between human and machine but of man and woman. The experiment is then replaced since it would not prove anything whether a man can express linguistic or symbolic utterances like that of a woman or of the woman by the same procedure to fully imitate a man. But between a man and a machine, one can well prove the point if there is any difference at all since the proper organization of thought would then be objectivity assessed if one cannot properly distinguish the responses between the two – in which case, proving therefore that machines can actually think. Žižek theorizes his assertion: ‘What if sexual difference is not simply a biological fact, but the Real of an antagonism that defines humanity, so that once sexual difference is abolished, a human being effectively becomes indistinguishable from a machine (ZNS).’

In this sense, sexuality would then be the ‘obstacle’ towards elevating man into the future envisagement of his perfection. In Nietzsche’s terms, the Last Man in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1969), as the opposite of the Superman, would be the present realm of humanity still distinguishable from the future that is the Superman. What this initially points is that Žižek’s posthumanism already exposes its primary characteristic, one that thereby castrates the very notion of sexuality in the current state of humanity. It would be a humanity that detaches itself from sex, a posthuman without sex, as a by-product of

cloning, and the self-replicating possibilities that involves the absence of sexual differentiation e.g. transfer of consciousness, virtual reality, etc. He says that

the end of sexuality in the much celebrated "posthuman" self-cloning entity expected to emerge soon, far from opening up the way to pure spirituality, will simultaneously signal the end of what is traditionally designated as the uniquely human spiritual transcendence. All the celebrating of the new "enhanced" possibilities of sexual life that Virtual Reality offers cannot conceal the fact that, once cloning supplements sexual difference, the game is over. (ZNS)

The posthuman future that is described here is therefrom a deliberate dismissal of any notion of sex. The possibilities wrapped altogether in this scenery articulate further the other ways in which the absence of sexual orientations can manifest. The making of a genome sets the mark of a human as subject but at the same time an object when, after all the procedural scanning and extracting of consciousness into a formula, the subject becomes reduced to the reified process of objectivity. Outside the dimension of sexuality, not only is the objectification process a dilemma to the subject but also the horizon from which this process takes place – the corporeal elements of the body – will also be rethought when what is virtual, in the case of transferring consciousness, can intersect disruptively with the real; and the same goes with the opposite: what is real becomes disenchanting.

The perspective that seems viable for Žižek is that the assertion of the body as the intersecting point is to confront the encounter as precisely traumatic. To formulate as it were a desexualized procedure that congeals altogether the human in a genome, the complete set of genetic material and codification of an organism, would emancipate a posthuman still draped with the problematic complexion of objectivity and subjectivity, reality and virtuality, and the existential trauma that looms over such posthuman's fate.

Trauma: The Body as Object, Subject, Virtual, and Real?

In a desexualized genome making possible the processes of consciousness-transfer, self-replication, and engagement of one's consciousness to the virtual world or cyber

space, the post-human is an obvious overlapping of the objectivity and subjectivity, virtuality and reality. This implies that the subject, the post-human, is no longer just a subject corresponding some object of reality: it is not just anymore the case of the conventional understanding of truth as that which conforms reality, the actuality of an already-existing object, towards the intellect. Given the frame of a genome outside an existing human one, this externality being the phrase 'brain in a vat', exposes one's consciousness – here closely resembling the simulacrum of subjectivity and the intentionality that it poses – as an object. Meaning to say, if I can see myself in the brain in a vat, or my genome in a Petri dish, the radical question is: who is the real 'I'? Is then not the complete objectification of my subjectivity the exact blurring between myself (as subject) – the perceiving and modifying ontological reality that has intentionality – and myself (as object) – the perceived and modified virtual existence with the same genetic component or consciousness as me?

What becomes of the body? The post-human, outside the realm of sexuality, also becomes an external object that detaches itself as an outsider of the body – a disembodiment that presents the corporeality merely as a vessel where one can jump from one to another. The concept of genome makes possible the idea that one can transfer oneself to another by implanting and modifying one's genetic components. But there is a paradox or antinomy that presents itself against this setting. Žižek notes that even in the access towards virtual reality, if we can at best project our Self into cyberspace, the body is still the existent reality that keeps one's consciousness to the ground. What this paradox exposes therefore is not that we can disembodiment ourselves per se, but that we can disembodiment our 'experience' of reality while still having a body. For him, 'we will never turn ourselves into virtual entities freely floating from one to another virtual universe: our "real life" body and its mortality is the ultimate horizon of our existence, the ultimate, innermost impossibility that underpins the immersion in all possible multiple virtual universes (ZNS).'

The blurring of one's identity either as an object or subject not merely in an epistemological but in an ontological sense confronts the question of the future or the

interrogation towards some possible divine higher body than man's present bodily component. That is to say, that there are possible worlds ahead: the worst kind or the best; even perhaps a kind just enough to satisfy naïve desires. The rationale of this possibility entails open questions. The glaring of which is the same query on being watched, being the guinea pig of something more advanced than present humanity. What if we are only the laughing stock of the future? Žižek emphasizes that

the first association that imposes itself here is the notion that the 'actually existing' humanity still dwells in what Marx designated as 'pre-history,' and that the true human history will begin with the advent of the Communist society; or, in Nietzsche's terms, that man is just a bridge, a passage between animal and overman. What Lorenz "meant" was undoubtedly situated along these lines, although with a more humanistic twist: humanity is still immature and barbarian, it did not yet reach the full wisdom. However, an opposite reading also imposes itself: the human being IS in its very essence a "passage," the finite opens into an abyss (ZNS).

It isn't hard to evoke this logic upon seeing for instance the 80's film '*The Gods Must Be Crazy*.' Some primitive human beings got a hold of an empty bottle of coke dropped neglectfully by a pilot. Remember how the natives utilized the empty bottle and made of use of it for various purposes. The Kalahari people, as they were called, were contented in their own lifestyle, until a trash from a more advanced civilization happened in their lives: the empty bottle, the trash as it were, suddenly bore a utilitarian meaning for their less advanced way of life. The event of finding the bottle was something not expected, but the question of handling it made it quite interesting. The initial attempts of finding out the proper usage of the bottle was a laughable thing for us; since a junk disposed from a throw-away culture serves nothing but a junk. For us, that kind of 'pre-evolved' humanity, if one may call it, behind the tide of modernization is a comic play of human nature, as it makes for an honest perspective of how naïve we are.

Naivety is the common term for the idiocy that an elite erudite group assigns to less knowledgeable groups. Such naivety holds true for present humanity: for the Kalahari people, we are the crazy gods, crazy enough to give them a bizarre thing and to laugh at them for tinkering on our manure; for the future humanity, we are still the crazy beings

laughing, but this time at ourselves – and they might be laughing at us too. This time, we no longer point to some god to speak of the unknown, but to an open universe of posthumanity and the concept of ‘god’ will have become obsolete. For the future, we are no longer gods, for the passage of time would have by then stripped us of our madly owned divine regalia.

Such artistic portrayal of distrust for the present generation handling of our ‘tools’ – gadgets, appliances, etc. – summing it up for a picture of bent humanity looking always at phones, marks the beginning of another evolution. Some have already realized that such technological apparatuses, rather than being adored as a gift from the crazy gods, are nothing but empty hazmat tools sucking the life out of our external harmony – some, turning off their Wi-Fi to pretend that we still have that harmony. The Kalahari people, upon finding out that the bottle incited envy and hostility, immediately knew of the danger it provokes in their relationships. On a prima facie level, it may serve as a valid prologue for promoting communism and the abolition of private property. On a more radical note, this means that we are heading towards a more mature insight of materialism, born out of an honest view of a humanism that rouses endless naïve questions for the divinity and the vast multiverse ahead.

This brings us again to Žižek’s point of “the radical question of ‘what we are’: am I that, the code that can be compressed onto a single CD? Are we ‘nobody and nothing,’ just an illusion of self-awareness whose only reality is the complex interacting network of neuronal and other links (ZNS)?” The case of objectivity to subjectivity can also be applied to the case of virtuality and reality. Is the virtual then reality, and vice-versa? Is our reality found in the virtual self that we create and modify ourselves in cyberspace? Is our body both virtual and real?

The literal "enlightenment," the "lightness of being," the relief/alleviation we feel when we freely float in cyberspace (or, even more, in Virtual Reality), is not the experience of being bodyless, but *the experience of possessing another - aetheric, virtual, weightless - body, a body which does not confine us to the inert materiality and finitude, an angelic spectral body, a body which can be artificially recreated and manipulated.* Cyberspace thus designates a

turn, a kind of "negation of negation," in the gradual progress towards the *disembodying of our experience* (ZNS; Italics mine).

The paradox in this setup, again, is not that we can possibly disintegrate the freedom of choice in reality and in the virtual, but that the Self that lies even just for a space in between the two, will still be there. He says that "one can argue that such a dystopian prospect involves the loop of a *petitio principii*: it silently presupposes that the same old Self which phenomenologically relies on the gap between "myself" and the objects "out there" will continue to be here after the completed self-objectivization (ZNS)." The insistence of this self and the demarcation line between reality and virtuality can be best explicated in an anime *Sword Art Online* (SAO). SAO is a Virtual Reality Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game (VRMMORPG) that enables the player's consciousness to actually engage in a virtual world. It basically transports one into another dimension by just plugging the NerveGear device that allows the transport and leaves the actual body in the real world safely unconscious. The twist of this game is of course the confrontation of the virtual into the real and vice-versa: if the player dies in the game, the real player outside the game also dies.

The true brand of posthumanism to be revealed is the very notion of breaking away from the real distinguishable facets of subject and object, the real body and the virtual body. But these facets intertwining altogether for a posthuman is something that dramatically involves a traumatic encounter. The same point that Žižek likes to make is that only in the moment of trauma can the encounter of subject, object, virtual, and real in a body can be properly distinguished. A crucial example here is the fear that one experiences before a plane crash: in the event when one becomes fully aware that one will die, objectively, thereby rendering oneself already as an object – a dead body – who is the one afraid? Even if this is merely a simulation of a virtual reality, say, a game in cyberspace where one is falling off of a cliff, the moments of falling can very much tell the difference that one's subjectivity is still there, that the horizon of the (virtual/real) body is not in a sense totally detached from the consciousness that controls it. Žižek asserts that the passage of man in becoming a posthuman is traumatic: the transition to the posthuman body is not an effect of an inner transformation or a modification of genome

but that the transition itself – the disembodied paradox of experience when the human does not really know absolutely what will happen (e.g. the instance of death, or to another unknown experience outside the ordinary – is the very trauma (an encounter or an experience) that provides the passage from animality into becoming a pure orb of consciousness. He says: “The idea is that this cutting off of the umbilical cord that links us to a single body, this shift from having (and being stuck to) a body to freely floating between different embodiments will mark the true birth of the human being, relegating the entire hitherto history of humanity to the status of a confused period of transition from the animal kingdom to the true kingdom of the mind (ZNS).”

In his book *What is Posthumanism?* Wolf (2010: 324) says that “the human for Žižek is not the ‘subject who knows’ but rather, in this inversion, alone ‘the subject who does not know’ – a non-knowledge, usually explored by Žižek under the thematics of trauma, that never arises as a problem

or possibility for animals.” Žižek is amenable of the take that reality is the concept of resistance: that some gap has to exist between the assertions of the intellect to the actual object in reality. It is not therefore that reality can be purely objectified, but that reality is still this ontological deadlock that stands in between one’s mind and the actual substratum of a thing. The idea of resisting is always going to be the ontological basis in which reality can be viewed *as reality*. If this resistance is taken away and a pure mind can almost grasp the totality of a thing, then the closing of the gap happens and by then there would not be any intervention whatsoever to inform the radical difference between what is virtual and what is real. What then governs the real is the act of resisting. For him, it is not found in one’s genome to enter the simulacra of the universe – what is perceived of as reality – without an intervention, without the gap that stands between it. Wolf pointed out that the manner in which humans deal with trauma for Žižek is different from the animals. Žižek explains the fundamental thought of this trauma:

The first thing to bear in mind here is that "trauma" is NOT simply a shorthand term for the unpredictable chaotic wealth of environment influences, so that we are lead to the standard proposition according to which the identity of a human being results from the interaction between

his/her genetic inheritance and the influence of his/her environment ("nature versus nurture") ... "trauma" designates a shocking encounter which, precisely, DISTURBS this immersion into one's life-world, a violent intrusion of something which doesn't fit it. Of course, animals can also experience traumatic ruptures: say, is the ants' universe not thrown off the rails when a human intervention totally subverts their environs? However, the difference between animals and men is crucial here: for animals, such traumatic ruptures are the exception, they are experienced as a catastrophe which ruins their way of life; *for humans, on the contrary, the traumatic encounter is a universal condition, the intrusion which sets in motion the process of "becoming human."* (ZNS).

This opens the thought that Žižek parallels in the Jewish-Christian tradition. Isn't it that the vocation of a human being, the trajectory that enables him to immerse into his life, is often undertaken in a traumatic encounter, an experience beyond his life-world? This happens so that life for a Christian is not simply the life that is undisturbed. On the contrary, the callings of the main characters and even the side characters in the scriptures are disturbed with a trauma that determined their fate: Moses with the burning bush, Saul's conversion into Paul, the drunk Noah to save the fate of humanity from the flood, the callings of the prophets, kings, and apostles. Here even Jesus in the gospels is radical when he says: "Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword (Mt. 10:34)." The irony here of course is that he is supposed to be the prince of peace prophesied by Isaiah in the Old Testament. What is obvious here is that the true vocation of the human is revealed only within the auspices of a traumatic event – something happens to unfold as it were the real mission of a human being, so that when this disturbance disappears, when there is absolute peace, one doubts whether the path in which a human treads is really his destined path. Sir Francis Drake's prayer (1577) is testament to the need for this disturbance. One line of the prayer goes:

Disturb us, Lord, to dare more boldly,
To venture on wider seas
Where storms will show Your mastery;
Where losing sight of land,
We shall find the stars.

We ask You to push back
The horizons of our hopes;
And to push into the future
In strength, courage, hope, and love.

The traumatic encounter for humans is a significant part of human existence, a 'universal condition' that distinctly separates man from the animals. It is in this frame that the vocation of a posthuman can also come to fruition. In his words, "This is the lesson of both psychoanalysis and the Jewish-Christian tradition: the specific human vocation does not rely on the development of man's inherent potentials (on the awakening of the dormant spiritual forces OR of some genetic program); it is triggered by an external traumatic encounter, by the encounter of the Other's desire in its impenetrability (ZNS)." In short, the fate of the posthuman relies on a calling that is beyond his capacity and is only triggered by the trauma that jolts him to surpass the gaps in between. If, in the end, posthumanism can grant humanity the ideal by which it can achieve not only its great heights but for some cause that warrants the maximum expectancy of a human's trajectory as a whole, then that would not bear much of a problem. The only antinomy here is again the sets of paradoxes waiting between the lines, inscribed along the vestiges of human embodiment and perception. It is not inherent, nay part of an aboriginal proclivity, for a genome, that is, for a complete objectification of humanity, to exceed beyond its interface and systematic setting of itself. At best, what the future of humanism will look like is still for Žižek an encounter that disturbs the very equilibrium that any bug fixing cannot permanently address.

Conclusion

In the discussion above, I have assessed Žižek's article "No Sex, Please, We're Post-human!" in the facets that merit his take on posthumanism. My exposition of Žižek's posthumanist perspective is a paradoxical intertwining of different aspects of perspectivizing a post-human from the backdrop of the end of sexuality. In the transport of humanism to posthumanism, sexual difference is the area that ceases: Žižek eludes the subject's confrontation with the question of sexual difference to the apex of the

genome project since it presupposed that the significant part lies only in the blurring lines of man and machine.

I have tried to expose also that the genome project touches the delicate coalescing of the notions of 'objectivity and subjectivity' and 'virtuality and reality' in the fate of the body. The body then, upon intersecting such notions, becomes the horizon that disenchantments and makes possible the event that Žižek can only refer as a traumatic encounter. Such trauma albeit analogous to the Judeo-Christian legacy – something that reflects his reading of orthodoxy in Chesterton and Kierkegaard – is for him a necessary and universal human condition that can transgress the true aspect of what it is to be posthuman. Only in a traumatic encounter can the absence of sexuality that informs the backdrop of the posthuman project can, in all probability, succeed to signal the coming of a brave new world.

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