Abstract
The politics of Slavoj Zizek has been attracting greater attention in recent times, particularly as a result of some of his recent public commentary key contemporary political issues, such as the Occupy Movement, the election of Donald Trump, and the Greek referendum. Zizek has advocated a range of political strategies in the course of his writings, including 'over-identification'. However, while the strategy of over-identification appears to have given way to a preference for the Lacanian Act, subtraction and Bartleby politics, the paper examines whether Zizek’s recent public interventions signal a return to his politics of over-identification. First, the paper briefly examines the underlying theory behind a politics of identification and how Zizek conceives it. The paper then turns to three events – Wikileaks, the election of Trump, and Trumps withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement on climate change – to examine the application of a politics of over-identification to contemporary political issues. The paper includes by highlighting further key points in Zizek’s theoretical edifice that reinforce the relevance and applicability of his politics to contemporary issues.

Key words: Zizek, power, political transformation, over-identification
The politics of Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek have been gaining increased attention in recent times, from both those who embrace his political approach to social change and those strongly reject it. Indeed, his style and approach has made him one of the few philosophers whose political views are widely reported and listened to (Goldhill 2016). This has particularly been the case since the Occupy Movement in 2011 and more recently with the 2016 election of Donald Trump. During the Occupy Movement, Zizek was a guest speaker in New York and his Bartleby Politics was, at the least, considered to be consistent with the politics of the movement. For example, Kelly (2017) argues that Bartleby is a “strange premonition of the Occupy Movement” and Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to” was posted around the streets of New York during May Day festivities connected to the Occupy Movement (Burdick 2012). However his Bartleby politics has received much criticism for its apparent advocacy of doing nothing in the face of injustice. For example, Simon Critchley (2010) criticizes Žižek for counselling us “to do nothing in the face of the objective, systemic violence of the world. We should just sit and wait and have the courage to do nothing”. More recently, during the lead up to the 2016 US elections Zizek infamously announced that if he were a US citizen then we would vote for Donald Trump. Predictably, he received swift critique for such a position. For example, Andre Damon (2016) describes Zizek as an “intellectual charlatan of the worst sort” and that his endorsement of Trump is “in keeping with his lurch to the right in recent years”. In an interview for Al Jazeera, Noam Chomsky argued that Zizek’s endorsement of Trump was similar to people’s endorsement of Hitler (Chomsky 2016). In any case, what is of interest to this paper is that Zizek’s latest public forays, particularly on the issues such as Wikileaks and the of the election of Donald Trump, seem to indicate a move away from Bartleby politics in favour of his earlier suggested political strategy of ‘over-identification’ or ‘over-conformity’. This paper takes a closer look at this claim.

The Ideological Deadlock and Zizek’s politics of over-identification
Prior to his 2005 turn to Bartleby politics, Zizek suggested a number of other strategies or approaches to political transformation, including over-identification or over-conformity; a politics of subtraction, suspension, or withdrawal; and the Lacanian Act. Despite these three approaches appearing to suggest different strategies for transformative political action, they nonetheless all seek to respond to what Zizek refers to as an ‘ideological deadlock’. This deadlock stems from the fundamental theoretical tenet underlying Zizek’s approach to social
transformation that power is never complete, or that there is a void or gap at the heart of Power that prevents it from being fully self-realised. This incompleteness is linked to the Lacanian notion of enjoyment or jouissance, which in Zizek’s theoretical edifice refers to the way that a concept (such as any notion of Society) is thwarted from being fully realised by an internal excess that both threatens it and conditions it (Dean 2006). Simply put, this is to say that the current social order is contingent, that things could be (or could have been) different and therefore it is in the interests of power to keep this fact hidden. In fact, not only is it simply in the interests of power, but power’s contingency has to be repressed in order for it to appear as consistent and stable. Therefore, the ideological deadlock revolves around the double nature of the incompleteness of power as both the very thing which the social order relies on for its existence and also its biggest threat.

A key way that power prevents us from exploiting its incompleteness for social transformation, according to Zizek, is by ensuring that we maintain a distance from power thereby remaining unaware of the explosive transformative potential that it harbours. For example, Zizek (1997) claims “an ideological identification exerts a true hold on us precisely when we maintain an awareness that we are not fully identical to it”. The paradox here emphasised by Zizek (2000a: 148) is that “the subject is actually ‘in’ (caught in the web of) power only and precisely in so far as he does not fully identify with it but maintains a kind of distance towards it”. Zizek explains this paradox through reference to the concepts of inherent transgression and the superego which help us to understand the way that power not only encourages us to break its explicit rules, thereby keeping us at a distance to it, but also how power itself does not take its own rules seriously. That is, in addition to the explicitly sanctioned rules of power, the latter is sustained by a series of unwritten or hidden rules which are transgressions of these explicit ones. The concept of inherent transgression enables Zizek to argue, for example, that issues such as corruption, torture, or spying on citizens, far from undermining liberal democracy, serve as its ultimate support. That is, while the explicit message of liberal democracy is adherence to a set of formal democratic rules and procedures (parliaments, free and fair elections etc), the functioning of liberal democracy is sustained by a series of hidden, unwritten rules that undermine these explicit rules. These hidden rules help ensure that, “even when democratic legitimacy seems healthy, our votes merely sanction the existence of an order whose framework has already been decided and imposed on us” (Vighi 2012: 117). Or to be blunt, the liberal rules only allow us to choose what does not interfere with the sovereign interests of Capital.

This notion of the inherent transgression has important implications for how Zizek thinks about political action. For example, he argues,
“The political consequence I draw from this notion of inherent transgression is that one has to abandon the idea that power operates in the mode of identification...so that the privileged form of resistance to power should involve a politics of disidentification. A minimum of disidentification is a priori necessary if power is to function...power can reproduce itself only through some form of self-distance, by relying on the obscene disavowed rules and practices that are in conflict with its public norms” (Zizek 2000b: 218).

This means that often the acts of resistance that we engage in are consistent with the inherent transgression, ensuring we maintain a distance from power and therefore are precisely those actions that serve to support power. Given this to be the case, a question that might arise is why then do we continue to engage in actions that support power? This is where the role of the superego comes in. The superego demands us to undermine the ideological edifice of power and participate in the dark underside of the dominant ethical order. Therefore, the superego turns the desire to transgress power into an obligation. Zizek (2000a: 142) explains, “When we obey the Law we do so as part of a desperate attempt to fight against our desire to transgress it, so the more rigorously we obey the Law, the more we bear witness to the fact that, deep within ourselves, we feel the pressure of the desire to indulge in sin”. The paradox of the superego is that one is guilty if they violate the explicit prohibition, but is even guiltier if he or she obeys it.

As such we are caught in an ideological deadlock where “we are dealing not with the simple tension between the impossible ideological injunction and subjective resistance to it, but with the double-bind inherent to this injunction itself: the injunction’s ‘explicit’ message is redoubled (supplemented, sustained) by an implicit obscene message which says the exact opposite” (Zizek 2002: 224-225). In response, ideological fantasy enables us to endure this deadlock. As Adrian Johnston (2009: 92) writes,

“Subjects acquiesce to a system of rules, norms and conventions...so long as they are somehow able to sustain a minimal sense of sane selfhood or individuality vis-à-vis conceiving of themselves as skeptics reluctantly going along with the run of things amidst a herd of simplistic, gullible believers, namely amidst those who believe in their place as ‘subjects supposed to believe’”.

This displacement takes place through what Zizek refers to as the fetishist disavowal. The fetishist disavowal functions in the manner of, ‘I know very well, but nonetheless I believe
(act) otherwise’. Therefore, even when we know that power is sham, that it is full of contradictions and therefore not a consistent social order, we nonetheless believe otherwise by engaging in actions that support power; and our reasons for doing so are displaced onto some other through ideological fantasy. Indeed, according to Dean (2005) the fetish therefore enables one to go about his or her life relieved of the guilt that he or she might not be doing their part and secure in the belief that we are all informed, engaged citizens.

Zizek’s search for a strategy that can meaningfully and effectively break free from this ideological deadlock is at the heart of his politics. One of the strategies advocated for performing this task, particularly in Zizek’s early writings, is ‘over-identification’ with power. In a simple way, this strategy argues that given a minimum of disidentification is a priori necessary if power is to function, then an ideological edifice can be undermined by a too literal identification, or simply taking power at its word (1998). While at times he suggests that this over-identification means ignoring the superego at other times he claims that because the obscene unwritten rules sustain power as long as they remain in the shadows then power can be undermined by making these rules publically recognized. It is this latter definition that seems to be more widely accepted. For example, as Feldner and Vighi (2007: 136) describe it,

since the ultimate support of ideology is a nonsensical kernel of enjoyment, the best way to expose the failure of ideology to coincide with itself (to impose itself as a self-transparent, neutral and consistent set of ideas) is to identify with it completely, inclusive of its concealed underside of obscene enjoyment. Since obscene enjoyment is nothing but a gentrification (the positive side) of the abyssal inconsistency of ideology, bringing this obscene enjoyment to the surface is tantamount to revealing the inconsistency of the ideological edifice.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the strategy of over-identification has also received criticism for being too vague and not offering any practical advice for political action (Newman 2004). Indeed, Zizek seems to offer few political examples instead relying on fictional ones (e.g., the movie A Few Good Men). In any case, over time the strategy of over-identification appeared to be superseded by preference for the Lacanian Act, subtraction and Bartleby politics.

**A return to a politics of over-identification?**

Zizek’s recent public commentary on political issues, however, seem to indicate a return to his politics of over-identification. For example, WikiLeaks, according to Zizek, was able to
move beyond simple acts of transgression and lay bare the obscene hidden rules of modern liberal-democratic power. He claims, “Whistleblowers do something much more important than stating the obvious by way of denouncing the openly oppressive regimes: they render public the unfreedom that underlies the very situation in which we experience ourselves as free” (Zizek 2014: unpaginated). Further, Zizek (2014: unpaginated) argues,

Assange designated himself a ‘spy for the people’. ‘Spying for the people’ is not a simple betrayal (which would instead mean acting as a double agent, selling our secrets to the enemy); it is something much more radical. It undermines the very principle of spying, the principle of secrecy, since its goal is to make secrets public. People who help WikiLeaks are no longer whistleblowers who denounce the illegal practices of private companies (banks, and tobacco and oil companies) to the public authorities; they denounce to the wider public these public authorities themselves.

More recently in the lead up to the 2017 US elections, Zizek publically announced that if he were a US citizen then he would vote for Donald Trump. In a direct link to over-identification, Zizek claimed during an interview with Channel 4, “In every society there is a whole network of unwritten rules, how politics work and how you build consensus. Trump disturbed this”. As highlighted earlier, this announcement predictably received heavy criticism, however, the logic is consistent with that of Wikileaks (that is with a politics of over-identification): the election of Donald Trump made public the otherwise obscene, hidden underside of liberal-democratic capitalism. Perhaps the unfortunate thing for Trump and his supporters is that rather than undermining the neoliberal establishment, his actions may make it even stronger. For example, Zizek (1997:27) argues “unmediated identification with the phantasmatic superego machine necessarily leads to a murderous passage a l’acte”. The point is not to give up and simply participate in the superego injunction to Enjoy, as this is an even stronger support for power, but to do the opposite (Zizek 1997). That is, one should seek to bring out the obscene underside of power not to for the purposes of enabling one to keep acting in accordance with it publically, but to use it to undermine power.

One could perhaps extend this analysis to Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. According to some commentators, it was not climate change denial that was the reason Trump advanced for withdrawing the US from the Paris accord, but rather because he felt that the agreement was bad for the US and implicitly unfair to it (Stiglitz 2017). In the context of this paper, one could argue that Trump has, once again, simply

1 See “Slavoj Zizek would vote for Trump”, Zizek.uk, http://zizek.uk/slavoj-zizek-would-vote-for-trump/
identified with the obscene underside of the Paris Agreement. For example, while positive assessments of the Agreement tend to emphasise the fact that it represents “the greatest success ever achieved by way of a multilateral approach to international problem solving” (Falk 2017: unpaginated) others emphasise how the non-binding Paris Agreement is ‘toothless’ and serving to undermine the rights of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable communities (Baselala 2015). Indeed, a close friend and colleague of mine who supports the Paris Agreement once described it to me as a ‘lowest common denominator agreement’ based on ‘no real appetite for mandating State parties reduce emissions’, and a ‘fall-back position’ with no requirement for state parties to actually meet the targets they set. He even concedes that under the Agreement, a state party could ‘do whatever it likes with regard to fossil fuels and domestic regulations, even increase emissions’. By withdrawing from the Paris Agreement in favour of rebuilding US industry, Trump has made public this disavowed underside of the multilateral agreement. Indeed, a similar point was made by Richard Denniss who claims that Donald Trump is more honest about climate inaction than the Australian Prime Minister. Denniss (2017: unpaginated) aptly describes the inherent transgression when he laments, “Trump shows his contempt for the world's problems by withdrawing from a global agreement on the basis that he doesn't think it's in his nation's interest, while Turnbull shows his contempt by remaining in that same agreement while funding the construction of a new coal mine that will still operate in 2080”. While for most of us Trumps actions rub against the grain of our environmental sensibilities, Jebediah Purdy (2017: unpaginated) rightly points out, “The odd thing is that Trump’s announcement that the United States will pull out of the 2015 Paris climate accord, while it is surely bad news, might also be a productive wake-up call for climate politics”.

**Going to the end**

There are three additional points to highlight in supporting a politics of over-identification as a strategy for political transformation. The first is Zizek’s emphasis on the gap that separates the content of the enunciated and the position of enunciation. Zizek makes this distinction in the context of over-identification in his writing on religion, particularly in distinguishing between Jewish and Christian religions. For Zizek, Judaism is an example of insisting on the letter of the law by ignoring the superego transgressive desire. However, Zizek (2000a: 143) points out that because Jewish obedience to the Law is not mediated by the repressed desire to sin, “they can stick to the letter of the Law and nonetheless find ways of realising their desire without any guilt feelings”. That is they can engage in transgressions of the law without the associated feelings of guilt and, subsequently, continue to obscure the void at the heart of power. In contrast, Christianity for Zizek occupies the place of the excess
or incompleteness of power, identifying with it through Christ. However, rather than choosing one over the other, Zizek (2001: 141) argues,

In order to get at jouissance outside the Law, not tainted by the obscene superego supplement of the Law, the Law itself has first to be delivered from the grip of jouissance. The position to adopt between Judaism and Christianity is thus not simply to give preference to one of them, even less to opt for a kind of pseudo-dialectical synthesis, but to introduce the gap between the enunciated content and the position of enunciation: as to the content of the belief, one should be a Jew, while retaining the Christian position of enunciation.

That is, one should over-identify with power, inclusive of its concealed underside of obscene enjoyment, but do so from the position of the incompleteness of power, of its excess. In other words, it is necessary to initially identify with the obscene underside of power, but one must take a step further and insist that this inherent transgression is not an aberration of power but its ultimate support. This latter component leads us to another form of ‘identification’ in Zizek’s work, namely identification with the symptom of the social order. For example, he writes that the Christian uncoupling that suspends the law is done so from the formal position of the outcasts from the social order. He adds further that this Christian uncoupling of agape is different from an approach that seeks to humanize the other beneath their socio-symbolic mask (Zizek 2001) in that it seeks a ‘symbolic death’ in which one erases the traces of one’s past and beginning afresh from a zero-point (Zizek 2000a). Zizek (2000a) links this uncoupling to the inherent transgression/superego, when he writes “the proper Christian uncoupling suspends not so much the explicit laws but, rather, their implicit spectral obscene supplement”. Or in other words, it involves precisely the suspension of the viscous cycle, or ideological deadlock, of Law and its transgressive desire (2000a).

Therefore, Zizek (1991: 140) claims,

“identification with the symptom’ is correlated with ‘going through the fantasy’: by means of such an identification with the social symptom, we traverse and subvert the fantasy frame that determines the field of meaning…ie, the frame within which, precisely, the ‘symptom’ appears as some alien, disturbing intrusion, and not as the point of eruption of the otherwise hidden truth of the existing social order”.

Therefore a politics of over-identification only represents the first step in the transformation of society. Consistent with Zizek’s emphasis on the Hegelian notion of ‘negation of negation’, over-identification represents the first negation which takes place within the existing
coordinates of the symbolic order, while the second reconfigures the very coordinates of the symbolic order. In addition to the point above about identification with the social symptom, Zizek later asserts that identification with the symptom, those whom power excludes, does not go far enough. Rather, at best, it stops at a hysterical form of resistance to power and at worst it preys on the suffering. Zizek (2000a: 125) emphasises this point when he writes that acting in solidarity with the oppressed “should not turn into perversion in which we love the lowest outcast because he is the lowest outcast (thus secretly wanting him to remain so) – in this way, we do not actually ‘unplug’ from the hierarchic social order, but merely turn it around, set it on its head, and thus parasitize on it”. Indeed, Zizek(1999: 234) claims “What power refuses to see is not so much the (non) part of the ‘people’ excluded from the political space, but rather the invisible support of its own public police apparatus”, thereby emphasising the need to go beyond identification with the excluded. In a statement that resonates strongly in today’s political climate, he highlights how,

“we should not forget that the series of publicly invisible agents leading a spectral half-existence includes, among others, the entire white supremacist underground. So the problem is not simply the marginal who lead the spectral half-existence of those excluded by the hegemonic symbolic regime; the problem is that this regime itself, in order to survive, has to rely on a whole gamut of mechanisms whose status is spectral, disavowed, excluded from the public domain (Zizek 2000c: 313).”

This point was apparent during a June 2017 episode of BBC’s Hard Talk, in which the interviewer made the claim that Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump were both appealing to the same ‘working class excess’ of the prevailing US system. The point to make is yes, this was the case, the working class poor are the excess of the US capitalism, however the politics of each candidate, or the way this excess is explained and mobilised politically, is the key difference. For Trump the explanation follows a ‘racist’ ideology grounded in a populist ‘us versus them’ mentality – that is, the reason for the plight of the working class is the immigrants, or the policies of the previous government, the establishment etc, all of which are opposed to Trump’s populist ‘Make America Great Again’. In contrast, Hilary Clinton and the broader liberal left explain the plight of the working class as an issue of human rights and liberal freedoms that are threatened by populist authoritarianism of Trump, thereby obscuring the excess position of the working class. The opportunity missed by Sanders on this occasions was to emphasise how his own politics was different than both Trump and Clinton. An opportunity missed not only during this interview, but also following his loss in the Democratic primaries. The point to stress is that identification with the symptom is not enough as it fails to ‘shift the underground’ or disturb power’s hidden link with its own
disavowed obscene supplement, or power’s inherent transgression. In order to ‘go to the end’ one must sacrifice the symptom itself and make a second negation in which the social coordinates which keep the social outcasts as such is dismantled. That is, “one bears witness to one’s fidelity to the Thing by sacrificing (also) the Thing itself” (2000a: 154).

The third and final point is that Zizek has emphasised on a number of occasions that a rupture or opening which provides the opportunity to begin again can emerge from a range of different interventions, not just a deliberate organised political intervention. For example, such openings can occur as a result of an election, war, military coup and so on. While this does not in any way mean we should not seek to engage in actions that force a rupture of the existing social order, it does mean that we must also be attentive to capitalise on alternative opportunities when they emerge. Zizek (2002a: 11) makes this point in his endorsement of Lenin whose fundamental experience was that of “being thrown into a catastrophic new constellation beyond his attempts to organize a revolutionary movement in which the old coordinates proved useless, and who was thus compelled to reinvent Marxism”. As he explains, “Through this moment of despair, the Lenin who, via a close reading of Hegel’s Logic, was able to discern the unique chance for revolution was born” (Zizek 2002a: 4). It is in this context that Zizek rightly asserts that there is no ‘ripe moment’ for the revolution, that there are no neutral objective conditions. However what the preceding discussion indicates is that there is nonetheless a moment in which an intervention could exploit the presence of a short circuit or rupture, steering it in favour of the direction of revolution. The point to emphasise is that this ‘moment’ in no way guarantees the outcome of the intervention. It is nothing more than an opening, an opportunity. Zizek discusses this moment with reference to what Lukacs called ‘Augenblick’ (the moment when, briefly, there is an opening for an act to intervene in a situation) as “the art of seizing the right moment, of aggravating the conflict before the System can accommodate to our demand” (2001). In this way, Zizek emphasises how the real hard work awaits us on the morning after, once the enthusiastic revolutionary explosion is over, and we are confronted with the task of translating this explosion into a new Order of Things, of drawing the consequences from it, of remaining faithful to it” (2002b: 135).

To return to the Trump example, we can therefore suggest that from the position of enunciation of the liberal-democratic capitalism, “Trump” represents a totalitarian threat to our multicultural, tolerant way of life. Rather than recognising the short circuit created by the election of Trump, the resistance offered by the liberal Left seeks to undo that negation in the name of the threatened liberal democratic capitalist order. In contrast, from the position of the void of liberal democratic capitalism (which in the positive social space is represented
by the social outcasts who embody the excess enjoyment of liberal democratic capitalism) “Trump” represents liberal democratic capitalism in its entirety, with its hidden, obscene underside brought out into the open. The next necessary step for effecting social transformation is not to undo the negation of the liberal democratic capitalist order “Trump” represents, but to rather negate this negation by “going to the end”. Or, as Zizek explains it in Hegelese, “The Spirit heals its wound not by directly healing it, but by getting rid of the very Body into which the wound was cut” (2005: xxx).

This discussion on the position of enunciation, decoupling and going to the end perhaps enables us to see Zizek’s recent commentaries as not simply a return to over-identification, but rather as a reflection of the dynamism within his extensive theoretical exegesis on breaking the ideological deadlock in order to effect political transformation. Indeed, it would be unfair to discuss Zizek’s endorsement of the election of Donald Trump without reference to his comments following Bernie Sanders defeat in the Democratic primaries and subsequent endorsement of Clinton. Zizek (2016: unpaginated) claimed, 

“Unfortunately Trump hit the mark when he compared his [Sanders] endorsement of Hilary to an Occupy partisan endorsing Lehman Brothers. Sanders should just withdraw and retain a dignified silence so that his absence would weigh heavily over the Hilary celebrations, reminding us of what is missing, and, in this way, keep the space open for more radical alternatives in the future”

Therefore, the apparent ‘return to a politics of over-identification’ is perhaps not so much a return, as it is a reminder of the need for constant vigilance demanded by the contingent nature of seizing the ‘right moment’ for political transformation. As Zizek (2017: 87) explained most recently, “one should look around for any place, any particular struggle, where there is a chance…for moments which may trigger what you call the return of history, and which may open up the way for a true political event”. In this way I suggest that Bartleby politics perhaps serves as Zizek’s master signifier for his tactical approaches to political transformation. That is, Bartleby serves as the position of enunciation, the place from which we look and act, while the other approaches refer to the content of our enunciation, of how we act (inclusive of Bartleby’s ‘I’d prefer not to’) in order to start the process of political transformation.
References


