Retroactive Temporality. The Logic of Jazz Improvisation read through Žižek’s Hegel

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Abstract

The paper offers a reconstruction of the logics of jazz improvisation that is drawing on Žižek's Work on Hegel. A basic concept of Žižek's reading of Hegel consists in the concept of Retroactivity as the temporality that is characteristic of what Hegel understands as the development of history. The logic of retroactivity cannot be understood in terms of a classical teleological account but rather draws upon the idea of incommensurable events: Each historical situation is presupposing its own preconditions in a way that the contingent is transformed into necessity. The paper discusses the structure of the temporality of jazz in such a way that it can be informed by Žižek’s thoughts on the temporal logic of history.

Key Words: Hegel; Retroactivity; Jazz; Improvisation; Time
Characteristic of Slavoj Žižek’s thinking is not only his extensive interpretation of the philosophy of Lacan and Hegel, but also his distinctive relation to art. In the important fourth chapter of his Hegel book *Less than Nothing*, he quotes literary writers to illustrate the idea of a retroactive positioning of one’s own presuppositions (c.f. Žižek 2012: 208ff). In his view, these writers such as T.S. Eliot and J.L. Borges articulate insights in a Hegelian vein when they stress the dynamic and changing character of the literary tradition when seen through the emergence of new writers and styles. Besides literature, film is among the art form Žižek discusses the most (e.g. c.f. Žižek 2001). And music (c.f. Žižek and Dolar 2002).

In what follows my aim is not to comment on Žižek’s existing works on music but rather to draw upon his interpretation of Hegel to shed light on a musical art form Žižek doesn`t speak of himself: jazz music. The most striking aspect of this musical art form is probably its improvisation. I will develop an understanding of the temporal logic of improvisation in terms of retroactivity that is sympathetic to what Žižek develops in his reading of Hegel. In a sense, such a retroactive temporality for Žižek’s Hegel does apply to all artistic phenomena – and even to reality in general. In working out the retroactive logic of jazz improvisation in this way I don`t claim to name a feature that is exclusive to jazz improvisation. What I rather claim is that what is implicit in most other musical and artistic practices is explicit in jazz music (c.f. Feige 2014). Jazz music is an art form in which aspects of art in general are explicit. I will develop this thought in two steps. In a first step (i) I will briefly comment on three features of jazz music I hold to be central for this music: improvisation, interaction and intensity. In the second step (ii) I will then focus my attention on the element of improvisation and show that it is determined by a retroactive logic in the vein of how Žižek’s Hegel understands thus logic.

Three essential features of jazz music

When one says that jazz improvisation is determined by a retroactive logic one clearly makes the supposition that there is a certain kind of music that can be distinguished from other kinds of music. In what follows, I would like to name and describe three characteristic features of jazz music: namely, improvisation, interaction and intensity (for a more detailed analysis c.f. Feige 2014b). In the spirit of Žižek’s reading Hegel, I understand these three
aspects not in terms of a definition of jazz; it is not the case that something is a jazz
performance if and only if it exemplifies improvisation, interaction and intensity understood as
solely necessary and jointly sufficient features. Nor do I understand these features within the
frame of thought that one could call Aristotelian. An Aristotelian conception of something
being something proposes to understand that there is an internal measure of goodness for
this something as the thing it is. Defining jazz in an Aristotelian manner thus entails an
internal normative standard for jazz performances being jazz performances: there are
full-fledged jazz performances meeting this standard and there are jazz performances that
are privative with regard to this standard to different degrees. Whereas the problem with a
classical definition is that it is an external account of jazz, the problem with an Aristotelian
deinition is the idea of a standard of excellence that is given before we judge the singular
jazz performances. As Hegel insisted and as Žižek reminds us, we have to think the
development of something in history not as unfolding of a pre-existing meaning, but rather as
a series of disruptions. When a jazz performance artistically succeeds it always brings about
its own criteria of evaluation that are not deducible from criteria brought about by former jazz
performances. Unlike an explanation of disruptions within a historicist frame of thought –
Žižek speaks of “mobilism” (Žižek 2012: 193; in the Philosophy of Science Thomas S. Kuhn’s
position would probably qualify as being mobilistic; c.f. Kuhn 1962: Chapter X) – a dialectical
account of disruption thinks of any disruption as being related to former disruption. To put it
more precisely: Every event inscribes itself into a series of former events and at the same
time reorganizes the meaning of those former events. In short: Those conceptual features of
Jazz music I discuss here structurally follow the same logics of retroaction that governs jazz
improvisations. I will say more on this topic in the second part of the paper.

Three essential features of jazz music in the sense outlined above are improvisation
(a), interaction (b) and intensity (c). First a few remarks on improvisation (a). I will discuss
improvisation here only in contrast to the practice of interpreting musical works in the
tradition of European art music, whereas I will characterize musical improvisation positively in
the second part of this paper. Although the difference may not always be clear-cut and
although there are philosophers and musicologists who propose to reject it or at least to blur
the lines (c.f. Gould and Keaton 2000; for a detailed discussion of the difference c.f. Brown
2011), it is initially plausible to categorically distinguish between a musical improvisation and
an interpretation of a musical work. Even though musical improvisation has been an integral
part of musical practice in the tradition of European art music up until the emergence and rise
of the work-paradigm (for an account of the emergence of this paradigm c.f. Goehr 1992),
one cannot make an argument out of this. Even though musical improvisation lives on in
sacred music and can be found in some areas of contemporary music, it is most notably linked to jazz music today. Even if it is true that musical interpretations of musical works are as interpretations also concrete spatiotemporal events, musical improvisations are so to speak mere spatiotemporal events. In the case of the musical interpretation, there is a work that precedes that interpretation. By contrast, in the case of musical improvisation, the work is what has musically been done during a specific duration at a specific place.\(^1\) Insofar as in the case of the interpretation of a musical work we have to separate the work from the interpretation, one can easily see by this fact that we can judge an interpretation of a work to be bad without judging the work itself to be bad.\(^2\) By contrast this difference doesn`t makes sense with regard to jazz improvisations: The object of appreciation here is the musical spatiotemporal event itself and not a musical spatiotemporal event understood in terms of an interpretation of a musical work. Of course some musical performances in jazz have to be understood as works – one can think of the big-band music of Duke Ellington, Maria Schneider or Bob Mintzer. This fact doesn`t contradict the idea of improvisation being an essential feature of jazz music because I am not trying to give a strict definition of jazz – a plan that is not only impossible but also not apt as I have claimed (for arguments in favour of the impossibility of such a definition in a Wittgensteinian spirit c.f. Hagberg 2002: 190ff). But even playing those works normally works differently than with what it means to interpret a work in the tradition of European art music. Even if there might be straight-forward-cases of works in Jazz music, namely in the area between avant-garde jazz and contemporary music in the tradition of European art music, the aesthetic point of the music of the three musicians mentioned above does consist in something that is solely present in the musical performances itself. In other words: Faithfulness to the work might not be an aesthetically relevant category with regard to jazz music and most composers for Big band music in jazz history didn`t hesitate to alter their works if they didn`t work well and weren`t especially interested in finding the definitive form of something like a work (c.f. Kania 2011: 397). Most of jazz music can do without works anyway. Contrary to what one might think, this even holds true for playing so-called jazz standards – an utmost important practice in jazz music. Standards are the name of the dynamic canon of jazz, which consists of appropriated tunes from Broadway shows, pop music and a lot of original compositions by jazz musicians. What has been composed there are nevertheless not works. If one works with notations in playing standards those notations are mere lead sheets: We find some indications of the melody, of harmonic progressions and probably of vamps or similar things if they are characteristic for the tune in question. But lead sheets are not scores (c.f. Hagberg 2002: 189f). Nothing notated in a lead sheet allows for a decision with regard to the question whether the musical performance is a musical performance that is an interpretation of a standard. Because
standards are no works; lead sheets don’t define criteria that have to be met for a musical performance to be an instantiation of a musical work. One has even to say that what it means to play the standard good cannot be said ahead – in a temporal and logical sense – the respective improvisation. This is the case because every good improvisation so to say reinvents the standard in question. Neither the harmonic progression nor the key nor the style nor the rhythm and not even the melody are sacrosanct. To put it in different words: Whatever is a constitutive aspect of the standard in question is worked out in and through the process of an aesthetic valuable improvisation. Musical improvisation thus differs from musical interpretation in the respect that musical improvisation produces unrepeatable spatiotemporal musical events that in and through the process of improvisation establish their own criteria of evaluation. Because of this autopoietic, self-generating logic the category of error has to be treated differently in jazz improvisation compared to interpretations of works in the tradition of European art music: Whereas I obviously make a mistake if I play different notes than those notated in the score – even if one has to note that the more interesting mistakes in a musical interpretation of musical works are not technical or similar mistakes but rather aesthetic mistakes – the case in jazz improvisation is different: A mistake in a jazz improvisation is a mistake that remains a mistake at the end of the improvisation (c.f. Bertinetto 2014). Why this is the case I will explain in the second part of this paper.

Alongside improvisation, interaction (b) is an essential feature of jazz music. Many jazz musicians as well as some philosophers have tried to explain jazz as a certain kind of artistic language (c.f. Kraut 2005). This obviously cannot mean that jazz improvisation exhibits a syntax and semantic as natural languages do. This analogy is rather drawn between jazz improvisation and certain performative dimensions of speech – like the gestural moments exhibited in acts of speaking and the unity and flow or the missing unity or stalling of acts of speaking. Another fruitful analogy is the constitutive collective character of language: For something to be a language it has to be understandable by others and translatable into their own idioms (c.f. Davidson 1991). Thus holding a monologue presupposes a socialisation into a common language practice – not only with regard to what it means for the expressions of this language to be understandable but also with regard to practices like holding monologues. The practice of solo improvisation is thus a practice that presupposes a musical socialisation in terms of collective and shared practices. There is another dimension of language that is even more important as a paradigm for understanding jazz improvisation – a dimension that can shed light even on solo improvisations: The genuinely dialogical character of language (c.f. Gadamer 2004: Part III). The paradigm even of the solo improvisation is the group improvisation. In solo improvisation one musician has internalized
and embodies so to say the roles of different musicians alone: With a certain musical move he objects and rejects something he has done before, with another move he emphasizes and reinforces something he has done before, even with another move he renders former moves ambiguous. Playing a standard collectively where the different musicians play solos after each other also has to be understood in terms of the paradigm of group improvisation. This is the case because the musicians who accompany the soloist do more and a different thing than just providing a mere passive background for the soloist. Even the accompaniment of a soloist on a harmony instrument is itself a mode of group improvisation understood as the collective improvisation of all musicians at one and the same time. This is because what the player on a harmony instrument does is to actively react to the moves of the soloist. One should thus not talk about the soloist improvising and the accompanying musicians not improvising but rather say that the accompanying musicians lower their voices in favour of the articulateness of the voice of the soloing musician. In short: Accompaniment and soloing are two different modes of group improvisation that are thoroughly interactive. From the essentially interactive nature of jazz music and from the fact that the temporality of jazz improvisation is always a shared temporality, some philosophers have concluded that jazz improvisation has a genuinely ethical dimension (c.f. Hagberg 2008). It is at least true that all musicians share a collective responsibility for the musical performance they participate in: Its success depends on the responsive articulations of all musicians involved. The contributions of all musicians involved thus are not contributions that can be isolated in an atomistic way with regard to the success of the performance as a whole. Rather the articulation of each singular musician is sublated in the aesthetic unity of the whole performance – without being neutralized as articulations of singular musicians. Thus the singular musician is not only responsible for his own playing but also for the playing of all other musicians.

In addition to improvisation and interaction intensity (c) has to be mentioned as the third essential feature of jazz music. Intensity can be understood in two ways concerning jazz music. On the one hand, it can refer to the manifest rhythmic properties of jazz music. Swing rhythm has been considered as a particularly striking feature of jazz music.³ Jazz music swinging means that the individual eighth notes are played somewhere between equally long played eighth notes and a dotted eighth note and a sixteenth note. One would be wrong however to think that the notes are played on the first and the third of a quaver triplet. Whoever plays like this probably plays a shuffle groove but is not swinging. The aesthetic point of swing rhythm rather is that not only does every experienced jazz musician place the corresponding eighth notes rhythmically at slightly different places depending on the phrase he is playing and the context of the phrase. It is also and mainly that every experienced jazz
musician has his own particular way of swinging; already on the level of the way they swing Thelonious Monk, Bill Evans, Herbie Hancock and Chick Corea massively differ. Thus it is not without irony that Adorno accused jazz of having a formulaic rhythm with just the pretence of subjective articulations (c.f. Adorno 2002 and Adorno 2002b). Not only does the concept of syncopation not describe what rhythmically happens in jazz, but Adorno was not able to hear and note that experienced jazz musicians develop the rhythmic quality of this music each in their own way. And he was also not able to hear that swing rhythm aesthetically has to be experienced as a paradoxical interlocking of tenseness and relaxation. But referring to swing rhythm is just one way of explicating the intensity of jazz music. Even if swing rhythm might be a sufficient feature of jazz music – something that swings entails that the music in question has to be regarded as jazz music – it is of course not a necessary feature of jazz music. Jazz operates with swing rhythms as well as with the rhythms of Bossa Nova; it operates with the Rhythms of Rhythm 'n' Blues as well as with the rhythms of rock music and today – if one thinks of the development of Nordic jazz scene – even with the rhythms of drum 'n' bass and house. It is thus not the case that the rock grooves migrating into jazz music in the fusion-era of the 1970s can be understood as a special case of swing rhythm – rather swing rhythm as well as those rock rhythms are a special case of something that is more generally characteristic of jazz music: that the rhythmic dimension of this music is governed by a logic of improvisation that entails a close relationship of this music to the moment of its execution.

These considerations have shown that even interaction and intensity as essential features of jazz music are governed by the logic of improvisation: The interactive aspects of jazz and its rhythmic intensity have ultimately to be understood as dimensions that participate and intensify the relatedness of jazz music to the moment of its execution. In what follows I now want positively to lay open the structure of improvisation – and I will show that it is governed by a logic for which Žižek’s Hegel has coined the term retroactivity.

**The retroactive temporality of jazz improvisation**

To understand the logic of jazz improvisation, it might in a first step be helpful to describe the beginning of a jazz improvisation phenomenologically from the perspective of the improvising musician. If I solo on a jazz standard, I might take the melody as a starting point and change either its rhythm or singular tones or both, or I might transpose the initial melodic idea into different keys and gradually also alter its rhythmic organisation. In a way,
one could say I start with a musical idea and then after transforming and evolving it in different directions I come to a new musical idea that I then transform and evolve in different directions. But I could also start my improvisation by starting with a completely different melodic line than the one associated with the standard – for example, a melody line of another standard, a phrase another musician just played – and develop it likewise. But I could also toss a completely different kind of musical idea into the ring – for example, I could concentrate on a certain rhythmic idea and thus accentuate the rhythmic dimension over the melodic development. Or else I could start by concentrating less on rhythmic or melodic ideas and more on certain aspects of the sound of the chords I play. Of course, all those kinds of beginnings are not mutually exclusive. They are not the only possible principles of starting an improvisation. On the contrary: What I aim at is the idea that the whole talk about possibilities is flawed with regard to jazz improvisation because it implies a kind of mechanist logic, in which the actualizations of possibilities are actualizations that actualize something that beforehand is given as something finished. One remark on this phenomenological beginning: Of course I don’t claim that a jazz musician has the thought he is doing this or that when he is playing. When he starts with an melodic idea or a rhythmic idea or a sound idea, he normally is not thinking in and during the improvisation and also not beforehand or afterwards something like “Now I begin with a melody, then I go on to transform it in this or that direction”, “I now vary the rhythm”, “I now explore the sound aspects of the chords”. Of course, a jazz musician knows all that – but it is practical knowledge that it is knowledge embodied in the musician’s musical movements and gestures, not a knowledge embodied in sentences about these movements and gestures. Even if the musician could describe his practice in the form of propositional sentences, the practice itself of course does not embody such a form. In short: The kind of knowledge I am talking about is not a knowledge that is embodied in the practice of talking but rather in the practice of musical improvising (c.f. Thompson 2008: Part two).

Whatever the improvising musician might begin with and however the musician might go on from here – the important thing about the temporality of jazz improvisation is the fact that the beginning does not determine the possibilities of how to go on. This holds true for every move of a jazz improvisation; no musical move determines the possibilities of the future moves. The beginning of a jazz improvisation thus does not specify how the further course of the improvisation will or has to look like; if a musician has his next moves mechanically or algorithmically derived from the beginning, he is doing something else than improvising precisely because the jazz musician is not someone who acts on behalf of a mechanism or algorithm. Rather every new musical move within a musical improvisation has
the character of an event with regard to the former moves. For something to be an event, it is constitutive that it is not possible to integrate it in a pre-existing order. Rather it is something that interrupts a pre-existing order neither being exterior to it nor being inherent prior to it. Rather an event is an event because it re-organizes a pre-existing order: it inscribes itself into in that order so every former event in a series of former events is retrospectively redetermined. Thus one has to think about the beginning of a jazz improvisation and the further moves of it not in terms of the beginning affording certain further moves. It is rather the other way around: The sense of the beginning is redetermined and worked out in and through every further move. The Beginning does not determine what happens next, but what happens next determines what the beginning will have been. If I go on developing a rhythmic idea after an initial phrase I played or if I go on developing a harmonic idea after this phrase, the meaning of the sense will have changed. It is precisely the phrase it is just through the further musical movements. Thus the meaning of the beginning has to be understood from the end; the aesthetic point of each musical move is renegotiated in every further musical move. It is thus not paradoxical to say that it is only when an improvisation has come to an end that we know what the beginning was.

The jazz pianist Bill Evans thus rightly characterized the temporality of jazz improvisation in terms of a retrospective model in contrast to a blueprint model (c.f. Gioia 1987: Part iv): In jazz improvisation, the singular musical moves are not governed by a blueprint given beforehand the improvisatory process, but rather every new musical move works out, determines and at the same time recreates all previously established moves. One could speak of a temporal holism of jazz improvisation (for the notion of holism c.f. Quine 1961): The meaning of each move depends on all moves happening later. Within the scope of this description one can see what is wrong about the common idea of jazz improvisation being a mere recombination of previously given elements. Of course there are jazz musicians who practise melodic phrases in all keys. And there is nothing wrong with that. But a description at least of a good jazz improvisation in terms of a mere recombination of previously given material is the wrong description, even if it is not a logically impossible description. Rather a jazz improvisation is a reinvention of such material in and through the process of improvisation – again if it is a good jazz improvisation. A description of a jazz improvisation in terms of a recombination of pre-existing licks is no longer an aesthetic description because it misunderstands the constitution of artistic material in terms of mere given material. In other words: Such a description is an external description of aesthetic objects and it is quite unclear what this description actually has to do with these objects. By contrast to the idea that a jazz improvisation can be measured beforehand as a given set of
material and its development, it rather has to be measured by what the jazz improvisation in question actually develops internally. There is something inherently ridiculous about the idea of judging the way John Coltrane is playing by criteria developed with regard to Charlie Parker’s playing, just as there is something ridiculous about the idea of judging Schoenberg’s compositions according to the criteria one judges Brahms’. In short: Not only the aesthetic success of a jazz improvisation is negotiated through the course of the improvisation but also the criteria that are at stake in judging what it means for a jazz improvisation to be aesthetically successful.

The reconstruction I just proposed of course has one blind spot: It sounds too much like that there is no connection between different jazz improvisations. This is wrong: Just as Schoenberg is in a certain way in a tradition of Brahms, so Coltrane is in a certain way in a tradition of Parker. In establishing an autonomous aesthetic order in and through the process of improvising or in and through the process of composing, they at the same time respond in and through such earlier establishments. This mustn’t be understood as a conscious process in all cases: Whatever I am doing in jazz improvisation; whether I like it or not and whether I know it or not, my way of playing is always answering former playing – this is an important aspect of what it means to be a jazz improver in contrast to other kinds of improvisers. If we think of this relation to former improvisations not as process of unfolding a former given logic or a monotonous reproduction of the same but in terms of events that reorganize what has been done before, we have to put into question the assumption that there could ever be an end of the aesthetic meaning of a jazz improvisation. So that this is not misunderstood: jazz improvisations normally have a specific duration and aesthetically can become irrelevant. But the meaning of a jazz improvisation is not something that is finished once the improvisation is finished: Aesthetic successful jazz improvisations constitute their own predecessors in the way that they work out their meaning anew. Thus the end of the improvisation is not the end of its meaning. Rather the relation of the individual improvisations is governed by the same retroactive logic like the singular moves of an improvisation. Thus the logic of improvisation I just worked out also applies to the history of improvisations; early recordings of Wayne Shorter got a different meaning in the light of his the later development of his style; in the light of the way John Scofield plays Miles Davis play start to sound different – and that not only because they played together. In short: The determinateness of a jazz improvisation is an indeterminate determinateness. To speak of indeterminacy in this context of course mustn’t be understood as an epistemic lack on our side. Rather this indeterminate determinateness is an ontological indeterminacy of the objects themselves.
The retroactive temporality I just developed can be understood as the logical principle Žižek’s Hegel claims to be a structural element of reality in general: what we refer to in our thinking and judging is something that we set as our own presuppositions (c.f. already Žižek 1993: Chapter 4). To say it again: This idea mustn’t be misconstrued in a subjectivist way. It is not the case that reality is the product of our subjective – or collective – projection on it. Rather reality itself exemplifies such a structure and dynamic. Preconditions as necessary preconditions are not something that is just given before they are discovered. Discovering them in and through an event that is always contingent with respect to an established series of events is itself an event insofar it is constitutive for a precondition to be a precondition. Thus Žižek’s Hegel tries to conceive of necessity as something that is no longer the opposite of contingency – as something that underlies contingent process and always stays the same. Rather necessity is something that is itself infused with contingency – and thus necessity is something that is a mode of becoming rather than a mode of being; the being of necessity is becoming.

In Hegel’s Science of Logic this kind of structure is already in play at the beginning of the logic of being (c.f. Hegel 2010). Hegel’s book offers a reconstruction of the fundamental categories of our thinking, which are also understood as the basic categories of reality (also in a common sense view this idea could be a lot less controversial than it sounds at first; c.f. McDowell 1996: 2.9). The logic of being begins with general concepts that are seemingly basic and all other concepts build upon them. Hegel, however, shows that the situation is quite the opposite: What at first seems to be the basis of all further concepts reveals itself to be a presupposition that is posited in and through the further conceptual developments. Being and nothingness are those first concepts. They are to be understood as pure without further definition. But understood this way, being and nothingness are indiscernible: nothingness is being and being is nothingness. They become separate only from the perspective of becoming: what was is no longer and what was not now is. The difference between being and nothingness thus is a product of a shift into a higher and new conceptual level. Only when being has passed into nothingness and nothingness has passed into being, only insofar being and nothingness are sublated into becoming, can they be understood as distinct – as well as united in their distinctiveness. The lesson of this first movement of the logic of being goes as follows: what seemingly is a simple premise of thinking we can find as something presupposed turns out to be something that is set by us that only becomes transparent from a later logical point of view. There is no being and nothingness before becoming; but once we think under the condition of becoming we have to separate both because they are essential moments of becoming. Even if the beginning of the logic of being
cannot be interpreted as the development of something in the sense of historical content – the whole science of logic rather is the enterprise to try to grasp the development of content itself – the just developed logic has to be regarded as a core moment of what it means to propose a dialectical conception of history: what at first seems to be a given presupposition proves to be a presupposition that is not given but set.

This kind of temporal structure that Žižek names retroactivity governs jazz improvisation in an explicit way. This doesn't entail that jazz music is aesthetically more important than other kinds of music. But it entails that this kind of music is philosophically of major significance because it shows a structural aspect of reality in an explicit way, whereas this aspect is implicit in most other kinds of music.

**References**


**Notes**

1 Of course musical improvisation normally draws on capacities the improvisers have obtained during long years of study. But what we evaluate if we evaluate a musical improvisation is not this process of obtaining such capacities but rather the musical event itself.

2 The relation between works and their interpretation is nevertheless complicated. I have argued elsewhere for the view that the aesthetic meaning of a musical work is developed in and through the tradition of its interpretation. Judging an interpretation to be bad and the work itself to be good thus has to be understood in terms of relying not to a work-entity that precedes the interpretation as a kind of platonic entity but rather to rely on other interpretations in the history of interpretations of the work in question. Thus when we judge a work in contrast to its interpretation such a judgment takes place on the background of different interpretations of this work (c.f. Feige 2014: 81ff.).

3 Not to be confused with „Swing“ understood as a specific style of jazz emerging in the 1930s.

4 Of course this does not refute Adorno’s objection to jazz music insofar it still could be possible that the aesthetic autonomy of those articulations is illusory and in fact just follows the logic of products of the cultural industry. The only thing I wanted to show here is that already the concepts Adorno uses to describe swing rhythm are inadequate (for a more detailed and a more far reaching critique of Adorno’s critique of jazz c.f. Brown 1992 and Bertram 2014).

5 That of course is only one possibility of understanding events; the analytical and post analytical tradition has understood events as the name of a mere ontological category amongst other ontological categories like properties (c.f. Feige 2010).